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Abstract
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Despite a grovdng interest in Censervatiea in recent years,
rfilsxtlrelj littls has been done (apart frt-s? the work ©f Frank
Meyer and Russell Kirk) to deal viith ConservatiEia afs a philos&phy
with clearly-defined principles Kcparate frea an adherence to
the staitufc'-qua. Thle disjsertatisn endeavsrs; to laake a start
at correcting this lack, and ir. addition f.eoks t® point 0ut the
existence and aaj«r ter.'ifcs ®r tv.'^. tm doaiaant straujas ef Coa-
sarvatirs thought
•
These tw© currf-r-te of Cfifnservatisa received their genesis
jifi organised philosop!iie« (Canservatlsm k.ad prerigusly existed
in as unerganised, often teBtperaatirtal , fashion.) in the political
philessphie.- »f Edaiund Burke and Jcsaph d© Kaistre* Though these
thinkeris are both Coaservatires, a^reein^; as they da on such
key principles ©f Conservative pailosfrphy as the ejiistence ©f
a chjingelftss and knowable acral ls7/,. the fallibility cf aian and
ef huican reason, the need ©f Kan t© be treated as a social beins,
thc> danger of abstract rationalism, and the need to be very cautious
ill carrying out reforms, they also disagree in many important
ways?, Ajaong these disagreements are differing viewc of the eor-
a.lity cf man (Maistre here being the more pessimistic of ths
tiit thinlcers.-) , differences of ©pinion on the origins and contea't
«f euetom and positire lavr, conflicts as t© the steaning of "freedoia"
(Msi-stre adheres to a positive theory of freedom, v/hereas Burke's
positica is a siixed one.) , contention as t® the degree of authority
and individual autonomy that should exist in the state, and finally
the degree t© which Utopian ©r laillenarian elements are present
iE the thefjries of the two thinkers.
It is the contention Qf this dissertation that the divorce
between Libertarian and Authoritari.<n Conservatism, begun by
Burke and Maistre^ has continued to the present day, and that
it is not possible to understand the nature of Conservatism and
its current jstatus vsatliout examining this disunity^
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Chapter I: The Origins and Nature of Conservatism
A. The Lives of Burke and Maistre. Since the philosophical
theircs & thinker stresses are often intimately associated with his
life experiences, it is a useful approach to begin a study of this
tort with brief biographical sketches oT the principals. We shall
first take a look at Burke*
Burke's date of birth is not known. It may be that the people
of that time considered personal record-keeping to be a less important
art than is the present opinion. John Morley, though uncertain
as to whether Burke was born in 172S or 1729»- finally settles upon
the date January 12^ 1729 (nev; style) , \?hereas Philip Magnus choc yes
January 1, 1729 (also new style). Most of Burke's biographers
have chosen prudence over valor and put the year of his birth as
1729, folloTred by a question mark. All these biographers are, iiov/-
ever, agreed that Burke was the offspring of an Irish Protestant
father, Richard Burke of County Limerick, and an Irish Catholic
Bother, Mary (Wagle) Burke of County Cork, and was born in Dublin.
As was the custom in such religious mixed-marriages at the time,
Edmund and his brothers Garret and Richard were brought up in their
father's religion, and their sister Juliana adhered to her mother's
faith. Despite his Protestantism, Burke's political adversaries
^John Morley > Edmund Burke (New York: Harper and Brothers,
Publishers, 1879), ?p. 3-^.
^Philip Magnus, Edmund Burke : A Life (Londonr John Murray, 1939)
»
never ceased to delight in calling bim a Catholic, and even a Jesuit,
charges he never bothered to deny. Richard Burke, Edmund's father,
was a rather successful law^yer, whose legal practice, however, was
later to be seriously damaged by his outbursts of bad temper, a
trait his eminent son was to inherit. At the age of six, Burke
was sent to Ballyduff, Ireland to begin his education at a Catholic
village school. After five years at this school and one at home,
Burke was enrolled in Ballitore School in Ireland, an institution
run by a Yorkshire Quaker, Abraham Shackleton. Burke considered
Shackleton a fine man and a fine teacher, and isas thereafter to
ascribe all he knew to Shackleton and to maintain a close personal
relationship m.ta Shackleton and his son Richard, It is clear that
the events of Burke's fainily lif^:; and early education were predis-
posing hini to that large degree of religious tolerance he was later
to manifest.
In 17if3, Burke enrolled at Trinity College in Dublin, remaining
there until 1?ifo, and receiving riis Bachelor's Degree. He was not
a brilliant student^ though he won a classical scholarship in l7i+6
that permitted hira to live at the college. Burke »s style of study
was to throw himself whole-heartedly into one area of study, for
a limited period of time. He himself spoke, in a letter to Richard
Shackleton (quoted by Morley) , of being possessed successively by
the "Furor Mathematicus" , the "Furor Logicus", the "Furor Historicus",
and the "Furor Poeticus". It ^dll be seen that Burke's later pol-
itical style was very much like this, in that he went from one
all-
consuming political interest (be it America, India, or France) to
another. Around this time Burke "began taking an interest in pol-
itics. In l7i+7, he was a founding member cf the Trinity College
debating club, in which his acidic and vociferous style of debating
earned hira the reputation of being "damned absolute", a verdict
that was later to be seconded by many of the greats of Britain and
Europe, For a few months after he received his degree, Burke almost
single-handedly began writing and publishing a short-lived literary
weekly. The Reformer , and also wrote a series of anonymous political
pamphlets in defense of the rights of Ireland against British opp-
recsion.
In 1750, quite possibly under some pressure from his father,
who sought to see his only son who attended a university make a
success of himself. Burke ceased his dabbling in politics and lit-
erature at Dublin and went to London in order to study for the bar*
It did not talte very long for Burke to develop a deep and abiding
respect for the institution of law, and a great contempt for the
way it was to be learned, which was chiefly by hanging around the
Londoti l&w courts and picking up what could be picked up. Around
thia tinre, Burke was leading a somewhat Bohemian existence, fre-
quenting the coffee houses and debating societies of London with
William Burke, a rather disreputable distant relative of his,
and
not concentrating overly much on his studies of the law. Burke
had decided on a literary career, a not unusual choice for a young
man with Bohemian tendencies, and this, plus the young Burke's slow
progress tov^ard entering the bar (a step he never did achieve),
caused his angry father to cut off his allowance in 1755, after
cpending a thousand pounds to support hira in London,
Now faced by the need to support himself, Burke began doing
secretarial work for politicians and started seeking a literary
career in earnest. In the latter regard, he published anonyniously
his first major work, A Vindication Of Natural Society , a tal-
ented satire of both Bolingbroke ' s writing style and of his
theories of natural religion. Though the authorship of the
Vindication, was soon revealed and the work caused some stir,
it d3.d little to remove financial problems from Burke *s life,
as is shoun by the fact that a short time later he was offering
his last few shillings to an Armenian wayfarer, Josef Eniin*
The year 1757 was a wonderful year in Burke's life. On March
12, he married Jane Nugent; Will Burke had been courting this
Catholic physician's daughter, but magnanimously stepped aside
far Sdreuiid. Then, ok April 21, Ediiiund»^s book on The Sublime and
the Beautlfal was published, this being the work that established
hie reputation as a writer.
For the next two years. Burke continued his literary work,
becoming editor of the Annual Register and publishing a history
of England, though his still precarious financial situation
(He was largely dependent on his father-in-law's generosity.)
caused him during this period to consider emigration with his
family to Aiaerica, la T759, however, his rising acquaintance
rith literary and society people (among whom were Garrick, Dr»
Johnson, and Mrs^ Montagu, the "Queen of the Blue-Stockings")
gained hin the opportunity to enter politics through the back
door. He became the private secretary of V/illiam Gerard Hamilton,
a Commissioner of the Board of Trade and Plantations, an M.. P.
rather unkindly known as "Single Speech", in recognition of hio
first and only brilliant speech in Parliament, For the next
six yoare Burke was associated with Hamilton, until a dispute
centering on the degree of independence Burke was to have utterly
shattered the relationship. Burke complained with some justice
that Hamilton had come to look upon, him as a piece of household
furniture. Since Burke clearly needed a job to support himself
and hie family, he sought and found a new position as private
secretary to Lord Rockingham, the leader of probably the least
corrupt Whig faction, to whom he was introduced by Will Eurke.
Fnen, shortly thereafter, Rockingham became Prime Minister, Burke
became, in effect, chief whip of the Wliig Party, a position that
necessitated a seat in Parliament. This problem was solved by
Will Burke's patron Lord Verney, who controlled a pocket borough
at ?/endover he had intended to give to Will; he was, hov/ever,
asked by Will to give it to Edmund instead, and complied. Another
packet borough was found for Will.
Burke took his seat in Parliament on January 1766,
and immediatly plunged into the British dispute with America,
taking the American side in the dispute, usually with little
success. Anierica was to be Burke s chief interest over the next
severcl yej^.rs, though India was also of interest to hira, due
to his desire to help along as much as possible his and Will's
iJivoBtments In India. It is not to be thought that this position
©n India entailed excessive dishonesty, for when Burke saw in-
justice being done in India, he allowed no thought of personal
or family profit to affect his decisions, Will Burke's financial
manipulations in India, which were as incompetent as they were
grandiose and dishonest, ultimately did the entire Burke family
serious financial harm, since the whole family lived together on
Edmund's he avily-raort gaged estate, "Qregories", and chared a common
purse. Edmund, however, turned a blind eye to Will's dishonesty,
©ut of affection for him.
Siaultaneously with this struggle over America, and not
unrelated to it, was Burke's attempt to free the House of Comraons
from th-^j influence of th© Crown, so that it might act as a vork-
able counterweight to the Crown. This was to be done in two
ways, as outlined by Burke in two important works. In Thoughts
On the Causes Of the Present Discontents , Burke declared the
root cf Brit?iin's current problems, both at home and abroad,
to be the growth cf executive power over the House of Commons,
which ought to be the people's representative. Rather disingen-
uously, Burke sought to excuse George III for this, preferring
instead to blame evil ministers. One solution for this was to
organize philosophically-united parties, willing and able to
pass on proposed legislation ac bodies committed to carrying
out reasonably clear prograras of government. This v.'ould effect-
ively destroy the King's divide and rule tactics. The second
prong of this two-pronged attack on nascent monarchical absolutism
was outlined in Burke's speech on the reform of the King's civil
list. The various feudal principalities, dukedoms, earldoms,
etcetera, in v;hich the King reigned under titles other than "king"
(a potent means of expanding the posts he could fill) were to
be abolished, and those offices which had been rendered entirely
obsolete, such as Master of the King's Stable, were also to be
eliminated. It had been the habit of George III and his cohorts
to buy the loyalty of Members of Parliament by appointing them
to these posts v/ith nice salaries and little or no work attached.
Though Burke's attempt to reform the civil list, and hence curb
the pov;er of royal patronage, was not as successful as he had
hoped, it was successful enough to earn him the bitter enmity
of George III, an enmity that did not moderate (and then far
from completely) until the writing of Reflections On "nvo Revol-
ution In France .
An extremely important event in Burke's life, as it aff-
ected bis political theory, was his visit to France from January
to March of 1773. Here, for the first time, no one regarded
him as an Irish upstart, and he was permitted, even encouraged,
to mix with the highest levels of society on a basis of full
equality. Though we may assume this was very pleasing to
Burke's
ego, A£ he becaa* the idol of French salon society (Walpole re-
marked, in a very pregnant phrase, that he almost made Christ-
ianity fashionable,), he nevertheless came back to England a
very deeply troubled man. It cannot be said that this journey
radically altered Burke's philosophy, but it did clarify and
deepen portions of it. From the time Burke began to think co-
herently about philosophy, he had a definite distrust of abstract
reason and of its potentially baneful effects (This was the theme
of his first important work, A Vindication Of Natural Society . )
,
but after this fateful trip, the earlier half-playful tone of
the Vindication was gone,. Seeing abstract rationalism at work
in all its glory in its capital city of Paris, Burke came away
convinced that it was necessarily subversive of all order, civ-
ilization and morality* Consequently, Burke^s references to
abstract rationalism and atheism (he considered the two necess-
arily connected) were from that point marked by the utmost passion
and even violence* He undoubtedly looked upon aia^elf as a man
vho, like Dante, had journeyed through the lowest circles of
hell and had brought back with him the ra-i^sage ©f redemption.
This aessage was: -^Hold to the British constitution and Christianity
In 177/f, Burke undertook his first and only attempt at
truly elective politics. The tide against the Tories that year
was running especially high^ due to the damaging effects on the
British economy of the American boycott of British goods. The
Whigs saw an opportunity to carry off both of the Parliamentary
seats of Bristol, then England's eecond-largest city, and therefore
ran Burks, who had the reputation ef a friend of British merc-
antile interests and a would-be compromiser on the disputes be-
tween England and America, for one of then, even though he had
just been chosen for the pocket borough of Malton. This commer-
cial city, Bristol, elected Burke with 270? votes, and he preferred
the larger constituency to the smaller. It cannot be said
that the six-year relationship between Burke and Bristol was
a happy one for either side* This difficulty stemmed from Burke »s
perception of h5.s role as an M, F» and his relationship with the
people, as shall be seen in Chapter Eleven, He ^as, first, firmly
set against accepting instructions from his constituents; he vras
in Parliament to exercise his .iudgement on the great affairs of
the state, and not to take orders like some clerk. It must be
cenXeoised that people hail the truly independent man, but they do
not vote for him. Second, Burke was vdlling to promote the in-
terests of Bristol when they did not run counter to those of England,
but when they did, he never forgot that he was a member of the
British Parliament from Bristol, and not a representative (or
ambassador) of Bristol t£ the British Parliament . Finally, Burke
did a very poor job of cultivating his constituents. He made
little attempt to visit Bristol frequently and perform the local
equivalent of kissing babies. Burke felt it was his responsibility
to stay in London and do his job there. When it came time for Burke
to run for reelection, he realized the race was hopeless, and dropped
out before the polling began. Henceforth, he stayed in pocket borough
When it became clear America was lost to England, Burke »e
thoughts turned to India. It has already been seen that liis
first interest in the subject had been profoundJ.y fajnilial and
financial. Upon studying the situation in India, hov/ever, Burke
became convinced that V/arren Eastings, first Grovernor General
of British India, was cruelly oppressing the Indian people, and
what had hitherto been a rather peripheral interest to Burke
became an© of the chief interests, and perhaps the compelling
interest, of his life* Froa T782 to 1795» Burke attempted to
have Hastings impeached on a variety of charges, all of which
could fall under the heading of violating the Natural Law. '.Vhen,
however, the verdict wae taken, the man v/hora Burke had called
"a spider of Hell'^ was, whether because of political reasons
or because his innocence was actually believed, acquitted on
all counts. Burke declared many cimes that he had never suffered
a more personally crush^.ng political defeat*
The one lasting cause of Burke, that which had been his
first interest in politics, was the rights of Ireland^ and of
her Catholics in particular. H3.s close personal connection ijriLth
Catholics, among them his mother, his sister, his first school-
Easter, his wife (until her conversion), and his father-in-law,
undoubtedly left him open to the charge that he- too was a Catholic,
a terrible charge in eighteenth-century England. From no' attacks
did he suffer more, or for a longer time. It was, in fact, the
©ttly issue on which Burke was ever in actual danger of physical
violeace. In 1730, Lord George Gordon, an H. P. and general
ruffian, prcvxjked massive anti-Catholic riots in which, before
they were quelled, hundreds of people were killed. One of the
chief targets of the rioters' wrath was Burke, who had a much-
deserved reputation as an advocate of religious toleration in
general and of Catholic emancipation in particular. A mob be-
sieged his home threatening to burn it, as they had already burned
Bany homes and shops, and when a contingent of sixteen soldiers
was sent to protect him^ Burke dismissed thera, telling them they
had Kore important things to do. Burke continued to ¥/alk. the
streets during the height of the riots, making no attempt to
hide his identity, and when on one oT these excursions he was
surrounded by a crowd of rioters and ordered to change liis vote
on. an issue of toleration, he adamantly refused tci do so and
began drawing his sv/ord to defend himself» Fortunately, the
riots were crushed after ten harrowing days, and did act succeed
in extinguishing the life of one of the brightest lights of British
Parliamentary history, Edmund Burke
The last conflict in Burke »s life, that he pursued up to
the time of his death, was, of course, the one v/ith Jacobinism,
It cannot be said this was a happy time for Burke, for in this
struggle hs had to split his beloved V-liig Party for betraying
British principles, losing several persoual friends in the pro-
cess, saw himself reviled as a fool, an enemy of liberty, and
even a lunatic, and finally suffered the untimely death of his
dear eon Richard, whom he had seen as the ornament of the Burke
family. Finally, still firmly in the midst of the crusade for
Western civilization, Edmund Burke died on July 9, 1797.
Count Joseph de Maistre was born at Chambcry in Savoy in
175<4, a member of the Savoyard branch oT a great French fairdly,
Maiatre, though geographically an Italian, always identified
strongly with France and probably considered himself to be French,
Maistre' s father was a nobleman and a high official of the Kingdom
of Savoy, and his mother was a very devout and tender woman who
had a great hold over her eldest son* So great v/as Maistre
willing submission to the authority of his parents that while
he was pursuing an education in law he would never read any book
without seeking and winning their approval of its contents first.
Maistre *s pre-university education was in the exclusive
care of the Jesuit Society. In all likelihood, liis life-long
devotion to the Catholic Church and to the Society of Jesus
stemmed from this period* After his Jesuit-run education was
completed, Maistre went to the dniversity of Turin to study law,
unlike Burke not finding that course of study to be uncongenial.
After the completion cf his legal stuflLes, Maistre effortlessly
entered the public administration of Savoy, ultimately graduating
frcm there to the Savoyard Senate presided over by his father.
Until the storm of the French Revolution came to Savoy,
Maistre •£ life was probably fairly typical of the life of an
Intelligent young French (by culture) nobleman of the Enlighten-
ffient period* Unaided he taught himself English, Spanish, Latin»
Greek, and German (the first three with high proficiency), in
addition to, of course, knowing his native languages of French
and Italian. Maistre was a member of the Masonic Order, belonging
to the Refora Lodge at Charabery, and this, plus his early advocacy
of freedom of speech and his youthful enthusiasm for the American
Revolution (which afterwards v/holly evaporated, to be replaced
by a loathing of America), earned him the reputation of a dan-
gerous yeung man who should be closely watched.
In 1786, Maistre married, and, despite the fact that hus-
band and wife were to be separated for many years, it was app-
arently a very happy marriage, Maistre looked upon his wife
as a perfect complement to himself, feeling her to have a great
facility for planning ahead, which he lacked (Maistre called
her Hadsjse Prudence.) and a real talent for teaching, which was
alsa net one of his talents.. This; happy union led to three offspring.
They had not been married for long when the events took
place that were to shatter the normal routine of a family of
aristocrats* The French Revolution broke out, and the Jacobin
armies spilled across the French border, sending the Maistre
family fleeing across the Alps to Aosta and safety. Shortly
after their flight, the new French regime in Savoy passed a law
requiring all refugees to return immediately, upon pain of con-
fiscation of all their property. Seeking to save something of
their possessions, Madame de Maistre (who was nine months pregnant)
left v.lthout tellins her husband, who was in Turin, and proceeded
to cross the Alps on a mule In the depth of winter to return
to Savoy -with her two children. Upon returning to Aosta from
Turin and learning what his vdfe v/as undertaking, Maistre set
off after her, fully ejiriecting at every moment to find the life-
less bodies of his vrfLfe and children in the Alpine snow« By
v/hat can only be called the grace of God, hov/ever, Madame de
Maistre and her children arrived safely in Chambery, to be joined
shortly afterv/ards by her husband. After Maistre refused to
sign the register of citizens and contribute money to iha Jacobin
army, he waited until his jife delivered her third baby, and
then abandoned his property and fled to Lausanne, Switzerland,
shortly afterwards bringing his faraily,
Maistre stayed in Lausanne for three years, in wlLich tine
he bscaiJie a leader ai^'d propagandist of the emigre movenientj de-
spite the fact that Kaistre, unlike the other emigres, despised
both the Revolution aiid the philosophy which had nurtured 'it; the
others vrers steeped in the Enlightenment philosophy Maistre had
by nc." rejected. One result of liis sojourn in S-^atzerland may
have been a softening of Maistre 's presumably hostile attitude
toward republics, as shall be seen later in this dissertation.
From Lausanne Maistre and his family went to Turin, where another
chapter in this life that sometimes resembles a melodrama was
acted out. Shortly after Maistre' s arrival, the French conquered
Turin, and so the Maistre family was obliged to take flight again.
this time do'vvn the Po on an overcrowded, ill-heated refugee boat
in the v/inter of 1797,. with Austrian soldiers on one bank of
the river and French soldiers on the other. The chance of being
blov/n up was, therefore, omnipresent.- As bad as the boat ride
was, his family's lot in Venice, their destination, was even
worse* Favlng been forgotten temporarily by iiis patron the King
of Sardinia, Kaistra and his family were entirely cut loose from
all me^ms ot subsistence, save for a few pieces of silver plate
that had been saved out of the general collapse of theii" fortunes.
John Morley, in fact, believes this period of Kaistre's life to
have worked deep effects on his philosophy, and it is difficult
to gsi.iasay hiE».
The student of Maistre^s philosophy raaj see in what crushing
personal ^nssuish same of its most tjinister growths h^id its roots,
Wlien the c.^rcjs of beggary coae suddenly upon a man in middle
life, they burn deep. Alone, and starving for a cause that is
dear to liim:. he might encounter grim fate vn.th a fortitude in
which there eiiould be many elevating and consoling elements.
But the destiny is intolerably hard which condemns a man of humane
mould, as Kaistre certainly was, to look helplessly upon the
physical pains of a tender woman and famishing little ones.
The hsjur of bereavt^ment has its bitterness, but the bitterness
is gradually suffused vdth a soft reminiscence. The grip of
beggary leaves a irark on such a character as De Maistre ' s that
no prosperity of after days effaces. The seeming inhumanity
©f his theory of life, which is so revolting to comfortable people,
was in truth the only explanation of his own cruel sufferings
in which he could find any solace. It was not that he hated
mankind, but his destiny locked as if God hated him, and this
was a horrible moral complexity out of which he could only ex-
tricate himself by a theory in which pain and torment seem to
stand out as the aain facts of human existence.^
^Joha Morley, Biographical Studies (Freeport, New York:
Books For Libraries Press, 1969) i PP. 1 81-1 82.
Whether or not one can go quite so far as Morley does in
ascribing political philosophy to personal events, it can be
said that this Venetian interlude v/as the worst period of Maistre's
life, though true prosperity never really returned. As the for-
tunes of King Charles Emanuel lY of Sardinia slightly improved,
he began to remember those who had suffered on his behalf, which
certainly included Maistre. Maistre was given the commission
of getting the government of the island of Sardinia, whose gov-
ernment had collapsed into anarchy during the war, functioning
again* It need hardly be said that it is a very difficult task
to get people to pay taxes and to observe a settled system of
justice SLgain when taxation has vanished and vendetta has taken
the place of law. That Maistre had any success at all (and he
had partial success) v;as a mark of his talent, and likely earned
him his next appointment, which to the King may have been a re-
ward, but to Maistre was a severe test of his loyal tsy to his
sovereign.
In recognition of his successes in straightening out (some-
what) the affairs of the island of Sardinia, Maistre was to be
exiled from his family and friends and all he loved, and sent
to distant Russia as the ambassador of a debtor power. This
exile was to last from l802 to l8l7. There can be no doubt that
this was an excruciating agony for Maistre. His patron, who
was himself a debtor, could do little to provide comforts to
his ambassador (What a proud title to cover such a sorry reality!),
r?
Such luxuries as a fur hat and fur boots were out of the question,
and, since two servants were required by an ambassador, Maictre,
due tft his sleader budget, was forced to employ a thief, whom
he rescued from justice through ambassadorial privilege, ia that
capacity, on the understanding the thief would stay honest.
Ma>jay a night Maistre»c supper consisted of sharing the soup of
his valet. As bad as the physical torments Maistre had to suffer
ift Russia were, the emotional agonies were far worse. It was
JL rare night in which he got three hours' sleep, for as he lay
In bed he was posr.essed with the thought that he could hear his
fafflily weeping in Turin., and tried to picture to himself the
appearance of his youngest daughter, whom he had never seen and
might never see, that "orphan child of a living father", as he
put it. That Maistre did not go mad is rather amazing. Know-
ledge ©f his torments was, however^ seldom shared with his family.
There were two factors that sustained Maistre during his
sojfturn m Russia. The first was reading and studying. Throughout
his life Maistre was an inveterate student, and the time spent
in Russia was no exception. The very zeal Maistre had for learning
is summed up by this statement (quoted by John Morley) , written
from Russia.
Nay, wore than ever, I feel myself burning with the feverish
thirst for knowledge. I have had an access of it that I cannot
describe to you. The mast curious books literally run after me,
and hurry to place themselves in my hands. As soon as diplomacy
gives me a moment of breathing-time I rush headlong to that favourite
pasture, to that ambrosia of which the mind can never have enough.
Not only did Maistre read voraciously, but when he read he always
had a pen in his hand, prepared to transcribe into notebooks
whole sections he felt might be useful to him. It is known that
at one time he had at least thirty of these large notebooks,
fully indexed. The other diversion that helped Kaistre to main-
tain his equilibrium was the social circuit of Saint Petersburg.
Surprisingly for a writer whose philosophy was often so cold
and harsh, Kaistre was a truly sociable individual, who was willing
to befriend even those whose philosophies he detested. For this
reacon, and because of his obvious ability, honesty, and devotion
to his royal patron under insupportable conditions, Maistre be-
came a favorite in the diplomatic circuit and at the Pussian
court. Kaistre's abilities and qualities even led him to be
respected by the representatives in Saint Petersburg of revol-
utionary France. Tsar Alexander showed great kindness to the
Sardinian envoy, giving to Maistre 's brother, Xavier de Maistre,
a post at one of the public museums, and to Maistre 's son a comm-
ission in the Russian army, this latter kindness causing Maistre
a great deal of anguish. During the battle of Friedland, and
during every campaign thereafter, Maistre felt he could read
the news of his son's fate on the face of every acquaintance
he met.
In 1814, Maistre 's vafe and daughter joined him in Saint
Petersburg, but his stay in Russia, unbeknownst to any of them,
was drav.d.ng to a close. In l8l6, a number of conversions from
Russian Orthodoxy to Catholicism took place, and a great outburst
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of relisioue fanaticism resulted. The Jesuit Society was expelled
from Rucsia and Maiistre himself, who was widely known as being
untiling if not ait ardent member of hie Church, fell under sus-
picion as having had a hand in the conversions. Called before
the Tear to defend hiaself on that charge, Maistre swore he had
Hot encouraged the conversion of any Russian, but was forced
by honesty to add that if any Russian shared with him his intent
to convert to Catholicism^ he could not in good conscience tell
the RuesiaR he was wrong. Realizing such an exchange had com-
promised his effectiveness as a diplomat, Maistre arranged for
his 9vtn recall, and in l8l7 returned to Savoy for the first time
In twenty-five years.
On the way back to Savoy, Kaietre spent a few days in Paris,
his first and only tiiae ever on French soil. While Maistre was
there, the King ©f France threw a reception in his honor and con-
ferred a klgh office ajid a smiill rue of money upon him. After
this, Maistre r»>turned to his beloved Savoy, and was in the pra-
cees of y.or-iting down his philosophy of man and politics when
death tocil: hiia in February of l821.
B,. The Origins Of Conservatism, We Eust now see how the
philosophy of these thinkers came to be. One should not expect
that any major system of philosophical and social thought would
come into being ex nihilo ; concrete historical events may cause a
law-giver (or law-givers) to assemble in a coherent package (or
packages) ideas that were floating loose up to then. This happened i
the cane of Conservatism, with Member of Parliament Edmund Burke
of England and Count Joseph de Maistre of Savoy serving as the
niidwives for a pair of twins who, as is true of fraternal (not
identical) twins, have both striking similarities and dissimil-
arities to each other. These twins are libertarian and author-
itarian Conservatism, and the event that brought them to conscious
life was the French Revolution.
As will be seen later in this chapter, one of the key el-
ements of both kinds of Conservatism is the feeling that it is
necessary to defend Western civilization, though different Con-
servatives may (and do) differ on those elements of Western trad-
ition that are worth defending. Considering tliis universal as-
pect of Conservatism, hov/ever, it becomes logical that a creed
resting upon such a premise would become fully conscious of it-
self only when Western civilization and its traditions were threat-
ened. With the coming of the "Enlightenment" and its offspring
the French Revolution, a very basic questioning of the V/estern
way of doing things developed that had not been seen in Europe
since the fall of the Roman Empire, or, even earlier, since the
introduction of Christianity into Europe. God was effectively
banished as a force in the world by having His existence doubted
or denied, by being seen as existent but irrelevant to the con-
temporary affairs of men (the Prime Mover doctrine), or by being
identified as inextricably immanent in nature (Pantheism). Man
was declared to be the center of the universe and was felt, through
either his mind or his vd.ll, to be capable of reshaping the world.
Finally, a radical democracy declared it to be its duty to ex-
port this creed to all lands, by force if necessary.
Under these conditions of ideological war, it is not sur-
prising that Burke and Maistre, who, like many others, had been
Inclined to avoid philosophical defenses of a system that did
not seem to need defending, were forced to bring their ideas
on aan and society into clearer focus. Burke was not a man much
inclined to set down his thoughts on the philosophical bases
of government. One who wishes to vrrlte on Burke's philosophy
is required to wade through an enormous collection (his collected
works total twelve large volumes) of essays, speeches, letters,
and reports of Parliamentary commissions, few of these v/ritings
being expressly philosophical in nature. Burke v/as a man who
was more inclined to act out his philosophy than to write about
it. It was, therefore, with considerable reluctance that Burke
undertook to defend his principles of government in the Peflec-
tions On The Revolution In France and later works. The philo-
sophical impact of the Revolution on Maistre was considerably
greater than it was on Burke. There is, simply speaking, little
evidence that Maistre had any sort of coherent philosophy before
the French Revolution. He was, due to his inherited nobility,
a member of the Savoyard Senate, was a believer in freedom of
speech (a position which earned him the reputation of a dangerous
character), was a well-wisher of the American Revolution (a stand
that was to b« transformed into a positive detestation of America),
and was an early advocate of the French Revolution. The funda-
teatal alteration these views underwent suggests they were not
held very deeply. Before the Revolution, Maistre had apparently
been a fashionable young noblenan adhering superficially to all
of the fashionable Enlightenaent ideas of his time. Wlien, how-
ever, the bases of Western civilization came under attack, Maistre*
basic Conservatism came powerfully into play, possibly surprising
his in doing so.
The foregoing should not be taken as saying Conservatism
was born in the French Revolutionary crisis. Many of the elements
©f Con IServatism date back to the beginning of human reflection
on philosophy and politics. The excellent four-volume set, The
Wisdom Of Conservatism , dates the pedigree of Conservatism from
Plato. ^ As will be seen often in this chapter, ConcervatiEm'
s
separ'?«.te theoretical components have probably existed as long
as human thought has. It is the development of Conservatisa
as a conscious, and somewhat integrated, ideology that dates
frem the French Revolution.
C. What Is Conservatism? The question of the nature of
Conservatism is one on which there is a great deal of disagree-
ment. This question divides internally those neutral toward
Censervatisffl, those hostile toward it, and those favorable toward
^eter Witonski, ed., The WLsdon Of Conservatism ; 4 vols.,
(New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971).
it. The Affierican Heritage Dictionary Of The English Language
declaree "Conservatism" t© be "The disposition in politics or
culture ta oaintaln the existing order and. to resist ©r cppose
change or innovation" attd sees "censervative" as "Tending to
favsr the preservation ©f the existing order and to regard pro-
posals far change 'ffith distrust; moderate, prudent, cautious;
Traditional in Manner or style; Tending to conserve; conserving;
preservative.."'^ A dictionary of a substantially different type,
Tlie Devil » s Dictionary ©f the great nineteenth and early twen-
tieth-century kuKorist and cynic Ambrose Bierce, feels the Con-
servative to be "A statesman who is enamored of existing evils,
as distinguished from the Liberal, who wishes to replace them
with others,"^ Ne matter how useful, or, for that matter, amus-
ing, a definition found in a dictionary can be, its actual value
whsa dealing with a major philosophy like Conservatism is likely
t© be very strictly limited* It is necessary, therefore, to
turn to Huch more rigorous attempts at defining the philosophy
of Conservatism, some of these attempts running to an entire
volume in length*
F©r RO very special reasoa, we shall begin by examining
the views about Conservatism held by its opponents. First among
tkese will ^e William Newman's The Futilitarian Society , a
^The American Heritage Dictionary Of The English Language ,
fourth edition, 1970, p. 284.
^Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary (New York: Hill
aad Wang, 1968), p. 27.
rather stupid and heavy-handed attack upon Conservatism, Dealing
with such a v/ork is, nevertheless, useful as a way of learning
what sonie think Conservatism is, Newman starts from the belief
that unrestricted innovation is necessary for freedom, or is
evea the essence of freedom. He never permits himself to enter-
tain the possibility that his definition might not be correct,
Newman's view of Conservatism follows from this first principle.
Conservatism has as its rn_ain concern the necessity of order
in a disorderly civilization (This is overstated, but not entirely
false"^. It is a search for a society in which innovation will
have come to an end, so that what exists may continue to exist;
a society in which there will be no problems and no danger be-
cause no one will be allowed to repudiate the past and venture
into the unknovm; a society in which rational, scientific, and
inquiring man v/ill be replaced by traditional, obedient, and
placid man. It is a search for a society in which essence mil
replace the excitement of concrete reality, and everyone will
have his fixed place, and freedom will have come to an end.
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The essence of Me^wman's position is that Conservatism is
militantly opposed to everything in life that is worthv/hile and
is an enemy of freedom and of all decent men. Conservatives
believe in Original Sin, and therefore "Conservatism is the refusal
o
of freedom." This book must be considered intellectual dishonesty
at its worst. A series of statements are made about Conservatism,
some of which are true, others of which are grossly exaggerated,
and still others of which do not necessarily follow from the
premises Newman ascribes rightfully to Conservatism, One v;ould
"^William J. Newman, The Futilitarian Society (New York:
Gdorge Brazillsr, Inc, 1961), pp. 38 and q8-i+9.
^Ibid
. , p. 13.
not even have to deal with this book at all, so little is its
significance as an intellectually meaningful work, but that it
does represent rather well some of the more hysterical views
some opponents of Conservatism have of that doctrine,
A more responsible criticism of Conservatism is found in
M. Morton Auerbach's The Conservative Illusion
. We learn from
Auerbach that "He {the ConservativJ rejects any theory of hist-
orical progress [Sic"]) or human perfectibility." and that "Conser-
vatism solemnly confides to the world that man is inescapably
9
evil," These points are, in my estimation, exaggerated, and
yet must still be kept in mind in any correct definition of Con-
servatism. Auerbach's main objection to Conservatism stems from
the vlev/ of history he ascribes to it. This \'ievv of history
is that of "a series of cycles in v/hich the early periods of
harmony are succeeded by cumulative degeneration".^^ Auerbach
sees Conservatism as seeking an impossible degree of harmony
rooted in tradition and explaining its unavoidable failure by
reliance on belief in Original Sin. Conservatism believes in
"the primacy of morality"'^ and sees an alteration in ideas of
social organization as proceeding an alteration in social struc-
ture; degeneration in morality preceeds degeneration in society.
It is Conservatism's alleged stress on the omnipresent tendency
^K, Morton Auerbach, The Conservative Illusion (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 310,
^'^Ibid
. , p. 286.
V^Ibid., p. 238.
to degeaer»tioa that causes Atterbach t» see it as a philosophy
for losers, for those always left behind by the advance of history.
Even if this view were true, and there nay be soae truth to it,
it is begging the question to judge the truth or falsity of a
pkilos4)pUy by its success in the so-called Earketplace of ideas.
Tliio beet product need not sell the best.
A different type of criticisa of ConservatisHi is found
in Herbert McCloskey. In his work, we find that Conservatives
are a group of people afflicted with mental illness; this is a
"fact" which must lesson one^s regard for their philosophy. To
get the full diraensions of McCloskey 's views requires a rather ex-
tensive quotation.
By every caeasure available to us, conservative beliefs are
found most frequently among the uninformed, the poorly educated,
and so far as we can determine, the less intelligent .. Uniformly
,
every increase in the degree of conservatism chows & correspon-
ding increase in submissiveness, anomie, eense of alieiiation,
bewilderment, etc. ..Of the four liberal-conservative classifi-
cations, the extreme conservatives are easily the most hostile
and suspicious, the most rigid and compulsive, the quickest to
condemn others for their i?aperfections or weaknesses, the Most
intolerant, the most easily moved to scorn and disappointment
in others, the Host infle^d-ble and unyielding in their percep-
tions and judgements. Although aggressively critical of the
shortcomings of others, thay are unusually defensive and armored
in the protection of their own ego needs. Poorly integrated
psychologically, anxious, often perceiving themselves as inad-
equate, and subject to excessive feelings of guilt, they seem
inclined to project onto others the traits they most dislike
•r fear in themselves. . .In other words, conservatives believe
what they do not because the world is jDhe way it is but because
they, the observers, are the way the^ 'emphasis McCloskey 'a are...
Related to this is the tendency for conservatives to be attracted
to sentiments that would have to be described as mystical, and
even obscurantist .In many ways hostility is a principal com-
ponent ef the conservative personality, as it is a principal
component of conservative doctrine. It does not seem accidental.
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considering the data on hostility, that conservatives prefer
to believe in man's -.dckedness, that they choose to see man as
fallen, unt rust v/orthy, lawless, selfish, and weak.. .The inflex-
ible and exacting features of conservative social doctrine are
related to the prototypical personality attributes of conservative
believers. ., Conservatives make a fetish of community, although
it is apparent that in many ways they are more alienated from
the community than most. 12
This is quite a remarkable bill of particulars. Unlike
the first two theories covered, the Conservative is not so much
a villain or a fool as he is a lunatic. While it must be con-
fessed that there are undoubtedly emotionally disturbed Conser-
vatives (as there are emotionally disturbed Liberals, Marxists,
and Zen Buddhists), McCloskey's treatment of Conservatiso makes
three errors of a fundamental nature. First, he sees as irrational
what might v/oll be rational responses by a Conservative in a
Liberal society. Can it be called mad for a man to feel alien-
ation tov/ard a society that scorns hira and even questions his
sanity? Second, he condemns as a manifestation of emotional
disturbance a political philosophy of at least two centuries'
duration, and does so on the basis of a sajr.ple of several hun-
dred people. Surely if Professor KcCloskey had tried hard enough
he could have found a sane Conservative somewhere! Third, this
being related to the second point, McCloskey identifies as ev-
idence of mental illness certain factors that from another point
of view may be taken as evidence of mental stability. If man
is "fallen, untrustworthy, lawless, selfish, and weak", why should
^
^Herbert McCloskey, "Conservatism and Personality," Amer-
ican Political Science Review. Vol. 52#1 (March 1958), pp. 35i 37-38, 40-43
©ne aot deem him to bo such? McCloekey falls into essentially
the eame sort of error as Newman and Auerbach. He takes certain
attributes of Conservatism (or caricatures of certain attributes
of CcpnserTatism) and, based on his own biases, automatically
beiievee them t9 be incorrect views of the world. If ycu declare
by definition that anyome who believes in the fallibility ef
man is emotionally disturbed, you have succeeded in condemning
all CoiRservatives t© rooms with rubber walls, but until you test
y©ur initial hypothesis against the empirical universe, you have
not really proven anything at all*
Still another way of attacking Conservatism is to say it
kas no ideas. A good example of this sort of position is the
fellowing:
It ie not the business of conservatives to state a fully
fashioned philosophy. They defend the established order of things.
It is enough, therefore, to appeal to tradition and sentiment
and inertia; and any attempt to build philosophical foundations
for their attitude is invariably evj-dence that the attitude no
longer claims the instinctive allegiance of the massea of men...
Conservatism is no more than the art of wise accomodation to
environment and a distrust of radical change... an alliance of
genial character and poverty-stricken intellect .. .It is the trad-
ition of wealth, comfort, elegance, and mannersj of a ruling
class that has regarded its power to govern others as a natural
right in a world of timeless perfections. The conservative seeks
not to create a new society but to resist the transformation
©f the existing. ^-^
Itt Lewis* treatment of Conservatism, one finds the toler-
ance that is often expressed by a warrior as he speaks a tribute
^^Gordon K» Lewis, 'The Metaphysics Of Conservatism," The
Western Political Quarterly , Vol. (December 1953) i PP« 729,
730, 731, 737, and 738.
over the corpse of a fallen foe. Since Conservatism ie a class
Ideology, as are all ideologies, and since its class (the landed
aristocracy) has nearly everywhere in the Western world ceased
to wield predominant power, Leu-is simply looks on Conservatism
as something irrelevant in the modern world and therefore of
only historical interest • Even if one accepts this basically
Marxist view of the character of political ideologies, it does
not explain why this fossil, Conservatisn
, lacks the good grace
to retire to the museum and even continues to win elections based
©a tho votes of those who control nary a single serf.
A similar, though also very different, view of Conr.ervatisa
is found in Saiauel P. Huntington. This description of the nature
of Conservatisa follows:
Concervatism is the intellectual rationale of the permanent
institutional prerequisites of human existence. It is a high
and necessary function* It is the rational defense of being
against Ciind, of order against chaos. Conservatism is not just
the abcence of change. It is the articulate, systematic, the-
oretical resistance to change. Conservatism thus reflects no
perraanent group interest. Depending upon the existence of a
particular relation among groups rather than upon the existence
of the groups themselves, it lasts only so long as the relation
lasts, not so long as the groups last...The substance of conser-
vatism is essentially static. Conservative thought is repetitive,
not evolutionary. It^ manifestations are historically isoiatec).
and discrete. Thas, paradoxical though it may seem, conservatir;ra,
the defender of tradition, is itself v/ithout tradition; conser-
TatiiQ, the appeal to history, is without history. .. Conservatives,,
however, do not subdivide into schools, nor do they, like lib-
erals and Marxists, engage in fiery arguments over the meaning
• f their faith. . .'(Conservatism has a lack of both an intellectual
tradition and a substantive ideal.
'^Samuel Huntington, "Conservatism As An Ideology,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. 51i^2 (June 1957) i pp. ^60,
^1, if68, L^69, and
It is preposterous to say that Conservatism is without
its schisms, as even a brief comparison of the vn^itings of Mr,
Franl\. Meyer and Mr. L, Brent Bozell would make clear. This shall
be pointed out at greater length later in this chapter. It is,
hov;ever, necessary for Huntington to declare Conservatism to
be ethically united, because he believes it to be ethically empty.
There is just nothing for potentiaJ. schismatics to fight over,
for Conservatism is the ideology of an endangered status quo,
whatever the objective character of that status quo may be«
Huntington, in fact, ends tliis article with a clarion call for
Liberals to become Conservatives, in order to conserve Liberalism,
It in, therefore, possible for anyone to become a Conservative,
be he a Liberal, a Fascist, a Socialist, a Communist, an Anar-
chist, or anything else. The only thing one is not permitted
to conserve is Conservatism! Conservatism is only a tool for
the preservation of other ideologies and has no actual existence
in itself, Huntington's viev; of the philosophical non-existence
of Conservatism vri.ll be answered in the course of this chapter.
In Bernard L, Kronick we find a position that allows some
snail measure of philosophical content to Conservatism, but only
within the confines of a given society. The situation develops
in the following fashion.
True conservatism is not a form of political paralysis.
It is a predisT30sition in favor of the past rather than an ir-
revocable committment to it. It is discernment in change rather
than frustrated reaction. .,The conservatism of one people may
well be the radicalism of another...It is sometimes said that
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the conservative of today worships the radical of yesterday.
This merely points up the relativity of T3olitical creeds. It
shows the tendency of all institutions and arrangements, hov/ever
abruptly conceived and hastily adopted, to become identified
v,lth a traditional order v/hich conservatives de fend.
. .There is
a process of innovation, reluctant acceptance of a fait accompli,
gradual adaptation, complete habituation, all adding up to—conservatism. '
^
Though Kronick sees Conservatism as serving a useful pur-
pose, that of restraining radicals from going too far, it is
also evident that Conservatism, in his estimation, must be a
frustrating position for anyone to hold. It is purely negative
in content, being the opposition to change or too rapid change,
and» as was seen above, is continually suffering defeats to v/hich
it ultimately becomes reconciled. For Conservatism to come to
pCTrer in its own name is impossible by definition, since Conser-
vatism docs not, and cannot, have any ideas as to how things
should be done. Another point Kronick makes is that there is
no such thing as Conservatism, but only American Conservatism,
British Conservatism, French Conservatism, German Conservatism,
etcetera. This is because the role of Conservatism is to con-
serve the ( sver-changing) traditions of a given nation. That
there could be such a thing as a concrete and relatively change-
less tradition of Western civilization as a whole for Conservatism
to safeguard is an idea Kronick does not seriously entertain.
Still another critic of Conservatism sees its essence as
lying in anti-individualism. Nisbct's explanation follows.
^
^Bernard L. Kronick, "Conservatism: A Definition," South-
western Social Science Quarterly , Vol. ZZttZ (September 19A-7), pp» 175-177*
In a significant sense, modern conservatism goes back to
medieval society for its inspiration and for models against which
to assess the modern v/orld. .. Conservatism opnoses individualism,
secularism, and equalitarianism. . , the conservative insisted upon
the primacy of society to the individual— historically, logically,
and ethically.
. .From this it follows that society cannot be broken
dovra, even for conceptual purposes, into individuals.
. .Not fic-
titious natural rights but unalterable needs (emphasis Nisbet's]
of man, his "wants'', as Burke termed them, are primary. ,, (Conser-
vatism is marked by, its essentially tragic conception of history,
its fear of the free individual and the masses, and its emphasis
upon community, hierarchy, and sacred patterns of belief. ^°
It shall be seen that there is a good deal of truth to
Nisbet's belief that Conservatism is inclined to be anti-secularist,
non-individualist (though not necessarily anti-individualist)
,
and elitist. It would, hov/ever, be a mistake to exaggerate the
degree or universality to which Conservatives hold these viev/s,
for they are precisely the issues on v;hich scMsm is most common
in the ranks of Conservatism. Further, some Conservatives may,
as Nisbet says, seek guidance from the medieval world, and yet
it is equally likely that there are other Conservatives v/hc see
medieval society as irrelevant or contemptible. Finally, v/hile
many Conservatives undoubtedly condemn the concept of Natural
Rights (largely because of the historical movements with which
it has been connected), others, notably including Burke, defin-
itely support it.
A thoroughgoing Marxist critique of Conservatism is found
in Randhir Singh's Reason , Revolution , and Political Theory;
Notes On Oaheshott's Rationalism In Politics . A quotation follows.
^^Robert A, Nisbet, "Conservatism and Sociology," American
Journal Of Sociology , Vol. 58#2 (September 1952), pp. 169, 170, and
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Conservatism denigrates human reason and human purpose, andleaves man v/ith no real critaria for judr;in- the worth of hunian
actions and attitudes. It distrusts scientifically grounded
ethics and politics, and doubts or mocks the reality of man's
Promethean struggle for the better, for social justice, for happ-iness and prosperity here on this earth. It... denies the leg-
itimacy of man's attempt individually to control his own fate
and collectively to build his ovm world. For it social action,
especially of a radical nature, is suspect. It not only empha-
sizes its futility but questions in fact the very assumption
of human capacity to solve problems of human existence. And
it therefore, sooner or later, urges upon man to bear the evils
and iniquities of tliis v;orld as necessary and inescapable, to
acquiesce patiently in the injustices of the existing order based
on private property, privilege and minority rule,
. . ConsorvatiGm,
whether old or new, has been rarely a positive creed, a positive
enunciation of principles, purposes and programmes. It has al-
ways been primarily a defensive, a truly negative reaction—
a
reaction, generally speaking, against the main direction of social
and historical development of our times. . .Elitipm has always
been one of the basic premises of all authentic conservatism.
It is the central political demand of contemporary conservative
philosophy.
. .This elitism is always the expression of an attitude
of contempt or indifference toward the raas^^es, an attitude in
whose recesses lurk fears v/hich can transform it in a single
moment of genuine confrontation into an attitude of violent,
merciless hostility. This elitism means not only the fear and
rejection of popular democracy, which is obvious enough. It
also involves a defence and Justification of the continued ex-
istence of an unjust, privilege-basod
,
minority ruled and self-
divided society. It seeks to make the present class divisions
of mankind—the schisms of humanity— a permanent feature
of social existence. 17
Conservatism is every bit as evil here as it is to Mevmian,
but at least the Conservative is not evil out of a sheer love
of e"-/!!, as Nevmian seems to feel him to be. The Conservative
is against change, advancement, and human liberty, and is for
elitism, because he seeks to keep in pov;or a given social structure
^"^fiandhir Singh, Reason , Rovoluticn , and Political Theory ;
ITotes On Oakeshott ' s Rationalism In Politics (New Delhi: People's
Publishing House, 1967), pp. 13^^, 158n, 169, and 170.
based on ffilnority rule. There is, therefore, contrary to McCloskey
view, nothing irrational in Conservatism, for there can be no-
thing irrational about trying to keep yourself and or your friends
in power by fair means or foul. Much of the criticism of Singh's
position can be found in the criticism of Lewis, Suffice to
•ay that, while there may indeed be Conservatives who are moral
monsters, it does seem to be unlikely that there is something in
Conservatism that causes its adherents to lust for the oppression
of their fellowmen.
Still another view of Conservatism is given by Louis Hartz.
He is critical of the possibility of an American Conservatism,
though not 60 much of the nature of Conservatism itself.
One of the central characteristics of a nonfoudal society
i« that it lacks a genuine revolutionary tradition, the tradition
which in Europe has been linked with the Puritan and French rev-
olutions: that it is "born equal", as Tocqueville said. And
this being the case, it lacks also a tradition of reaction: lacking
Robespierre it lacks Maistre, lacking Sydney it lacks Charles II.
Its liberalism is what Santayana called, referring "oo AmttriCG.n
democracy, a "natural" phenomenon. . .Law has flourichod on the
corpse of philosophy in America... We can thus say of th«5 right
in America that it exemplifies the tradition of big propertied
liberalism in Europe,!^
Leaving aside the question of whether EartT. is factually
correct in seeing America as almost universally Liberal, it is
interesting to see the outlooks about the origins of political
philosophy and about the nature of Cons;ervatlsm that derive from
this. First, political philosophy is not something that exists
^^Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition In America (New York:
Harcourt Brace and Company, 1955) i PP» 5» 10, and 15.
in a society independent of that society's culture and or history.
It is not the truth ®r falcity «f the belief that determines a
«aa»s adherence t© a political philosophy, but whether that phil-
osophy is congruent with his nation's past. An American cannot,
tkerefore, be either a true Conservative or a true Socialist,,
cince, Hartz believee, both of these philosophies derive ultim-
ately fro« a Liberal attack on Feudalism which, since Feudalism
never existed here t» a meaningful extent, never to«k place in
Aaerica. This position ef Hartz is remarkably close to belief
ia a group Kind, That is, however, a question which is rather
extraneous t© the subject under investigation. His positiest
decis-.res CosservatisBi te be a defense 9f Feudal political and
social iHstitutisas. This would Imply Conservatism t© be anti-
ittdiviri^alist, elitist, and possibly theocratic. As this chapter
proceeds, it will be possible ta analyze the validity »f those
assertions, though the very magnitude ©f writings for and against
Ciraservatisis would seen to answer the suggested belief in its
irrelevance to the aeodera American society.
It has beea seen by now that many areas of disagreement
exist awsng the critics of Conservatism as to its nature. Some
feel Conservatism t« be a real philosophy, others see it as simply
a rationalization of the power of a ruling elite, others (primarily
McCloskey) feel it appeals ©nly to those who are emotionally dis-
turbed, and still others see it as a conserving of any philosophy
or syste*,. There are^ however, certain areas of agreemeHt among
the critics of Conservatism • They see Conservatism as being
substantially elitist in character, as seeking lessons from the
past, as being opposed to or at least skeptical of change, and
as stressing the ^/irtues of community^ As shall be seen momen-
tarily, the advocates of Conservatism also have strong disagree-
ments as to its character.
Russell Kirk begins his work The Conservative Mind
, From
Burke To Santayana by declaring that "Burke »£ is the true school
1
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Of conservative principle." ^ This statement gives hints of
schism, of which more shall be seen later, YUrk goes on to say
that "Conservatism is not a fixed and immutable body of dogma,
and conservatives inherit from Burke a talent for ra-expressing
their convictions to fit the time."'" Kirk then proceeds to
explain what the convictions of Conservatism are.
I think that there are six canons of conservative thought
—
(l) Belie.? that a divine intent rules society as well as conscience,
forging an eternal chain of right and duty which links great
and obscure, living and dead. Political problems, at bottom,
are religious arjd moral problems. ..( 2) Affection for the prolif-
erating variety and mystery of traditional life, as distinguished
from the narrovdng uniformity and equalitarianism and utilitarian
aims of most radical systems. .. (3) Conviction that civilized
society requires orders and classes. The only true equality
is moral equality; all other attempts at levelling lead to des-
pair, if enforced by positive legislation. .. Persuasion that
property and freedom are inseparably connected, and that econ-
omic levelling is not economic progress. (5) Faith in prescrip-
tion and distrust of "sophisters and calculators" ^he phrase is
Burke ^sJ^^'C^) Recognition that change and reform are not identical,
^
^Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind, From Burke To Santayana ,
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953) »P» 5*
^Ibid ., p. 7-
and that innovation is a devouring conflagration more often thanit is a torch of progress.^'
It can be seen that, according to Kirk, Conservatism is
nothing if not an ethical doctrine, and, in fact, a doctrine
founded upon a belief in a God Who intervenes in the affairs
of men. It must be said at this point that the question of whe-
ther a Conservative can be an atheist has been one of lively
controversy ivithin Conservatism. IVhat exactly Kirk's point numbe
two means, other than (apparently) being a paean to pluralism,
is hard to ascertain, V/hether or not Conservatism as a v/hole
is, as charged, obscurantist, it would have to be confessed that
this statement of Kirk's is ranging on obscurantism. Point numbe
three declares that Conservatism takes a middle position on equal
ity. True social equality is felt to be impossible and absurd,
and yet the moral equality of all men is taken as a fact of life.
This convicts Conservatism of elitism, but not to the degree that
Singh T.'ould have one believe. There vri-11 not, and cannot be,
an?/ abolition of classes, and so Singh is correct in saying that
Conse-rVcitism seeks to maintain the class divisions of society,
in much the same waj'. Kirk might declare, as one who points out
the existence of the sun can be accused of advocating its con-
tinued 6-d.stence, In a more fundamental sense, however. Conser-
vatism departs from elitism. Though classes vo.ll continue to
exist and the few will run the government. Kirk implies that
the government shall not be run for the benefits of a few, which
^^Ibid., pp, 7-8,
some critics of Conservatism contend is its position, but for
the sake of all. Point four places Conservatism squarely behind
the institution of private property, but does so, Kirk declares,
for the sake of freedom. Point five pleads "guilty" to the charge
against Conservatism that it values institutions based on their
longevity and sees a nation's history as incorporating v/isdom.
The finil point, point six, implies a willingness to accept gen-
uine reform, but shov;s a decided skepticism tov/ard the value
of change.
An analysis of Kirk's points of Conservatism indicates
that he is somev/hat inclined toward what shall be described later
in this chapter as the libertarian form of Conservatism. Point
two gives an accolade to pluralism, point three suggests limit-
ations on government, point four declares freedom to be valuable,
and point six gives an at least half-hearted endorsement to re-
form. It shall be seen later that not all Conservatives agree
on these points.
Franlc Meyer, a rather more consistent Conservative Liber-
tarian (though he considers himself, a centrist so far as Conser-
vative doctrine is concerned), has his ovra six points of Conser-
vative belief. These may be profitably compared vdth those of Kirk.
(1) Conservatism assumes the existence of an objective moral
order based upon ontological foundations. ..( 2) Within the limits
of an objective moral order, the primary reference of conserva-
tive political and social thought and action is to the individual
person... (3) Conservatism is profoundly anti-utopian. . . (if) On
the basis of concern for the individual person and rejection
of Utopian planning, conservatives believe in a strict limitation
of the power of government ... (5 ) From these points American con-
servatiem derives its firm support of the Constitution of the
United States as originally conceived— to achieve the protection
of individual liberty in an ordered society by limiting the oower
of governrasnt.. ,(6) In their devotion to Western civilization
and taeir firm American patriotism, conservatives are deeply
aware of the danger of Communism as an armed and messianic threat
to the very existence of Western civilization and of the United
States. 22
It is noticeable that there are certain themes in Meyer
that are not present in Kirk, and still others that are expanded
far beyond their dimensions in Kirk, It can be seen, first,
that while both Kirk and Meyer believe in an objective, knowable
moral order, that of Kirk is exclusively religious, whereas that
is not necessarily true of that of Meyer, Second, Meyer clearly
embraces individualism (though point two shows it to be a qual-
ified individualism), whereas Kirk supports individualism only
by implication, Meyer also coaes out much more strongly and
unambiguously for the limitation of government than does Kirk.
In point number six, Meyer raises explicitly an issue about which
a great deal more will be heard with regard to the nature of
Conservatism: the role of Conservatives as conservatore of Western
civilization. It is also of importance to note that, with the
exception of a stricture against utcpianism,. one does not find
in Meyer's defintion of Conservatism Kirk*s rather strong ad-
monitions against the dangers of change, nor is there the stress
upon social elitism. These arc, in all likelihood, more diff-
erences of degree than anything else, but differences of degree
^^rank S, Meyer, The Conservative Mainstream (New Rochelle,
New York: Arlington House, 1969), pp. 1^-16.
can, nevertheless, be of very great significance in the under-
standing of a political philosophy.
A substantially different view of Conservatism is found
in the theory of L, Brent Bozell, a man who cannot be accused
of being even a modified libertarian. The flavor of this comes
through very strongly in Bozell' s writings.
We of the Christian V/est ovie our identity to the central
fact of history— the entry of God onto the human stage. IVe do
not regard the Incarnation as a supernatural stunt, but as a
terrestrial event: God, in time, with us...The Christian eschaton
is post-human. The purpose was to impart the means for dealing
with human imperfections— for easing man's way to his ultimate
goal, and for realizing, in this life, his maximum human poten-
tialities. , .Our commission is to plant in history the ideals
and the standards contained in Christian truth—and to build
institutions and foster mores that vri.ll help sustain these ideals
in short, to build a Christian civilizatior. emphasis Bozell' s...
The V/est, the geographical place, is unimportant. The '-Vest,
the civilization, is of consuming importance. It is what happ-
ened when man set out to build Augustine's earthly city...Our
good fortune belongs to the human race. '.Ve are chosen only in
this sense; that because we have received, we have the duty to
give... If we know v/hat our mission is, the "will" to carry it
out Yfill follow as a matter of course...The V/est is.; a God-orie^nte
civilization. 23
Several months later, Bozell sketched in further details
of his theory of man and society. It shall >^e seen that this
addition was even less amenable to the notion of liberty, at
least insofar as liberty is felt to have anything to do 'jri.th
individual freedom of choice, than was the above writing.
If freedom is the "first principle" in politics, virtue is,
at best, the second one; and the programmatic aspects of the
movement that affirms that hierarchy will be determined accor-
dingly...The freedom that is necessary to virtue ,such as the
^^L» Brent Bozell, "To Magnify the West," National Review,
Vol. 12#16 (April 2k, 1962), p. 287.
desire to go to church, whether one is able to or noB is presum-
ably a freedom no man vail ever be without. ..If moral freedom
is beyond the reach of politics, surely politics has better thing;
to do than making the preservation of moral freedom its chief
preoccupation.
.
. Man's nature is such, hov/ever, that he, uniquely
among created beings, has the capacity to deviate from the patt-
erns of order—to, as it were, repudiate his nature: i.e. he
is free. So viewed, freedom is hardly a blessing; add the rav-
ages of original sin and it is the path to disaster. It follows
that if individual roan is to have any hope of conforming vri.th
his nature, he needs all of the help he can get. That is why
the role of grace is so vital to the Christian view of things,
not only supernatural grace, but the natural grace that springs
forth from man's constructs: his institutions, his customs, his
laws— the ones that have been inspired by his better angel and
that remain in time to give nourishment to all of the human, race.
V/hen a comraonv/ealth builds according to the divine patterns of
order, then it is in a position to help man conform to his nature
which is the meaning of virtue. .. Since man v/ill always have suff-
icient moral, freedom, i.e. sufficient occasions for "proving
himself"—and even for doing so heroically; and since these occ-
asions are basically traceable to his corruption, the ideal to
which man should aspire is to minimi ze such occasions— to develop
the kind of character that will generate virtuous acts as a matte
of course. For, as the mystics tell us, true saaictity is achieve
only when man loses his freedom— v/hen he is free of the tempta-
tion to displease God. ..The urge to freedo'ri for its own sake
1b, In the last analysis, a rebellion against nature; it is the
urge to b8 free from God. 2Z+
It can be seen that the Conservatism of L. Brent Bo sell
is radically different from that of Kirk and especially that
of Keyer. What he does is to take themes present in thera. and
basically in all of Conservatism, and carry them far beyond the
limits Kirk and Meyer vwuld be ^Tilling to go. Though Kirk goes
part way in endorsing a sanctified state and Meyer might do so,
Bozell endorses what in effect is a theocracy, though he argues
rather unconvincingly that this is not v;hat he advocates. In
Brent Bozell, "Freedom Or Virtue?", National Review .
Vol. 13#10 (September 11, 1962) » pp» 1SI-I82, l3if, and l87.
line with this position, in a radical departure from what might
be called the mainstream Conservative position, Bozell says no-
thing at all about the desirability of limited government. In
fact, by stressing the need of government and society to erect
institutions to direct man to the good, in Bozell' s phrase, "to
help nan to conform to his nature", Bozell goes a long way to
denying the possibility of limiting the government to any great
extent. Further, by stressing so strongly the need for a Christian
civilization, Bozell effectively transforms Kirk and Meyer's
skepticism about change to an absolute animosity against change.
If the state exists only to realize Christian doctrine, this
doctrine having been set irrevocably centuries ago, change (ex-
cept toward Christianity) can never ba either safe or desirable.
Finally, this attitude tends to extend the Conservative view
that prescription is a reasonably accurate guide to the proper
functioning of society into a view that prescription is the in-
fallible authority for all questions on earth. It shall be seen
later in tliis chapter and elsewhere in the dissertation the great
extent to wiiich Bozell 's thought, possibly not accidently, re-
flects that of Maistre,
Since World War II, a new view of Conservatism, or perhaps
a new variant of it, is said to have developed. This is what
has been called New Conservatism, and its principal exponent
is Peter Viereck, Viereck's view of Conservatism will follow.
h3
The conservative principles par excellence are vrovortlon
and measure; self-expression through self-restraint^; preserva-
tion through reform; humanism and classical balance; a fruitful
nostalgia for the permanent beneath the flux; and a fruitful
obsession for unbroken historic continuity. These principles
together create freedom, a freedom built not on the quicksand
of adolescent defiance but on the bedrock of ethics and law...
The core and fire-center of conservatism, its emotional elan,
is a humanist reverence for the dignity of the individual soul...
Democracy, though slowly attained and never by revolutionary
leaps, is the best government on earth v^hen it tries to make
all its citizens aristocrats. But not when it guillotines who-
ever is individual, superior, or just dif ferent . . .In times of
shallow prosperity, the conservative function is to insist on
distinguishing value from price; vdsdom from cleverness; haiop-
iness from hedonism; reverence from success-v;orship. In times
of defeat, conservatism reminds us that we must still respect
moral and social law, no matter how desperate our apparent crisis
and no matter how radiant the ends that would "justify" our using
lawless means... The conservative lays the greatest possible stress
on the necessity and sanctity of law. To him the "general laws",
to which Thucydides referred, must be supreme over the partic-
ular ego of any individual or class or state. General ethics
must restrict the particular means, regardless of ends... Sad
experience v/ould teach us that man can only maintain his exist-
ence through guiding it by the non-e]<istent : by the moral abso-
lutes of the spirit .. .Whenever possible, bad should be elimin-
ated. . .Western conservatism is evolutionary; Eastern and often
Central European conservatism is authoritarian and irrational...
The conservative evolves change peacefully and gradually from
above instead of by unhistorical haste or by mob methods from
below...The conservative resists the trend to sacrifice liberte
to fe'galite .. .Freedom should be the goal of all political action...
Tc prevent majority rule from becoming majority despotism, every
stable society has certain traditional institutions acting as
brakes on precipitous mass action... For the history-minded con-
servative, individual liberty derives less from political abstrac-
tions and economic tinlcerings than from Christianity and from
its extension of the' free Athenian ideal. . .Inward moral reform
of the individual, which economic determinists are perennially
"er-rposing" as a reactionary trick to postpone progress, must
preceede or at least accompany the outward material reform of
society. ..Conservatives claim that every human being is by nature
barbarous, capable of every insanity and atrocity. . .Conservatism,
which is for politics what classicism is for literature, is in
turn the political secularization of the doctrine of original sin. 2^
^^Peter Viereck, Conservatism Revisited : The Revolt Against
Revolt . (Hew York: Charles Scribner'e Sons, I9it9)i PP» 6, 9,10, 13iT4 , l3, 19,
27, 29, and 30
To have called Viereck»s theory of Conservatism "New Con-
servatism" may well have been an error. While there are undoubt-
edly major differences between Viereck's theory and that of Bozell
(centering primarily around the former's greater willingness
to accept reform and greater stress on individualism and liberty),
Viereck's theory nonetheless fits in rather well with a given
current of Conservatism, that of Burke. What is significant
Is that Viereck, as has been seen, recognizes the fact that Con-
servatism is divided, and has some idea of the issues that di-
vide it. Beyond this, however, the basic structure of Viereck 's
thought fits into a pattern of Conservatism that need not be
called "new".
Michael Oakeshott, in his view of Conservatism, takes the
stress on individualism and limited government further than any
other Conservative. He basically comes to the view that Conser-
vatism is an endorsement of the Lockean "Night V/atchman" state,
and he even uses some Lockean language in his description.
What makes a conservative dispositiop. in politics intellig-
ible is nothing to do wdth a natural lav/ or a providential order,
nothing to do vrich morals or religion; it is the observation
of our current ^i.^nner of living combined ivith the belief (which
from our point of viev/ need be regarded as no more than an hy-
pothesis) that "overning is a specific and limited activity,
namely the provi.siori and custody of general rules of conduct,
^vliich are understood, not as plans for imposing substantive ac-
tivities, but as instruments enabling people to pursue the ac-
tivities of their ovm. choice vath the minimum frustration, and
therefore something which it is appropriate to be conservative
about. ..The office of government in the Conservative vievr is
not to impose other beliefs and activities upon its subjects,
not to tutor or to educate them, not to malie them better or happier
in another way, not to direct them, to galvanize them into action,
to lead them or to coordinate their activities so that no occ-
asion of confict shall occur; the office of government is merely
to rule. This is a specific and limited activity, easily corr-
upted when it is combined v/ith any other, and, in the circumstances
indispensable. The image of the ruler is the umT)iro v/hose bus-
iness it is to administer the rules of the game/. .In short, the
intimations of government are to be found in ritual, not in rel-
igion or philosophy; in the enjoyment of orderly and peaceable
behaviour, not in the search for truth or perfection, ^6
Oakeshott appears to be virtually alone among Conservatives
in feeling Conservatism to uphold the notion of an ethically-
neutral state. Government, in Oakeshott 's view and (according
to hin) that of Conservatism, is to permit men "to pursue the
activities of their own choice v/ith the minimum frustration",
or, in contemporary usage, to do their ovm thing. It can be
seen hov; radically these views of Oakeshott 's depart from 7;hat
might be called orthodox Conservatism, The society is, first
of all, either entirely ncrmless, or, at most, gets its norms
from the common consent of the ccmmun^.ty. Any system of universal
morals, be they religious or non-religious, is expressly denied.
The fact that Oalteshott believes this to be part of Conservatism
leads one to believe that he does not believe Original Sin, or
human inperfection, to be part of Conservative doctrine, for
if men are capable of compacting together to determine what their
moral law ought to be» they must be either perfect or very close
to it, V/hile, as has been truly said. Conservatism is not an
infallible Church capable of enforcing its strictures upon pain
26Michael Oakeshott, On Being Conservative , in Witonski,
ed, , The Wisdom Of Conservatism, I, 110-111, 114-115* and 117»
of excommunication, any philosophy must have a certain core of
belief binding morally upon those who claim to be its adherents.
It seems to me that, ;vith regard to Conservatism, Oakeshott has
passed beyond the boundaries into some sort of Ayn Rand-type
atomism.
It has been seen that, just as there is great disagreement
among anti-Conservatives as to the characteristics of Conserva-
tism, so there is substantial disunity among the advocates of
Conservatism on this question. With a hope to establishing some
clearer understanding, it vo.ll nov; be well to examine the thoughts
of some v/ho are neutral on the conflict between Conservatism and
its foes.
In general, conservatives v/ish to preserve present or oast
values rather than to create or adopt new ones.
. .Conservatives
oppose equalitarianism and support the Constitution and private
property. », Conservatives are likely to be skeptical of the rat-
ionality of men, especially when_they act in groups. .. Convention
and experience are safer guides lin the Conservative vievr thar.
experiment, statistics, and inference for the foundation of huiuan
institutions.
.
.If an institution exists, that e>d.stence is priina
facie evidence of its validity. The burden of proof is always
upon the advocates of change ... Cons ervativo.g do not approve of
concentrated poiver in public governments. . .(Continuity isj a leading
principle of conservatism..^'^
There are certain basic canons that have been commonly rec-
ognized by intellectual conservatives from the days of Burke
to the present time. These can be summarized as: (1) man is
a blend of good and evil; he is neither perfect nor is he per-
fectible; (2) society is the product of slow historical growth;
(3) existing institutions embody the wisdom of prior generations;
there is a presumption in favor of that which has survived the
test of time; ik) religion is the foundation of civil society;
27Jasper B. Shannon, "Conservatism," The Annals Of the
American Academy Of Political and Social Science . Vol. 3^^ (Nov-
ember 1962), pp. 1^, ^3, 19, and 2if.
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(5) prudence, experience, and habit are often better guides than
reason and logic; (6) society requires claeces and orders—tho
superior clneses must be allowed to have a hand in the directjon
of the ctate in such a wsy as to balance the numerical prepon-derance of the inferior classes; and (?) duties are superior
to rights. Although the rneaning of these principles has changedfrom generation to generation and even from thinker to thinker,
there is a substantial area of agreement among genyine conser-
vatives in respect to their ultimate assumptions.'-^
A conservative is one who wishes to preserve or conserve
certain existing institutions or nrinciples.
. .There have, of
course, been profound differences among the various conservative
thinkers, but they have generally agreed on certain basic prin-
ciples of political philosophy. They have always been skeotical
of the idea that there is any single clear-cut scheme which will
solve all of man's political, social, and economic difficulties.
Though many of then; have been ardent reformers, they have refused
to believe that human nature can be completely transformed by
legislation or that any sot of political reforms will bring about
the creation of a golden age. The conservatives have always
claimed to be great admirers of reason, but they have rejected
all political schemes based solely upon abstract reason without
reference to concrete experience and the accuraulat-jd wisdom of
many generations. They have insisted that any one generation
of men can progress only if it is willing and able to profit
from the mistakes and successes of pact generations and to msike
use of the stored-up practical wisdom of its ancestors. . .They
have argued that to be successful any system of government must
be in accord with the spirit, the ideals, and the traditions
of a people, . .Most conservatives have also argued that the ac-
tions of the majority ( li ka the actions of any minority) should
be subject to the dictates of "natural" or higher law, ..The con-
servatives have always been devout believers in the general
principle of individualism. . .They have argued in favor of vrtvy
far-reaching freedom of thought and expression, but they hnve?
insisted that this freedom cannot be absolute or unconditional...
They have always been in favor of the general principle of pri-
vate property and of property rights, but they also believed
that the state should take an active interest in tho economic
welfare of its citizens, . .The conservatives have usually claimed
not only that man is naturally and fundamentally sinful, but
also that it is almost if not absolutely impossible to change
human nature— at least by governmental means. '^9
op
Henry J. Schmandt, A History Of Political Philosophy
(Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, I960), p. 323.
^^Williara M. McGovern and David S. Collier, Radicals and
Conservatives (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957), PP» 15-19 and 8l.
Now that so Kany varying views of Conservatism hsive been
seen, it is necessary to distill from thea the answer to the
questiott tkat is the subject of this section, namely, what is
CoBcervatism? When dealing with a subject such as this, great
pains must be taken to keep it from becoaing either (based on
•Re»c feelings) an apologia or an attack. As much as one c-^n,
I shall endeavor t© be objective,
Tke foremost fact that must be considered about Conserva-
ticM is its belief that there is a knowable and universal moral
law. There is no room in CoiaservatisM for ethical relativisa,
at least as far as the key principles of moral law are concerned,
Tbcse principles have been set once and for all time and, hew-
ever derived, ©we none of their legitimacy to their popularity.
The ffioral law is strictly beyond the control of huiaaa beings.
It is probably a majority position aiaong Conservatives tkat tr.e
ii«st iffpartant portions of the Horal law derive from a beneficent
Gi&d Who intervenes in the affairs of men, and yet a Conservative
could believe in opposition to this that moral laws derive fraa
the unshakeable necessities of human existence or the actions
•f a brilliant ancient law-giver, A Conservative could embrace
deisM, pantheism, agnosticism, or even atheism, without necess-
airily being false t© his philosophical creed, Iffhile the two
Conservatives treated as archetypes ia this work were both firm
theists, this seed not be taken as a necessary part ©f the def-
iaitioa. It is quite likely that this belief in a knowable moral
law, unchanging throushout the generations, is what gives Con-
servatism both its sense of rightness (no pun intended) and its
frequent rigidity. It is difficult to muster un-self-conscious
zeal if one is only blindly defending the status quo or protec-
ting one»s property, but when one feels he is a warrior for the
cause of revealed and perpetual truth, that is a different sit-
uation indeed*
Conservatism viev;s man as a fallible being. The degree
to which tliis view is held, however, differs enormously among
Conservatives. There are those like Maistre and Bozell who tend
to accept the idea of Original Sin with little or no diminution,
and therefore see man as a rather evil creature. Then there
are Conservatives like Burke and Meyer, v/ho , while possibly in-
fluenced by the idea of Original Sin, just do not see man as
being particularly sinful. I'/blle not blind to man's weaknesses
and even \'ices, these Conservatives, either expressly or by in-
timation, tend to minimize the potency of these attributes.
Mar. is no saint, and yet without an inordinate degree of effort
or tutelage he can be expected to lead a reasonably moral exist-
encea It is, therefore, correct to say that not all Conserva-
tives believe in an unadulterated version of Original Sin, or
at least do not apply this theological concept to their polit-
ical theories. This important difference betv/een the authori-
tarian and the libertarian schools of Conservatism, one seeing
man as sinful and the other merely as fallible, lies at the root
of the very real disputes between them.
Conservatism sees itself as the guardian of Western civ-
ilization, or (more correctly) as the guardian of certain prin-
ciples
-v-rithin Western civilization. This point cannot be stressed
too strongly, both for what it shows of Conservatism as a whole
and for what it points out about the divisions vdthin Conserva-
tiem. To the extent Conservatism seeks to maintain institutions
or social patterns deriving from the past, it does so not nec-
essarily out of an advocacy of the past as past, but out of ad-
herence to principles enbodied in these institutions or social
patterns. Conservatism is either a principled advocacy of the
status quo, or, should its beloved principles have been dethroned,
a principled advocacy of change. There is nothing necessarily
incongruous about spealcing about Conservatives as advocates of
change, because adherence to a set of principles is just as likely
to dictate holding the position of a social critic as it is to
dictate being a pillar of the "establishment"; it shall be seen
shortly, however, that Conservatives lack enthusiasm for change
as such. Another point of great importance to the understanding
of Conservatism must be stressed in this regard: Western civil-
ization, despite v;hat some of its defenders may say, is obviously
not a homogeneous tradition. Those who, therefore, see it as
their role in life to defend the principles of Western civilization
may divide into csunps based upon which of the principles of Western
civilization they wdsh to defend. Specifically, there are those
Conservatives who feel called upon to defend the right of the
individual to manifest his personality, keeping in mind, however,
man'G fallibility. This is the group that is called Conserva-
tive Libertarian (;vith both elements of the name stressed equally).
Then there are the Conservatives who stress the more authoritarian
aspects of Western civilization, who favor the unlimited corporate
society and the group over the individual, and v/ho, far from
feeling individual self-expression to be even a modified good,
feel it to be the root of sin and evil. This second group is»
of course, the Conservative Authoritarians. V/hat must be stressed
i£5 that both schools are honest in claiming the title of "defender
of Western civilization", and yet they are defending very diff-
erent elen-.onts within it. The very act of defending .Vestern
civilization, therefore, pulls the two schools of Conservatism
apart.
Conservatism feels the principles it defends derive either,
as has been seen, from the changeless moral law, or from the
accumulated customs of the nation, or from both. Conservatives,
however, differ on the source of a country's customs. Some feel
that they are the result of God's intelligence (or the workings
of some other, often unspecified, non-human source) acting vd-thin
history. Others embrace the view that custom is the collected
experience of many generations of men, each generation being
both as wise and as foolish as the present one. It can be seen,
therefore, that there is a significant difference of opinion
among the two Conservative camps in their attitude toward custom;
one side respects custom and the other venerates it. For one
group of Conservatives, custom is something not of human origin
and either unchanging or changing in a way men cannot control.
To the other, custom is a record of the usages of many genera-
tions of human beings, with custom therefore being evolutionary
in nature by human action, and a possibility even existing of
there being bad customs (something the logic of the first Con-
servative school cannot really concede).
This leads to an examination of the Conservative attitude
toward change. Conservatism is either skeptical or antagonistic
toward change. It does not overly trust the ability of the human
mind to judge the quality of its inheritence or to plan alter-
ations of it. Such changes as are undertal^en should be based
on a true understanding of what man is and what bis history teache
Beyond this, however, the two schools of Conservatism vary mar-
kedly in their feelings toward change. The authoritarian school
is inclined to see society as perfect, or at least as perfect
as man is able to make it, and therefore views as either foolish
or heretical the attempt to institute any more than the most
trivial changes. The libertarian school, while having no enthu-
siasm for change, does see major changes for the better as possibl
and sometimes even necessary. That these differences between
the two Conservative schools bespeak major differences in their
views of man and society need hardly be stressed at any great
length*
Both forms of Conservatism believe there should be limita-
tions on government, but they differ importantly on what the
nataxe of these limitations should be and who should be the re-
cipient of the benefits of them. The Conservative Authoritarians
believe there is a moral law above the government to which it
must adhere and which it may not alter. This is obviously a
very real limitation on government, but not, as it turns out,
one that rebounds to the benefit of individual freedom. This
is so bec-.use, while it is not permitted to determine the char-
acteristics of the moral law, the government is morally oblig-
ated to enforce them. It is felt that the individual is just
too weak to do what he ought to on his own volition, but he can,
nevertheless, be "forced to be free." It can be seen instantly
what this does to any possibility of individual liberty, but
it must be pointed out in addition that this tends to uiake the
government itself subordinate to some other authority that rules
infallibly on the contents of the moral law and hands dovm binding
orders to government for their enforcement. Such a syatsm, there-
fore, robs both the individual and the de jure government of all
claim to rights and (based on the principle that power, like
nature, abhors a vacuum) temds t« vest all power in a de facto
theocratic government of priests. What starts out in authori-
tarian Conservatism as a system of sweeping limitations upon
government ends in a system of potentially totalitarian power.
Conservativo Libertarianism also believes government should be
limited and made to adhere to the moral law, but here the natures
of the two forms of Conservatism diverge. Libertarianism, based
on its rather more optimistic view of man, does not think quite
so much of taking power from political authority in order to
place it in the hands of established moral authority, but rather
seeks a true limitation on the authority which can be v/ielded
by any institution over the indi\rLdual« Conservative libertar-
ianism, therefore, tends to think more in. the direction of in-
dividual rights which may, if necessary, be vindicated by indiv-
idual action, than does its authoritarian sibling. It is not
that one wing of Conservatism believes more in the validity of
moral lav; or In the necessity of having it pervade the entire
society than does the other, but that the two v.dngs differ ra-
ther fundamentally as to hov; this desirable state of affairs
is- to be brought about. 7/hile Conservative libertarianism denies
the right, or even the power, of government to command observance
of the moral law (v/ith the exception of those acts which are
properly subject to the authority of criminal justice) , it does
nonetheless insist that government ought to serve as a good ex-
ample for the citizens under its care^
The logic of the above would seem to dictate somewhat diff-
erent attitudes toward private property from the two variants
of Conservatism. It must be said, at the outset, that both types
place a high value on private ovmership of property, but do so
for different reasons. Libertarianism stresses the need for
private property both becauce it believes it to be a basic human
right (and important for the moral well-being of the individual
as well) and because it serves as a powerful check upon govern-
ment, by giving the individual a powerful means of self-suf ficien(
It has already been seen that the libertarian fears political
institutions claiming excessive power, however defined, over
the individual. The authoritarian vd.ng values private property
because it believes it to lead to beneficial social results.
v;hile the libertarian probably agrees on this point, he does
not believe it to be the primary reason for the existence of
private property. In the authoritarian scheme of things, there-
fore, private property has a somewhat uncertain tenure. It may
continue to be in effect so long as it remains socially produc-
tive (v;hich there is a strong presumption it T/ill continue to
be), and only so long as this is true.
Conservatism has been said to be elitist, and though this
is true, it is possible to overstress it* In the Conservative
view, orders and classes are a permanent part of human existence.
It is vain to expect all people to wield the same degree of in-
fluence in society or government. This is because the abilities
of people are just not equal. Based on superiority in intell-
igence or the advantages accruing to favored birth (neither of
which can ever bo equalized) , some people vdll just naturally
excel. For a state to legislate an end of inequality ;70uld be
just like it repealing the law of gra'i/lty. Political and social
inequality do not, however, imply moral inequality. Conserva-
tism feels all people to have equal rights to the protection
and benefits the state can offer, though, of course, different
Conservatives differ on the nature of the benefits government
can offer. It was this opposition to treating people as morally
unequal that caused Burke and Maistre, vmo vrere different in
so many ways, to be as one in their opposition to slavery. As
proof of Conservatism's belief in moral equality, at least until
the individual in question commits a crime, it will be seen that
even while they v/ere reviling the French revolutionaries as sav-
ages, criminals, and renegades against God, neither Burke nor
Maistre at any time intimated that these criminals v/ere in any
way congorJ-tally more given to crime than anyone else. Both
the authoritarian and libertarian v/ings of Conservatism agree
on this belief in moral equality, this being something that diff-
erentiates authoritarianism from Fascism with which it is some-
times (erroneousl.y) compared. As has already been seen, hov/ever,
the two forms of Conservatism differ in their view of the moral
level at which men are equal. The authoritarian has little faith
in the moral goodwill of the human being, whereas the libertarian
is somewhat more optimistic on this regard.
An important characteristic of Conservatism is its doubt
about the efficacy of human reason and the definition it often
gives to the term "reason"* While Conservatism does not necess-
arily deny the existence of reason, it believes there are sharp
limitations upon it» To talk about people creating or recreating
their society based on their individual complements of reason
is treated as the greatest folly. Individual reason is just
not felt to be that powerful. The course of true reason consists
in following the dictates of morality and the customs of the
nation, either with or without understanding. The attitude of
the two sides of Conservatism to what is generally termed "reason"
is an important difference betv/een them* Both are inclined to
accept the existence of individual reason, but after that the
differences set in. Libert arianism believes individual reason
to be of a certain degree of use, so long as it is kept in a
subordinate position to morality. Despite this, reason can be
of value in understanding morality. Authoritarianism., on the
other hand, equates indi-'/idual reason v/ith sin, evil, and rebell-
iousness. The dictates of morality require that individual reason,
which allows man to doubt and question, must, in the authoritarian
perspective, be totally effaced from the earth. It is, there-
fore, quite correct to say that Conservative authoritariarJ.sn
is an enemy of human liberty, at least if liberty is felt to
involve the power of individual decision-making.
This last point brings up a major difference between the
tvio aspects of Conservatism.. Both consider themselves to be
defenders of liberty, but their definitions of liberty differ
significantly. Libertarianism definitely believes liberty to
consist in choosing v;hat is right, but believes in addition that
this choosing must be free. It is only the choice of virtue,
while under no external constraint to so choose, that is the
essence of liberty. The libertarian position is, therefore,
a compromise between positive and negative theories of freedom*
V?hile free choice is a necessary part of freedom (negative freedom),
this freedom must end up directed into the proper channels for
the person to be correctly designated "free" (positive freedom).
Ko such compromise position is present in Conservative author-
itarianism. Here freedom is deemed to be the embracing of correct
attitudes, however this embrace comes into being. In other words,
coerced freedom, which is a contradiction in terms to libertar-
ianism, may not be so to authoritarianism. That is not to say
an authoritarian is necessarily a devotee of coercion through
torture (Maistre, for example, opposed the use of the Holy In-
quisition, except for defensive purposes, this being, in prac-
tice, an ambiguous distinction.), it is just that there is no-
thing in his creed to preclude such a position. In summation,
it can be 60en that the two strains of Conservatism have rather
sweepingly different ideas as to what liberty is, and how it
is to be achieved*
Conservatism, even in its libertarian ?Tianife station, be-
lieves the cor'porate nature of man must be considered if msin
is to be understood. Man is not a social atom existing in a
world of social atoms. He is a member of many social groups,
most of them at most only semi-voluntary in nature, and some
of them entirely involuntary: the family, a religion, a social
class, possibly a significant educational group (the Old School
Tie), an occupational group, and lastly a nation, Man is by
his very nature an organized being and is not made to live in
isolation. Not only is man naturally a member of groups, but
this fact gj.ves him an at least semi-fixed position 7athin the
larger society and the state. Conservatism believes in what
has been called an organic society. Society is one structure
of many interrelated and interdependent parts, with the good
of one part ultimately depending upon the good of all, and vice
versa* No individual, under ordinary circumstances, could ever
be right in seeking to set his will against that of society,
but if the society is acting rationally he should have no desire
to. Both libertarian and authoritarian Conservatism agree on
the foregoing points. There are, however, noteworthy difference
betv/een them even here. Authoritarianism believes man can be
understood perfectly by understanding the sum of his group tnem-
berships. There is nothing ultimately independent about any
human being, Libert arianism differs on tliis point. iVhile by
no means minimizing the importance of man's associationai rela-
tionships, libertarianism believes there is still an individual
left v;hen all the person's social groups are, as it were, sub-
tracted from him. This makes some sort of independent existence
possible, and thereby gives to man a certain grandeur resting
in his individuality. While the human being is not the proud
and 7/holly independent atom envisioned by some Liberal tiiinkers
(for example, Locke, in his theory of the State of Nature), nei-
ther ie he wholly determined by his group memberships. He is,
in the final analysis, at least somewhat free*
D, One Conservatism Or Two? Now that a description of
the bacic principles of Conservatism has been given, and some
understanding of the divisions within Conservatism has been gained,
it becomes necessary to ask the important question whether Con-
servatism is one philosophy v/ith authoritarian and libertarian
currents vri.thin it, or v/hether Conservative Libertarianisra and
Conservative Authoritarianism are, in fact, two separate phil-
osophies, vn.th certain points in common? The answer given to
this question must of necessity be somewhat subjective, and yet
I believe my answer can be supported by recourse to the facts*
The two philosophies have somev/hat different views of man, the
^rlevf of man held being the root of any philosophy. One believes
man to have an understanding of both good and evil and, while
having an omnipresent tendency toward evil, also has the ability
to freely choose good. The other philosophy also sees man as
a mixed being, but feels the mixture to be so slsinted toward
evil that nan can only save himself by subordinating himself
to some other-worldly authority, or to the earthly representa-
tive of this authority.
The two formulations of Conservatism differ on what is
worth defending in Western civilization. As was seen, one defends
what could be called a Conservative version of the libertarian
tradition, whereas the other seeks the conservation of a modified
version of the Western authoritarian tradition. The two Conser-
vatisms just do not seek to conserve the same thing.
Devotion to custom, a key element of Conservatism, far
from being a source of unity to the two philosophies, is actually
a fount of discord. This is because "custom" just does not mean
the same thing to both authoritarian and libertarian Conserva-
tism. As has been seen, the first sees it as a direct emanation
of the mind of God or of some great ancient law-giver alone,
and consequently feels custom to be unchanging and beyond the
power of man. Custorn is to be obeyed, and not questioned or
altered. Libertarianisra , on the other hand, definitely accepts
the belief that custom is to be respected, but that is because
it is a record of the knowledge and achievements of many gener-
ations of men, a process which, it must be added, is still going
on. When two schools of thought both claiming to be Conserva-
tive disagree on a matter so important to Conservatism as the
D;eaning of "custom", one has a right to take this as evidence
of a major divorce.
It has also been seen that the two Conservatisms differ
rather significantly, in practice, on the subject of governmental
power. Libertarianism favors fairly strict limitations on gov-
ernment, mainly because it favors more authority being left to
social (as opposed to political) structures, rather than to the
state, and also because it believes the individual to be morally
fit to be allowed some measure of authority over his ov/n life.
What authoritarianism feels about man has already been seen.
Nevertheless, authoritarianism claims to favor limited govern-
ment also. This limitation, however, is of the nature of sev-
erely emasculating the political agency, and vesting absolute
pov/er over the individual in a moral agency. Usually this moral
agency would probably be a Church. What the genuine positions
of the two Conservatisms on government power are, therefore,
are limited government on one side, and at least incipient tot-
alitarianism on the other. That this is a basis for deep and
probably bitter dispute need hardly be belabored.
The different attitudes of the tv/o Conservatisms toward
private property must be closely considered. It must be stressed
that the defense of private property is a very important theme
of Conservatism. Libert arianlsni, in essence, sanctifies private
property and aakes its defense as close to a moral absolute as
anything in the theory (It vdll be seen later that it took truly
enormous abuses in India to get Burke to consent to the virtual
nationalization of the East India Ccm.pany,). Authoritarianism's
defense of private property is more pragmatic, and therefore
not as strong. It sees private ovmership of property as desir-
able because it is felt to lead to beneficial social results,
which is a less than rousing defense of the institution. In
the final analysis, according to the authoritarian perspective,
the individual cannot claim private property as a matter of in-
disputable right. His property may be legitimately taken from
him if his possession of it is felt no longer to serve the needs
of society.
The two Conservative philosophies also differ in the forms
their elitism takes. Both believe in the social and political
inequality of men, and in their moral equality. As has already
been seen, however, the absolute moral level at which this moral
equality is felt to exist differs markedly between the views
of the two philosophies, based on their different conceptions
of man.
These philosophies have different attitudes toward the
extent of human reason and toward its safety and efficacy. Nei-
ther believes man to be a primarily rational animal, but liber-
tarianism believes reason to be a greater attribute of man than
doos authoritarianism. Libertarianism is inclined to believe
man can order his existence through reason to some extent, whereas
authoritarianism is not even this sanguine. Finally, authoritar-
ianism believes reason to be always dangerous v/hen allowed to
work in the affairs of ro.en, whereas libertarianism believes reason
can be made safe if placed under proper guidance. It is true
that these are basically differences of degree, and yet they
are still fundamental differences between the two philosophies.
This difference of opinion about reason is matched by one
on liberty. Liberty just does not mean the same thing to the
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two theories. For both, liberty is essentially the leading of
a proper moral existence, but libertarianism insists this moral
life must be freely chosen for liberty to be said to exist.
Authoritarianism insists upon no such limitations. In its view,
that man is free who adheres to a moral style of life, however
that adherence comes to be. A man can indeed be forced to be
free. Here again is another point on which there is a substan-
tial base of agreement between the two philosophies, but cn which
the disagreements are equally significant.
Finally, the two Conservatisms even differ in their views
about the limits of corporate society. Both believe corporate
associations to be very important for the molding and well-being
of the individual, but authoritarianism believes corporate struc-
tures pre-empt the entire social v/orld. Libertarianism, in con-
trast to this view, believes a cert.ain (probably not very large)
area of autonomy is left to the care of the individual. Again
this difference is only a matter of degree, and yet it would
be a mistake to underrate its significance.
One should not over-estimate the differences between Con-
servative Libertarianism gind Conservative Authoritarianism.
Of the many political philosophies extant, they are probably
closer to each other than they are to any other political phil-
osophies. Nevertheless, they are separate philosophies, not
merely variations within a single philosophy. Therefore, in
reply to the question that opened this section, it is possible
to declare with some confidence that there are tv/o Conservatisms, not one.
The remainder of this dissertation shall be devoted to
exploring the political philosophies of Edinund Burke and Joseph
De Maistre, as representatives of the two Conservative philos-
ophies. It is obviously somewhat dangerous to use the political
thoughts of persons as archetypes for general philosophies, and
yet in the cases of Burke and Maistre I believe they are suff-
iciently true to the varying traditions of Conservatism to allow
an intensive examination of their theories to serve as an expli-
cation of the two Conservatisms. That shall be the goal of this
work.
Chapter II: Views On Man
A. Man As Creation Of God. Both Burke and Maistre are con-
vinced that man is a creation of God, and, at his very worst,
continues to show marks of his divine origin. This belief is
taken in somewhat different directions by the tv;o theorists.
For one thing, Burke apparently felt man partook more of the
essence of a semi-divine creature than Maistre did. One part
of the bill of indictment Burke drew up against the French Rev-
olution concerned its unwillingness to accept a right of dissent.
Severs.! ideas about the intrinsic nature of man must follow
from this. First, man, as creation of God, shares in enough
of the 'sn.sdom of his Maker to cause dissent to be something
other than the folly of a rebellious creature. Man can perceive
his goals and seek to achieve them with a great possibility
of success, Han, due to his divine parentage, is able to work
his will on the physical and social environment, never in ways
counteracting the long-term goals of God, but still acting as
an independent furtherer of God*s will» There can be little
doubt that Burke saw himself as doing exactly this in his crusade
against slavery and for the rights of India* Man is, of course,
not a fully divine creature by any stretch of the imagination,
^Edmund Burke, A Letter To a Noble Lord , in The Works Of
the Ri.?;ht PTonourab] e Sdr?:und Burke In Twelve Volumes , V (London:
Ballantyne, Hanson & Co., l899), 175»
but he is able to see God's moral law, and act effectively in
accordance with it. The aspects of God that Maistre sees man
as possessing are somewhat different. Man is, by his very
nature, a powerful being, but without the help of God his power
only leads to destructiveness.^ To Maistre, man is in some
ways, through his divine genesis, even more powerful than Burke
felt him to be. Not only can man draw up plans of action, but
he can put these plans into effect, even when, in the short
run, they directly resist the will of God. Man will, in the
long run, suffer terribly whenever he is so foolish as to attempt
Bonething like this, just as the French are suffering terribly
for their revolution against God's vn.ll. The crucial thing
to consider, however, is that Maistre believes man can actually
declare war on God, and even win a few battles. It may well
be that the authoritarian, nature of so much of Maistre »s theory
stems frow his appreciation of the tremendous, though unguided,
power of man. Man is a little god without the judgement of
God. Such a creature must be fenced about securely so that
he will not hurt himself* Burke's view of man's divine attri-
butes is simultaneously more complimentary and less complimentary
than that of Maistre. Burke's man has considerably less power
than that of Maistre, in that he is not able to challenge God,
even unsuccessfully. Though Burke shared Maistre 's view that
2Joseph de Maistre, Essay On the Generative Princi-ole Of
Political Constitutions , in The V/orks Of Joseph de Maistre, ed.
by Jack Lively, (London: Allen and Un\7in, 1965) » P» 170.
the French Pevolution was a challenge to religion, he did not
trouble himself much with the deeper philosophical meanings
of this fact. The power man has, however, he is, due to his
God-given reason, able to use effectively to reshape the physical
and social world. Man is able to be a true partner of God,
albeit, of course, not an equal partner. On the whole, therefore.
Burke sees man as more powerful than Maistre does. It is the
long-term results that, are truly important, and these are the
partial prerogatives of Burke's man, not Maistre »s. When the
latter »s man seeks independent activity, he will be finally
frustrated.
This component of the thought of Burke and Maistre should
serve as a partial corrective to those who might view these
thinkers as pessimistic about man. There can be no doubt that
the charge does stick to a significant extent, but neither one
is blind to the special qualities of man that lift him above
the other animals. He is, indeed, capable of doing very great
Sood, when in league with his Malcer.
B. Original Sin. Though some writers do see Burke as
a believer in original sin-^, recourse to Burke's actual writings
makes this by no means clear. If he were an orthodox Christian
in his political thinking, one would expect him to embrace the
concept of original sin, but the degree to v;hich Burke's thought
was genuinely Christian (as opposed to generally religious)
^Alfred Cobban, Edmund Burke and the Revolt Against the
Eighteenth Century (London: Allen and TJnvri.n, I960), p» 84«
is not certain. At any rate, it would be more correct to say
that Burke deals with a flawed man, rather than a fallen man.
If Burke ever believed man to be fundamentally different from
the way man was at present, that is not evident. If man was
flawed, this was due to his innate attributes as a human being,
and not to any sin he or his ancestors may have committed.
Man is a mixed being, but the mixture is not so weighted toward
rebelliousness and sin as to preclude the possibility of liberty.
A reasonable approximation of liberty is possible, so long as
ffian»s imperfect nature is taken into account. The notion of
original sin takes on a much clearer and greater importance
in Maistre. Maistre refers to man as having a "naturally re-
bellious heart", and adds that it is incorrect to say that the
innocent suffer with the guilty in this world, for original
sin neans that no men are truly innocent.^ The idea of original
sin explains everything that happens in the world, constantly
recurs, and, due to the inheritence of moral evil, shows all
mv?n to bo corrupt to the core. It is amazing that a personally'"
kindhsa.rted man like Maistre was absolutely convinced of the
moral degradation of his species. This may be termed properly
the heart and soul of his theory. Man will run to do evil out
of a sheer viciousness, and not out of any desire to receive
reward. It is not likely that any theorist ever painted a more
'^Maistre, First Saint Petersburg Dialogue , in Lively,
Workfr Of Joseph De Maistre, p. l83.
horrible picture of man. All things that Maistre does not like
stem from original sin, the spirit of false pride and rebell-
iousness. Among these baneful derivatives of original sin are
Protestantism, Gallicanism, the Enlightenment, reformism, and
(of course) the French Revolution. All moral and physical ills
that man suffers are the direct result of his original sin and
serve as fitting punishment for it.^ Ko punishment, be it at
the hands of man or of God, can be deemed unjust, for every
man*s sin is so great that any punishment he receives he has
merited, whether it be for the crime charged (in the case of
a human tribunal), or for another crime never detected. The
punishment meted cut to man by God may bs the work of an angry
God, but is also the work of a just and loving God. God punishes
so that man may turn from the ways of sin and return to Him,
which is the only way in which human happiness can be achieved.
Maistre is ^Adlling to admit that in some rare cases a truly
innocent person may be punished, but even this sacrifice stems
from original sin, in that the condemned serves as "a propitiatory
victim" for those most deeply mired in sin.^ Maistre does have
a clear (and perb^^ps exaggerated) view of the griraness of human
existence, and agrees with many of the thinkers of his time,
such as Locke, that God causes this grimness, but unlike them,
^Ibid.
, p. 189.
Maistre, Enlightenment On Sacrifices , in Lively, Works
Of Joseph De Maistre, p. 298.
he feels God to be only the proximate cause, with the ultimate
cause of the human tragedy being man himself. That these two
views of original sin in Burke and Maistre decisively influence
their opinions as to the possibility of liberty and the necessity
of authority certainly follows. Though Burke (knowing his fellow-
man rather well) does recognize man's penchant for sin, the
idea of sin does not bulk very large in his thinking. In BurK;e»s
theory of man, in fact, the true notion is much more adequately
expressed by the phrase "human weakness", than the phrase "human
sin". Man is not so corrupt that he may not act in an indep-
endent, though somewhat controlled, fashion. Maistre 's man
cannot be trusted co be free. He is simply too evil (or, at
best, misguided) a creature to have any hand in governing himself.
As previously stated, the only solution to this dilemma that
Maistre can conceive of is to vest all Earthly authority in
a state that is not a typical state, ruled by a man v;ho is not
a typical man.
C. Degree Of Good and Evil In Man, Obviously, neither
Burke nor Maistre believes man to be either a pure saint or
a pure devil. The truth lies somewhere in between, but to set
its exact location is quite impossible, because neither man
stated his position on this subject explicity. Burke did not
have any great respect for the popular will (to put it mildly),
for in defense of a certain bill he once said that it was demanded
by the people "whose desires, when they do not militate with
the stable and eternal rules of juctice and rcacon (rules which
are above us and above them)
,
ought to be as a law to a House
of Commons."'^ This is not exactly a clarion call for follovdnc
the inevitably good will of the people. It is strongly suggested
that a man will, as often as not, demand that which is contrary
to reason and justice. This theme recurs again and again in
Burko, but never so forthrightly as in a speech given in an
(not surprisingly) unsuccessful attempt to achieve reelection
to Parliament from Bristol. In defense against the charge of
having sold out the interests of Bristol, a major trading center,
with regard to America and Ireland, Burke declared: "I conformed
to the instructions of truth and Nature, and maintained your
interest, against your opinions, with a constancy that became
me," It is rather refreshing to read of a politician who is
willing to say of his constituents right to their faces that
they are a pack of short-sighted immoral fools. This is not,
however, the best way to win votes, as Burke learned to his
misfortune. This speech ends v/ith the stirring declaration
that "The charges against rae are all of one kind; that I have
pushed the principles of general justice and benevolence too far.'
The implication is very clear that man can be regularly relied
7Burke, A Plan For . .
.
the Economical Reformation Of bhc
Ci vil and Other Establishments
, in Burke ' s Works, II, ;^7l.
gBurke, Spoech At the Guildhall In Bristol
.
in Burke '
s
Works, II, 382.
"^Ibid.
, p. if23.
upon to flaunt the dictates of r^ature, justice, and decency.
This is a none too optimistic view of man, and it is one which
Burke never abandoned. That there is a very large component
of evil in man is something that Burke never doubted. There
is, however, another side to Burke's view of man, one stressing
the sociability and decency of man. In his Fragment Af^ainst
the An ti -Popery Laws, Burke rebuts the allegation thaz the
Catholics of Ireland must not be treated with moderation, lest
they rebel, by saying that people rebel against oppression,
not moderation. Man is, therefore, able to recognize when
he is being treated fairly, and will return good for good.
Man, furthermore, may often do wrong, but he does not wish to
do so.'^ It is impossible to say just how evil or how good
Burke felt man to be. Much of this would depend on the mood
ho happened to be in as he was v/riting a given speech or book.
On the v;hole, however, Burke was relatively optimistic about
man, Man may often be ignorant, but he is not really bad«
The average man, for example, is not naturally rebellious.
As will be seen later, a truly national revolution is always
provoked by the evil actions of government. There is very little
consistency, as has been seen, in Burke's view of man's good
and evil. The overall trend is, hov/ever, a positive view.
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Maistre's view of the mixture between human good and evil
is rather easier to relate than that of Burke. Man is corrupted
to the core by original sin, is rebellious against all authority,
and for his own good must have his broken to the dictates
of the nation and the Church. Man not under the guidance of
religion is naturally a cannibal. The savage, the fallen man
unredeemed by society and religion, is far from the virtuous
and happy creature Rousseau felt him to be. He instead is a
wholly corrupt and miserable being, whose salvation constitutes
a genuine miraclo, which can therefore be achieved only by the
true church. The savage is not, as Rousseau believed, the orig-
inal man; he is the man who has once lived in the state and has
EOmehov; been removed from this condition. Such a man is more
monster than man, and Maistre does not hold out much hope for
his redemption. One reason why Maistre did not desire a speedy
counter-revolution in France was that he desired all the rev-
olutionaries, who were savages, to be exterminated so that France
might be prepared for her next king. Four million people would
1 2have to die before France could be saved. A terrible fear
that Maistre had was that the monarchy would be re-established
before all the savages had fallen in war, and the monarch would
mercifully, but foolishly, spare them. The only realistic way
to treat a conquered savage is to put him to the sword. Maistre
1 2.
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is thereby reading one large class of human beings out of the
human race. He really believes that the French revolutionaries
are literally demons. A more balanced view of the Jacobins
is found in Burke when he says that conquered Jacobins must
"be put under the guide, direction, and government of better
Frenchmen than themselves, or they will instantly relapse into
a fever of aggravated Jacobinism. "^^ Burke xeels, therefore,
that even Jacobins are redeemable, and that the problem they
pose is primarily one of education, though undoubtedly a strict
regimen of education. There will be punishment of guilty in-
dividuals, surely including some executions, but punishment
will not be meted out to a whole class (one of Burke's key
charges against the revolutionaries). It is this last proposal
that Maiotre specifically intends to undertake. Large numbers
of people can, to Maistre, be so radically and fundamentally
evil as to be beyond the pale of humanity.
There is in Maistre 's thinking a second class of human
being with an admixture of evil all its own. This is the bar-
barian, the true original man, who still survives in some areas
of the world. He is a strange mixture of good and evil. The
barbarian is the only truly creative man (Ke is, for example,
the only man capable of creating language, a facility Maistre
prizes highly as symbolic of creativity in general.) and, though
''Burke, Remarks On the Policy Of the Allies With Respect
To France, in Burke's Works, IV, z+27.
without religion in any institutionalised sense, is somehow
under the direct sovernment of God. As for human government,
the barbarian has it only in the form of the family. It might
seem that Maistre idealizes the barbarian much as Rousseau
idealized the "noble savage", but such is not really the case.
The barbarian is not what man ought to be. He is the undeveloped
man, and since God wills man's development he is in that degree
divorced from God. For this man to truly be what he ought to
be, he must have government, because he is also fallen man,
though Maistre himself is net fully cognizant of this at all
times and sometimes almost regards the barbarian as analogous
to Rousseau's noble savage. The barbarian must be civilized,
but since the barbarian has never had civilization and lost
it (like the savage), it is not hard to give it to him. The
barbarian is, in fact, subject to ci\'llization by the bearers
of any religion (a major concession from a fervent Catholic
like Maistre) , chis showing just how easy it is to do. The
barbarian's criir:es, other than those stemming from his nature
as a fallen human being, stem from his lack of refinem.ent and
not from any special depravity.
The average man, fallen but under government, was Maistre 's
main interest. This being is "a monstrous centaur", part man
and part beast. Man is a degraded creature v/ho seeks what
Maistre, Second Saint Petersburg Cialo^ue, in Lively,
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he does not really want, and shuns that which he does want.
His saving grace, however, is that he senses his degradation,
this sensation being the source of both misery and grandeur.
Man is not like the other animals. He knows when he does wrong,
and Is therefore capable of being a criminal (which an animal
cannot be) and of being good (which is also impossible for an
animal). God has given man the innate ideas of good and evil.
Kaistre, however, is so convinced of the horrible evil of the
average fallen man that ho despairs of the individual man ever
being able to make himself good. The will is just too base
for that to be possible, mat the human can do, by (paradox-
ically) an enormous act of will, is to place himself completely
under authority, both political and spiritual. The greatest
act of individual will is achieved in the extermination of vd.ll.
Unlike Hobbes, whose solution to the problem of human evil,
the placing of oneself under the, in practice, absolute authority
of another human being, is highly illogical, Maistre's view,
if one accepts his view of the nature of authority, makes perfect
sense. Sinful man is not subordinating his will to the wills
of bther, equally sinful, men, but to institutions created by
God. Kan is not subordinating his will to man, but to God.
The extreme nature of Maistre's solution to human evil shows
Just how deeply imbedded he thought it was. Burke's solution,
which is never really clearly spelled-out, is for every individual
to personally adhere to the known law of God. Only in the rare
instances of flagrant acts of evil, such as those of Hastings
in India, is any authority external to the individual to inter-
vene. This bespeaks a strong faith in human rectitude that
is missing in Maistre. A further example of this difference
between Burke and Maistre on the degree of human evil is shown
by their difference of opinion as to the popular base of the
French R.^volution, which both regard as radically evil. Burke
was of the opinion that any genuinely popular revolution is
always a reaction to misrule and tyranny. Consistent with this
belief, he declares the French Revolution to have been the acti
of a conspiratorial elite carried out in direct opposition to
the expressed will of the French people, as manifested in the
cahiers given to the men elected to the Estates General, The
evil was, therefore, the work of a very small minority, with
the large majority of the French being guiltless. Maistre has
a very different view of these events. He forthrightly declare
that a majority of Frenchmen for two years supported the action
that ultimately culrtainated in the murder of King Louis XVI
Lest it be thought that these differing viov/s on the popular
character of the French Revolution reflect a dislike for the
French by Maistre and a warm feeling for the French by Burke,
and not an attitude toward the dimensions of human evil as such
it should be said that the situation was quite the opposite.
^
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Evon before the French Revolution, Burke had a strong dislike
for and diotrust of the French, probably stemming from his great
British patriotism. Maistre, on the other hand, was very much
the Francophile, and the Revolution did not seriously dent this.
France was always seen by Maistre as the leader of temporal
European Christian civilization, standing by the right hand
of the Pope. Burke, in other words, feels human evil to be
relatively shallow in the individual and not very widespread
in the community, while Maistre feels it to be both deep and
wide .
It is important to understand Maistre' s view on the nature
of human evil, as this greatly influenced the type of author-
itarianii~m he embraced. Maistre accepts the Augustinian view
that evil, including human evil, is a flaw in being that was
1 r
no part of God's original creation. Had man not sinned, there
would have been no evil in human beings (this being, wfhon one
thinks of it, a very confused belief) or any suffering in the
world. Evil is contrary to what man's nature ought to be, and
all suffering, including all illness, is the result of moral
vice and exists due to God's desire to expiate man's guilt while
he yet lives, and thereby earn hin: some redemption cheaply.
Man, not God, is therefore the ultimate author of evil and
suffering. The reason why Maistre desires human subordination
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to authority is the same reason why Maistre's foes desired human
freedom from non-responsible authority. Maistre wants man to
be rendered whole and, since his evil subtracts from his whole-
ness, evil must be removed at all costs, in the name of humanity.
The removal of e-ril vdll be the removal of all disease and
unhappiness. The realization of man is the goal of Maistre,
and this is to be accomplished by removing from man that which
is unreal. Maistre may, therefore, be called a humanistic author-
itarian. There is really very little to say about Burke's view
of the nature of human evil, for such a deeply philosophical
subject was not generally to Burke's liking. About all that
can be done is to suggest what Burke's approach to such a question
rould have been if he had had to tackle it. It is clear that
Burke's belief in a merciful and loving God would not have per-
mitted him to believe in God as the ultimate source of evil.
This would have forced Burke to say that either God was not
omnipotent T much evil and suffering thereby being purely for-
tuitous, or that man himself was the source of evil, ks one
may assume Burke would not have been prepared to deny God's
omnipotence, he would therefore have been driven to either vest
absolute pov/er over man in some divinely-sanctioned institution
or institutions (v/hich was Maistre's solution) or succumb to
despair. That he did neither was the result of his extreme
disinclination to live in the rarified realms of pure philosophy,
though there was certainly an impressive foundation of ITatural
Law philoscphy to his thinking. Burke was obviously aware of
the existence of human evil (the belief in which may be said
to be a central tenet of conservatism) and there is little reason
to doubt he felt it to stem from violation of God's Natural
Lav/ by man. The main reason why, with these first principles
which are so fundamentally similar to those of Maistre
, Burke
reaches a much more hopeful view of man is that he does not
permit himself to "brood about human evil. Perhaps he would
have if he had been driven from his home by invading armies
as Maistre was. If, however, Burke had been given to brooding,
the death of his son, his continually desperate financial sit-
uation (which was aggravated by an absolute incorruptibility
and a noble ^--enercsity)
,
and the scurrilous attacks calling
him a secret Jesuit (about tne worst attack imaginable in eight-
eenth century England) and, after 1789, a Don Quixote, woald
have given him cause to do so. Whenever Burke brooded, and
he unquestionably cad do so, it was about the future of his
family and oi E'l^-land, and not about the wortn of his fellow
men. One cannot do justice to a thinker's theories without
considering his temperament from which so much of these theories
arise, and Eurke was just too kind a man to think his fellow
man to be really evil.
D. Free V/ill In Burke and Maistre. Both Burke and Maistre
believed man had free will, but this statement alone obscures
ncre than it clarifies, for there were important differences
in v;hat free will meant in their theories. Burke starts off
from the belief that God has given man innate ideas concerning
good and evil and the ability to identify each. These ideas
are common to all men, and men are thereby united on the basic
question of what is good and what is evil.^"^ The free will
of man, therefore, concerns his choosing between good and evil,
but not the defining of the concepts. Here man is not free*
Kan lives in an ordered moral universe which he can defy, but
which he cannot redefine. Burke, as will be seen later in this
dissertation, does believe there is a pre-planned goal to human
history, and it is a happy goal, but he is certainly no believer
that things v;ill necessarily work out right in the short run,
which can be very long. Burke »s actions show this belief.
He undoubtedly felt it necessary to support the Americans in
what he deemed their just struggle with England, even to the
extent of toying with the superficially treasonous idea of raising
a regiment in England to fight for the Americans, lest the forces
of tyranny (England) defeat those of liberty (America). The
emotive terms used express the ideas, if not the words, of Burke,
Burke was here afraid that evil would triumph over good. During
the French Revolution, Burke had absolute terror that evil would
defeat good, spoke quite seriously of the possibility that he
would one day look through the "National 7/indow" (the hole through
17Burke , A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Origin Of Our Idea
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which one inserted his head in the guillotine), and required
that after liis burial his friends should secretly exhume his
body and rebury it in a secret place so that if the Jacobins
triumphed in England they could not do indignities to the body
of their great enemy. Any thought in Burke's mind that evil
could '/an triumphs over good would have been confirmed by the
case of India, where Burke was absolutely convinced that Gov-
ernor General Hastings had committed murder, enslaved the people
under his charge, and violated the Natural Law, and despite
years of effort to punish Hastings for his crimes against God
and man, Burke lived to see him exonerated. Men were free to
commit vile crimes and to escape all earthly punishment. There
is, moreover, no doubt in Burke's mind that this cannot be ex-
plained by saying these men escaped earthly punishment because
they acted as God's agents for a good purpose invisible to men
and to the criminals undertaking these deeds. Burke does not
spell out his belief in free will in so many words, but his
actions bear out the contention that he held this belief in
free will. While a thinker's actions need not necessarily
adhere to his beliefs, Burke was a man whose life reflected
his philosophy. This belief in free will is indicated by the
fact that Burke was alv/ays willing to hold people morally re-
sponsible for their actions, whether for good or ill. When
he counselled lenience in punishment, as in the case of the
anti-Catholic rioters who, among other things, had endangered
BUrke»« own life, it wa« not because people were not morally
responsible, but because prudence dictated this course. In
the case mentioned, the rioters were to be treated firmly, but
leniently, not because they were not morally culpable, and cer-
tainly not because they were right, but because this would be
the course that would most further the cause of tolerance.
All men could, in fact, achieve their own salvation through
the help of free will, right reason, and good institutionsJ
^
A man in an evil society would have a difficult time redeeming
himself, and a man lacking right reason (a phrase which will
be explained later) probably would not be able to do eo at all,
but free will was also a fundamental necessity for moral well-being.
No man could save any other man, and institutions could, at the
most, play a supportive role. Man's rectitude or lack of it
was ultimately of his own doing. It is really somewhat sur-
prising to find such a strongly individualist view (though not
one wholly discounting the effects of society) in a man who
in £0 many other things was inclined to stress organic theories.
It is likely that this individualism stemmed either from Burke's
early Lockeanism or from his Protestantism, or from both currents
together* Man is ultimately an independent moral entity. There
i«, however, one aspect of Burke's thinking bearing on the idea
of free will that renders the whole logical structure rather
fragile, and casts severe doubt on Burke's actual adherence
idPeter J. Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law (Ann
Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1965)» PP» 136-1 87.
to a free mil position. As was already mentioned, God has
decreed a goal to human history. What is necessary to make
Burke's view on free will hang together, therefore, is to re-
concile free will in individual human affairs with determinism
over the long haul of history. Burke, who in a rather unfairly
sell-deprecating attitude viewed himself as no philosopher,
did not ever attempt to undertake this task. He was, after
all, not consciously a system-builder. Philosophical niceties
were things he was quite content to leave to other people.
There is no indication that Burke was aware of this inner con-
flict in his theory, nor should one believe he would have been
terribly concerned if someone had pointed this out to him.
Suffice to say that Burke simultaneously held a belief in man's
individual moral freedom and hence moral responsibility, and
in the existence of a divine plan for history. Even the greatest
of thinkers may slip up.
Maistre's view of free will is a good deal more compli-
cated than that of Burke. He begins, as was seen, by -'/iovlng
even illness and the Lisbon Earthquake as the results of tho:
erring v;ill of man. There is, therefore, virtually nothing
that can happen to man v;hich is outside the realm of his own
free will. Maistre, though, as was seen earlier and will be
seen again, belie\a.ng there were knowable laws of man and society,
at another point explicitly contradicted his belief that there
were such laws and accused philosophers of spreading the canard
about invariable laws of nature and society in order to dis-
courage men from praying. ""^ V/hatever one may think of the logic
of this accusation (to me the logic seems very scanty, seeking
to debunk belief in invariable laws because of the belief's
effect on prayer), it does show that the power of prayer is
limitless, or at least very greats As each individual must
make his own decision whether to pray or not, for even under
the most repressive theocracy a person could merely go through
the motions of prayer, each individual must ultimately decide
whether or not he will reshape the world through prayer to God,
This, hov/ever, is a form of free v/ill at one remove. Though
man does freely pray or not pray, it is God ^^o hears or does
not hear. It is God's will that calls forth changes in the
vTOrld, though man's prayers do have great efficacy in calling
forth God's will* This view of Maistre's follows his belief
in the ultimate uncreativeness of man.
Maistre's concept of the justification for punishment
muddles the notion of free v/ill even further. First, he did
believe that each man's punishment was individually merited.
How this comes to pass does, however, cast severe doubts on
the extent to v/hich Maistre believed in free will. Man was,
after all, a fallen creature. The original sin of his first
ancestors, while not closing the door of redemption to all their
1
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descendents, did render redemption a very uphill struggle^
This idea of Maistre»s is generally subsumed within his theory
of substitution. One can, and does, inherit both good and evil
from his ancestors. It would seem that original sin and the
theory of substitution effectively destroy any real free will
that man might have, but Maistre is not of this opinion. He
does consider man to be morally culpable for his own deeds,
but he also feels a man to be culpable for the deeds of his
ancestors. Incredibly, Maistre the royalist concedes as just-
ified the argument of the French revolutionaries that the current
French i^oyal family may be held to account for the crimes of
its ancestors over the centuries. Men might be able to free
themselves from the good or evil history of their families to
some extent, but what the use of the stupendous effort required
would be if this history rightfully pursues them nonetheless
is a good question. Despite his occasional paeans to individ-
uality, "without which immortality is nothing"^\ it is clear
that Maistre does not really believe man to be a morally auton-
omous individual. As society is and must be corporate, so is
all history and every family. Man is simply not 3 moral entity.
This inheritence of guilt or honor from one's forebears v;ould
raal^;e reward or punishment morally suspect, if it did not also
20
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involve inheritence of sin or virtue. Man is, in a sense, pun-
ished and rewarded for his own sin and virtue, but these are
qualities which the individual cannot really control. This
view degrades man to the level of the offspring of syphlitic
parents, who is quite literally cursed from the moment of con-
ception. It is strange that Maistre did not realize just how
destructive of individual good behavior his theory of familial
predestination could be.
Even if this belief in the inheritence of virtue and vice
were not enough to destroy all individual free will, Maistre »s
strictures on the role of society in man's moral development
would surely do so. Burke once declared: "Let us only suffer
any person to tell us his story, morning and evening, for but
one twelve-month, and he will become our master. "^^ It was
exactly this that Maistre advocated that the state and Church
should do, and not for "one twelve-month", but for eterni.ty.
Religious and political dogmas are to unite to form a "national
mind" which exists "to repress the aberrations of the individual
reason which is, of its nature, the mortal enemy of any asso-
ciation whatever because it gives birth only to divergent op-
inions"; the national mind is, in Maistre 's own phrase, "indiv-
idual abnegation." All the pov/ers of state and society are
22Burke, Thoughts On French Affairs , in Burke '
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to be harnessed to indoctrinate the individual in this national
mind and to cause him to submerge his own mind in it. Anyone
who vri.shed to see Maistre as a forerunner of modern totalitar-
ianism could have a field day vdth this teaching. The parallels
between Maistre 's "national mind" and Rousseau's "general will"
are also interesting to ponder. Suffice to say that it is diff-
icult to see how individual free will could exist in any state
with either a "national mind" or a "general v/ill" that the state
was v/illing to enforce by all the tools at its command. Maistre
final summary statement on the subject of free ^rlll is "Man
having been created free, he is freely led."^^ This statement
is objectionable for several reasons, both as a true statement
of Maistre 's own beliefs and as a work of logic. First, Maistre
treatment of his own State of Nature theory shows he believes
man was not created free. The defining condition of man's
original state was that he had no free will, at least not so
far as God was concerned. It is parenthetically intriguing
to note the similarities betv/een thijs quotation and that opening
the first chapter of Rousseau's Social Contract . It v;ould not
have been beyond a man of Maistre 's literary ability and vri.t
to parody one of the most famous statements of his arch-rival.
There are a number of problems in the second part of Maistre 's
statement, that referring to man as being "freely led." First,
PL
Maistre, Fifth Saint Petersburg Dialogue , in Lively,
Works Of Joseph De Maistre
, p. 231.
in a loGical sense, the relationship of leader and led is not
a free relationship, or at least not wholly so. When the leader
acts rightfully and within his legally ordained term of office,
he is the leader without having to seek the consent of anyone.
As Maistre observed, it is this which separates a true leadei-
froEi' the "leader" of a club. The latter, if he takes a consti-
tutional, but unpopular, position, may lose all or part of his
club's membership through secession, but in a state this would
be treason. Even if the nature of leadership were free, Maistre
obviously did not intend it to be so. Man was not to be led
by any choice of his own, but by the force and moral authority
(supported by the control of information) of the state. There
seem, therefore, to be three possible interpretations of the
above-mentioned quotation. Either Maistre was making an asser-
tion that goes against the grain of the dynamics of his phil-
osophy (which his early attraction to liberalism would render
possible), was making a statement he felt to be absurd, just
to have a little private fun with Rousseau, or v;as saying that
to b© free is to be led in the right direction. I subscribe
mostly to the third possibility, for reasons v;hich will be made
clear later.
Burke believes man to be really the architect of his fate
on earth, though this power by the individual is somehow to
coexist with a final control of history by God. Maistre, on
the other hand, believes the human will, in concert v/ith God,
or even, in the short run, out of concert, to be extremely eff.
icacious, but whether or not this will is to be used, and how,
is determined by original sin, family background, and the re-
straints exercised by society. Burke believes free will to
be a positive element necessary for individual redemption, but
Maistre thinks free will (in the normal definition) to be a
manifestation of human rebelliousness, and is therefore to be
effaced as much as is possible.
E. The Role Of Passion and Its Relationship To Reason.
A belief in the power of human reason was one of the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of the Enlightenment, and the way
in which Burke and Maistre respond to this belief is an important
difference dividing them. Burke did lay great stress on the
power and importance of passions. This has led some, Sabine
among them, to feel that Burke negated the importance of reason.^^
This is essentially false. BurkQ was by no means an irrationalist.
Reason and passion were two independent facts of life, but they
could be made to work together. Of the two, reason was to Burke
the most important. As Watkins put it. Burke "believed that
reason was the most valuable and distinctive of human gifts, "^^
Reason could not, however, stand alone. Passion is needed to
be the activating principle of reason, which is itself passive.
25George Sabine, A History Of Political Theory (Mew York:
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As Burke puts it: '-ejudice, with its reason, has a motive
to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give
it permanence. Prejudice is of ready application in the emer-
gency; it previously engages the mind in a steady course of
wisdom and virtue and does not leave the man hesitating in the
moment of decision skeptical, puzzled, and unresolved. "2? ^^^^^
is, it must be noticed, nothing here that says that passion is an
intrinsic good, for Burke does not believe it to be so. Passion
can be no better than the reason and the social order it con-
serves. Passions, to be good, must be under the governance
of reason, and, through education and the beneficial results
of social living, must be rendered tractable and improved into
morals. Burke does not believe all passions to be good necess-
arily; those which are not may even have to be redirected or
suppressed.- Passion is, therefore, in a highly subordinate
position to reason. Burke is sensible enough not to have any
unrealistic views about the qualities of human passions, but
neither does he hold the opinion that passions can be eliminated.
They are even very valuable, but not for themselves. This is
nothing if not a libertarian position, for Burke is neither
prepared to destroy society in pursuit of man's "noble natural
self", nor to exterminate man's passions so that he might achieve
his "rightful rationality". There can be no doubt that a strong
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social conservatism is a major reason for this, but a sen^
Of the right Of the individual to be left alone is also a facto
A very different view of passion is found in Maistre.
Reason is here in a very subordinate position. Maistre says
scornfully that in the eighteenth century by the time he had
left school a student had already created on paper a system
of education, a constitution, and a society.^^ Passion is the
necessary element in creativity, for when man has any part in
creation at all, it is as an inspired servant of God. An in-
stitution, in fact, cannot last "if it has not a name taken
from the national language and self-generated, without any
previous or known deliberation " (italics mine).^° Deliberation
far from being a necessary or even neutral element in man, is
positively baneful, as a symbol of man's evil pride. As far
as man is concerned, intuition is certain; man by following
his "intellectual conscience" (with the stress on the second
element) will very often guess right in the natural sciences,
and will have a nearly perfect score in philosophy and religion
the last two being what Maistre considered to be the most im-
portant spheres of human endeavor.-^^ There is not even any
special need to engage in reasoning at all (though Maistre is
29Maistre, Sssay On the Generative Principle Of Political
Constitutions
, in Lively, Works Of Joseph De Maistre
, p. 150.
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so.e»hat content to let this foolish sa«e be played in the natural
BClencos. which do not matter very ™uch by themselves), for
••Nature itself if ^sely consulted fchich means following one'
passions to Goi leads us toward the truth.-^S n^i^^re feel,
that, contrary to the view of the Enlightenment, that which
differentiates man from the other animals is not his reason
(though Maistre does concede the intellectual superiority of
man over beast), but his ability to intuit the existence of a
spiritual world separate from but united to the world of sense
experience s»^-^
There are several important consequences of Maistre's
stress on passion. One of these is that reason, being opposed
to passion (which is a thing of God), is necessarily anti-religious
in Maistre »s estimation. This anti-religious element is true
of the Enlighteniaent theory of reason against which Maistre
was fighting, at least according to Maistre. As vrill be seen
in a later chapter, Maistre had his own definition of a ki^d
of reason he felt to be morally acceptable. From this belief
in the anti-religious nature of reason followed an extreme hos-
tility to all intellectual inquiry. Maistre believed that no
man could ever go wrong by following his passions. The passions
came directly from God and hence could never lead a man astray.
32Maistre, Fifth >Saint Petersburg Dialogue, in Lively,
Works Of JosoTDh Do Maistre, p. 232.
33Richard A.. Lebrun, Throne and Altar : The Political and Heligi
Thought Of Joser)h De Maistre (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 196
Thic is not necessarily true of reason. God, Who is the Creator
of all, is, of course, also the Creator of human reason, but
much that men deem to be reason is actually the prompting of
their rebellious hearts. Passion is certain, whereas reason
is not. This downgrading of human reason is one of the char-
acteristics Maistre most shares with Rousseau and is one of
the factors in Maistre 's thought giving some credence to the
claim that he was, at least in part, a precursor of Fascism.
There was, however, another side to Maistre's view of human
passions. In his letter to the Comte de Vallaise of December
12, 1815, he vn-ote: "Prejudices resemble inflamed ulcers, one
must touch them gently to avoid bruising them."^^ Whatever
else one can say about this statement, it is clear that it is
very far from being an endorsement of human passions. It is
difficult to know what to do vath this contradiction, and the
other contradictions in Maistre. There is no doubt that Maistre
did consciously exaggerate positions of his in order to make
them more forceful intellectually. The question is, was Maistre
exaggerating when he stressed the perfect nature of passions,
or was he exaggerating when he called them "inflamed ulcers"?
There is only one man who could answer this question for certain,
and he has been beyond the pale of human com.raunication for a
century and a half. It would seem that the view stressing the
^Slaistre, Letter To the Conte de Vallaise
,
quoted in
Lebrun, Throne and Altar
, p. 20.
divinely-created and hence perfect nature of passions is i.ore
consistent with the body of Maistre's thinking, for one of his
cardinal principles was the inability of man to create anything,
even an "ulcer". The only problem with this view is that if,
as could be suggested, Maistre stressed the delicate nature
of human passions out of his strong social conservatism, he
utilized a less sure defense of the status quo in place of a
more sure one. Certainly there could be no greater defense
of human passions, and of the institutions, both social and
political, deriving from them, than to say they are instituted
by God and utterly perfect. It is just possible that there
was a degree of rationalism in Maistre lurking under all his
irrationalism. Such would not be entirely surprising in a man
whose thoughts were in other spheres a combination of different
elements. The question is, therefore, the degree to which Maistre
was an irrationalist
, but beyond doubt it v/as quite large.
The consequence of Maistre 's irrationalism, whatever its
degree, is a sanctification of all established authority. The
true results of human passion either cannot or ought not be
judged, whether this be because of their divinely-instituted
perfection or (in direct contradiction to the first) because
of their extreme susceptibility to damage. Most of all, the
derivatives of passion cannot be judged by reason, for passion
(whatever its possible imperfections) is infinitely superior
to reason. Such is not Burke's belief. He stresses that passion
±3 superior to reason only because it allows man to act with
dispatch in the ways reason dictates. The institutions of
society are, furthermore, the products of reason, both human
and divine, but reason nonetheless. It is therefore not incon-
ceivable for human reason to be permitted to judge social in-
stitutions, as Burke himself most surely did with regard to
the institution of slavery. Such judging had to bear in mind
the will of God and the necessity of gradual historical devel-
opment, which greatly restricted its scope, but it was possible
nonetheless. The Pandora's Box that Maistre slammed and locked
was left open by Burke, albeit only a crack.
F. The Extent Of Human Reason. Neither Burke nor Maistre
had unbounded faith in individual human reason, but their views
on its extent were quite different. Burke, first of all, did
not lil:e to have the human mind directed tov/ard determination
of ends, wishing instead that it accept the goals handed d.omi
by the society's traditions and work to devise means to these
ends. One of the many things Burke found objectionable about
the French Revolution was that the Jacobins instituted a whole
new set of goals for society and pursued their quest for them
irrespective of the means needed to achieve them. That man,
or at least some men, could thinly about the goals of human
society v/as implied (without being expressly stated) in much
of Burke *s theory. In his Speech On Conciliation V/ith the
Colonies , for example, Burke declared that it is the duty of
a state to provide for the happiness of its people. ^his is a
view that has probably been held by most political theorists, but
it is not a truism, and might moreover be disputed by some theorists
and politicians. When it came to the extent and limitation of human
reason, Burke was definitely not an equalitarian. Some people were
clearly superior to others in both their intellect and, consequently,
the role that they should play in the state. Only very few men
could be relief upon to adhere to the institutions of the country
because they understood them; in the case of almost all men, this
allegiance would have to arise from prejudice. This understanding
by the superior of the country's institutions was not to be of
a speculative nature. Instead, Burke could state that "^Vhat in the
result is likely to produce evil is politically false; that which
is productive of good, politically true."^^ It was a society's ad-
herence to the laws of God and to the traditions of the nation through
understanding that was most likely to be productive of good, and
this intellectual union with all of creation could be the prerogative
of only a very select group. The vn.ser would have to protect and
lead those who were poorer, weaker, and less intelligent.^"^ Intell-
igence was, however, very far from being in the sole possession of
either the social or intellectual upper classes. Burke clearly believed
35Burke, S-peech On Conciliation With the Colonies (Chicago:
H, Regnery and Company, 196/+), p. 87.
36Burke, An .Appeal From the New To the Old y/hi gs (Indianapolis,
Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), p. 99.
^"^
Ibid
., p. lOZf..
the ruling classes could be blind to the traditions of the
country and to the necessities of policy. He believed they
provoked revolution in America, sanctioned injustice in India,
sought to strip Parliament of its legitimate powers, and created
an unsettled situation in Ireland. These were hardly signs
of perfect intelligence. Finally, it was the ruling classes
of England who were first willing to temporize with revolutionary
France and were then inclined to surrender to her, while the
common people urged resistance. At the very minimum, much
intelligence could be found in the middle class. It was one
of Burke's boasts concerning the first administration of bis
patron Lord Rockingham that "That administration was the first
which proposed and encouraged public meetings and free consul-
tations of merchants from all parts of the Icingdom; by which
means the truest lights have been re ceived, "-^^ A degree of
elitism is evident even here, but it is clear that intelligence
for the running of the state is spread at least fairly widely.
Burke, in many cases, could be extremely harsh toward the ciris-
tocracy. At one point he declared of them, "I hold their order
in cold and decent respect. I held them to be of an absolute
necessity in the Constitution; but I think they are only good
39
when kept within their proper bounds." Burke, in fact, goes
53Burke, A Short Account Of a Late Short Administration
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one .top further and says that the aristocracy might act in
such a v;ay that he ^vill have to side with the people "to the
last extremity, and to a contest of blood."^° Despite these
statements. Burke did feel the upper classes, both noble and
non-noble, to be the natural home of rationality, and did be-
lieve these men to be rational enough to diagnose ills in the
state and, if absolutely necessary, to seek to correct them.
This act of correction was, however, not recommended, because
the interconnections of society were so complex that no mind
could really understand them. Therefore, a seemingly harmless
reform in one area could severely damage a necessary component
of society in another area. In time of crisis, reform may be
justifiable because the tumult of the time leaves little to
lose, but generally a reform should be carried out only to
remove an intolerable abuse that a majority of the people agree
exists. Tv;o points can be discerned from this. First, the
ruling classes, despite their relative superiority of intellect
do not have the mental pov/er to reform the state all by them-
selves, and except in extreme conditions ought not to attempt
to reform the state at all. The mind of no man is really so
acute that he can carry out reform with real confidence w It
is by no means a Platonic aristocracy that Burke advocates.
^^Ibid.
, p. I3if
,
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As will be seen momentarily, Burke left more to the common people
than even Aristotle. In Burke »s scheme of things, the average
nan is not permitted to determine matters of policy; such is
beyond his intellect. The average man does, however, know when
something is wrong, even though the cause of the problem v/ill
elude him. There are two basic reasons for this ignorance
of causation. The first is a simple weakness of intellect.
The average man is just incapable of mastering the intricacies
of government. It was, of course, seen previously that Burke
doubts that anyone can really do so. The second reason is
(paradoxically) the conservatism of the average man. Burke
declares that the average man cannot have an active role in
the governing of the state because he tends to think along lines
that are fifty years out of date.^^ He will not bo able to
recognize the nature of a problem, and will confuse a new problem
for an old one. The relationship of the common man to the
rulers of the state is therefore like that of the wearer of
a pair of shoes to a shoemaker. One does not have to know how
to make shoes in order to know they are pi'-icriing his toes, nor
does he have to know how to repair a shoe for his complaints
to be taken seriously. It would be a very poor shoemaker (or
ruler) who deafened himself to the declarations of his customers.
42«Burke, Thoughts Or: the Cause Of the Present Discontent"
,
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When It comes to intellect, therefore, there are two distinct
types of people: those who sometimes have the ability to plan
reforms, and those who have the ability to point out the exist-
ence of problems,
Maistre's view of the extent of human reason is quite
different from that of Burke. As was seen before, he does not
even value reason very highly, tending to identify it ^;d.th re-
belliousness against God. The aristocracy is to rule in Maistre
state, but the justification for this is not that the arist-
ocracy is more intelligent than the common people. It rules
simply because it v/as the aristocracy and the sovereign who
formed the state. Though Maistre may consider the aristoc-
racy to be more intelligent than the average people, their right
to rule is only secondarily derived from intelligence. If the
ruling class governs stupidly, and more importantly, immorally,
it is likely to lose its rights over the state. The state,
involving the lives of men, is obviously no ordinary possession
which may be abused with disapproval, but without forfeit jr??.
The relationship of rulers to state is one of stewardship which
if TLolabed ^vill result in its loss, either through revolution
or through action by the Pope. There is, furthermore, no reason
to believe Maistre considers aristocrats to be exceptionally
moral, morality being (as will be seen) Maistre's real definitio
Tiaistre, Considerations On France, in Lively, Works
Of Joseph De Maistre, p. 77.
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of intelligence. There are three reasons, therefore, why it
is right for aristocrats to rule the state. First, they created
the state. It goes ^.dthout saying, of course, that they did
so as the agents of God. Second, they are more intelligent
and possibly moral than other people. Being fallen human beings
like everyone else, however, they score very low on an absolute
scale on both these points. Finally, a minority must rule the
state, so why not this minority? Whenever it is thought that
Maistre is an extreme aristocrat (which in many ways he un-
doubtedly is), it must be remembered that he regards his fellow
aristocrats but little higher than he does anyone else. Aris-
tocrats are men, and men are not terribly bright or decent.
Unlike Burke, moreover, Maistre feels human intelligence should
never bo directed to social reform, under any conditions.
If Maistre' s feelings toward the intelligence of the aris-
tocrat are unfavorable, his feelings toward the common man on
this score are downright hostile. The average person can never
be anything more than the ward of his betters, because he is
"a perpetual child, a perpetual lunatic, a perpetual absentee, "^^
and like these others needs a keeper. Naturally, he has not
the intelligence to impose mandates on or even make suggestions
to his guardians. As is to be expected, though Maistre is
willing to permit and even concede the usefulness of an advisory
Maistre, Considerations On Franco, quoted in Roger Soltau,
^T^erich Political Thoug;ht In the Nineteenth Century (New York: Russell
and Russell, 1959), p. ?.1.
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council, not everyone has the intelligence to serve on it or
even vote for it.^^ The man who wears the shoes is not to be
permitted to say they hurt his feet. As vd.ll be seen in a later
chapter, the customer may not criticize the handiwork of the
cobbler, though he may cashier one cobbler and get a new one.
Maistre, it is quite obvious, sees almost everyone in society
as being one of Plato's men of iron. They are to accept what
their betters do for them in a proper spirit of humility, for
they truly do not have the intelligence to know what is good
for them. The average man is, simply speaking, a mental nullity.
The very most the average man could ever be was a good follower,
which to Maistre was a blind follower.
It goes without saying that both Burke and Maistre had
severe doubts about the degree of intellect belonging to the
human being. Beyond this, however, the differences between
the two on this subject are far more compellins than the sim-
ilarities. The differences, moreover, take Burke in a liber-
tarian direction, and Maistre in an authoritarian one. Burke
believes the upper classes (as judged by both ability and her-
edity) to be mentally superior to the average man and, on rare
occasions, to have the ability to repair defects in the state.
The average man, however, always has some role in the state,
and sometimes it could be a very decisive role. In the case
• Maistre, Study On Sovereignty
, in Lively, V/orks Of
Joseph Do Maistre
, p. nS.
of Maistre, the average man was a ward of the state, and even
the rulers of society were credited as having only enough in-
telligence to administer policy decisions made long ago.
Neither Burke nor Maistre could have been called a fervent
admirer of his fellov.Tnan and certainly neither was willing to
trust him with absolute power over the state. Burke, however,
sees the individual as possessing the decency and intelligence
to at least take care of himself, and Maistre does not. Burke's
society would, therefore, necessarily be a freer place than
that of Maistre.
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Chapter III: Nation. Natural La>,. and State of Nature, and
Their Relation To Reason
A. The Nation. It is necessary that ono understand at the
outset Burke's ideas on the origins of the nation, for these ideas
are quite indicative of the general configurations of his thought.
He feels the nation to be simultaneously natural and artificial,
natural in that it is vdlled hy God to aid man's betterment, such
betterment being both possible and necessary, and artificial in
that the particular forms it takes are the products of human in-
telligence. God gives His sanction to a social contract that
is everywhere the source of such legal fictions as the people
and the nation.^ This social contract originally required the
consent of all the people (Burke here shows a definite sign of
his youthful attraction to Locke's philosophy.), and the majority,
therefore, has no right to say that it is the nation. TM.s is
because the nation, besides its divine institution, is also the
product of its history and traditions, which may be immanent in
the whole body of the nation or in the nation's ruling class acting
as virtual representative of the whole. ^ The nation is more than
anytliing else a moral unity to Burke, rather than a mere geograph-
ical area or an unrelated collection of people. Instead, the nation is
^Burke, Aidpeal From the New To the Old .'/hi gs
, p. 100.
2
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in most cases taken to be mutually extensive with the mass of
the population, but in rare cases (like the French Revolution)
even a dispossessed minority can serve as trustee for the nation-
traditions. In this sense, the nation does have a soul, and
since, as will be seen, Burke's view of history is one incor-
porating change through conscious human action, it can be said
that the nation's soul, and hence the nation itself, is in part
the creation of human intelligence. The national soul is also
shaped by objective considerations such as geography, which
act as limitations on the role of human intelligence. Man does,
however, create his own nation to a substantial extent. The
nations of Europe are, therefore, entities possessing somewhat
different souls, though all members of one common Christiar.-
Germanic-Roman civilization. Many of Burke's most bitter denun-
ciations of the French Revolution concern its fragmenting of
this perceived common civilization. The nation is both a free
actor and a subordinate institution. There is no institution,
on earth superior to the nation, and yet the limitations on
the nation are two in number. First, the European nations,
though they will unavoidably engage in war with each other,
are to have their ferocity limited by appeal to their common
civilization. Burke sees the nations of Europe to be in much
the same situation as the cities of ancient Greece. Second,
the nations of Europe (and all other nations) are under the
God-given Natural Law. A nation may not act in just any way
it feels Its self-interest to dictate. Therefore, Burke felt
that the nations of the world (especially those of Europe) were
culturally diverse, yet united, and independent, but subject
to a hisher (other-worldly) authority. The restrictions that
were to be placed on the nation were purely moral in nature,
but nonetheless real.
Kaistre»s views on the nation are radically different
from those of Burke, in a more authoritarian direction. First
of all, the origin of the nation is entirely from the Hand of
God. Tliis is so directly and indirectly. Maistre does declare
that the nation is the work of God and men together, but .;hen
nations are partially the work of men, this is because God is
using men as His instruments.^ 7/hen nations do differ from
each other (which Maistre could not deny happens), this is becaus
God has willed these variations in national character.^ Maistre
was very much influenced by Montesquieu's views on the importance
of geography and climate in the shaping of national character,
which in the former's hands were used as further pieces of
evidence for the absolute predominance of God's will in the
shaping of the nation. Maistre, therefore, entirely denies
any real human role in the formation of the nation. Man is
a mere passive instrument of God in the creation of the nation,
-Maistre, Study On Sovereignty
, in Lively, Works Of o^oseTjh
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sometimes utilized and so.eti.es not, but never of any independent
consequence. All is the work of God, the work of authority.
For this reason, Maistre denies the possibility of any social
contract, even an essentially irrevocable one such as that of
Burke. Burke, as was seen, gave some independent importance
to man in the formation of the nation, but Maistre never would.
There is only one true lawgiver in Maistre 's universe, and that
is God,
Whereas the nation in Burke's theory had a large measure
of effective independence, in Maistre 's the nation is generally
consigned to the role of an adraininstrative sub-unit. Maistre
reached this conclusion after abandoning an originally Galilean
position. The nation is everywhere consecrated, with divine
right rule a matter of course, but the Pope does universally
have the right to punish, and ultimately to remove, erring rulers.
As Maistre himself believes, one who could judge the sovereign
would then be the sovereign.^ The power of the Pope thereby
stripe all the nations of Europe adhering to Catholicism (which
Maistre hopes will soon become a truly catholic creed) of any
pretensions to sovereignty. The Pope rather ungratefully let it
be known that this teaching of Maistre was embarassing to him,
for while he was fighting to preserve any of his authority in
revolutionary Europe, a claim to absolute authority might bring
down trouble on his head. Even the power to make war does not
truly belong to the nation in Maistre' s view. As will be seen
^Ibid. . 112.
in the treatment of Maistre's philosophy of war, war is under-
taken by God's will to fit the designs of God, not those of
men or nations. There is no reason to doubt Maistre's state-
ment that the Pope would not overuse his power to punish or
remove rulers, as such an action would cause no small convulsion.
This is not the reason Maistre gives, however. He feels the
Pope will be temperate in his use of this power since he is
as passionless as any man can ever be, being old, a priest,
and celibate. If Maistre had his way, however, the Pope would
be able to use the power to punish or remove rulers whenever
he saw fit. No nation of Europe could claim any independence
against such a potentate. Burke declared Europe to be a family
of nations living ultimately under one moral law derived from
their common history and from God, but a series of nations none-
theless. Burke's view of international relations is therefore
the same as his view of the proper domestic situation, an ordered
liberty (though international relations unavoidably involves
war and therefore has considerably less order than is true of
the domestic situation). Maistre also extends his view of domestic
politics to international relations, and thereby eliminates
international relations. His hatred of diversity is never more
manifest, and, as we shall see later, he subordinates all in-
dividual human diversity to a corporate spirit centered in the
nation; here he makes all national independence exist only on
the sufferance of God's vicar -on Earth. To Maistre, Christendom
is truly only one absolute state v;ith one absolute ruler.
Before Burke and Maistre's ideas on Natural Law and the State
Of Nature are treated, there shall be an examination of their con-
cepts of reason and causation. The treatment of the former sub-
ject shall investigate the sources, meaning, limits, and signif-
icance for man of the theories of reason presented. These consid-
erations must vi.tally influence Burke and Maistre's theories of
Natural Law and the State of Nature, for they decisively concern
the potential of man,
B» The Sources Of Knowledge In Burke. Burke »s theory on
the sources of knowledge is incorporated into his Philoso-ohical
^"q^^^y Into the Origin Of Our Ideas Of the Sublime and Beautiful
.
]!±th an Introductory Discourse Concerning Taste (first published
in 1757). Almost at the outset, Burke declares that "The standard
of reason and taste is the same in all human creatures."^ It v/ould
seem likely, therefore, that the most fundamental ideas are ultim«
ately the product of a single source. It is not impossible that
different stimuli could lead to the same conclusions, but a single
factor explanation would be the more likely. Burke is .of the im-
pression that identical standards of reason and taste among all
men are necessary to maintain human intercourse. This is no doubt
true on the most basic levels. As Burke observes, all men with
properly functioning organs of taste agree on what is sweet and
what is sour. On a higher level, hov/ever, one involving questions
of philosophical import, agreement is not as unanimous as Burke
^Burke, Discourse Concerning Taste, in Burke* s Works
,
I, 79.
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believes. It .ay be, therefore, that the ethical foundation of
society is not as fir. as was Burke^. contention. All men's senses
(Burke asserts) are the same, and imagination affects one's tastes;
since imagination comprises only the results of the senses, all
men's imaginations must be the same.^ There is, of course, a glaring
weakness in this argument. There is no way that one can be really
sure that all men's senses are the same. Two men may call the cole
they are seeing green, but one may be seeing green and the other
red. In such a concrete case, experience may reveal the disagree-
ment, but when one is dealing with a question of ethics, even real-
izing the existence of a disagreement may be impossible. Before
it is thought that Burke adhered to Locke's sensist view of the
genesis of ideas, it must be said that he saw two distinct sources
of ideas: through sense experiences (acquired) and innate to the
mind. (natural). The most important ideas, which are basically
one's moral ideas, are the innate ideas. As might be expected from
the general configuration of Burke's thought, God is the Creator
of man's mind, and hence of Ms innate ideas. The most basic ideas
man possesses have nothing to do with any action of man. Man is,
in these things, entirely controlled by God. In a secondary sense,
however, man is the architect of his own ideas. As was seen, man's
less important ideas derive from his sense experiences. To some
extent, every man chooses the sense experiences he will have. He
^Ibid
.. pp. 86-87.
^Ibid.
, p. 86.
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.0 to one type or show o. another, Uve in the city or the country,
listen to a Rock and Roll record or a Classical one, etcetera.
This leaves a not inconsiderable freedom to each individual in the
kind Of knowledge he .vill possess. It is possible for a person
to restrict somewhat by choice the degree of knowledge he has by
having defective Judgement, such defective Judgement resulting either
from natural weakness or more commonly from lack of exercise of
the faculties.9 ;vhether Burke believes natural weakness of intellect
can be overcome by exercise to at least some degree is uncertain,
but what is certain is that failure to exercise the intellect is
in Burke's view the primary cause of low intellect. Several important
considerations derive from these views of Burke on the sources of
knowledge. First, all men are equipped equally when it comes to
the most important ideas, the moral ideas. Those ideas come dir-
ectly from God without translator or intermediary. A man may, there-
fore, not be amoral. No man can claim ignorance of the moral law.
Man can, however, resist what he knows '.vithout question to be right
morally. Immorality is quite possible. That man is responsible
for his acts is inescapable, for he has the moral knowledge, and
may use it or not use it as he chooses. A belief in the fundamental
moral equality of all men results from this. It has already been
seen that this equality is of a middle level. Man is neither God
nor brute. As to the other type of knowledge, non-moral varieties
of judgement, in these too men could be equal, or nearly equal.
9Ibid
. , p. 96,
V^th proper intellectual exercise, inequality in knowledge night
possibly be much reduced. This is a remarkably "radical- idea
to come from a man some have seen as an advocate of social stag-
nationJO It is not likely that Burke saw the potentially unsettling
effect of this belief of his. There is another side to this coin
of fundamental intellectual equality that does very little to speal.
well Of the average man. That a man is intellectually average
or belov; is essentially his own fault. Burke was too kind a man
and had too much love for his fellovmian to stress this very strongly,
but the idea does necessarily follow from the belief in intrinsic
human equality. More on this subject will be seen in Chapter Eight,
which concerns social mobility.
A third major source of knowledge is entirely separate from
the individual human being. This source of knowledge is a country
and culture's history and traditions. Burke put it thusly:
We are afraid to put non to live and trade each on his own
private stock of reason, because v/e suspect that this stock
in each man Is small, and that the individuals would do better
to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations
and ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of exoloding
general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent
wisdom which prevails in them. ^
^
Three points must be observed from this oft-quoted statement.
First (and this is generally missed), this statement, at the
same time as it declares doubts about the amount of individual
reason, affirms that individual reason does, nevertheless, exist.
Cobban, Burke and the Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century
,
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Under certain unclear circumstances, therefore, man may not
havo to be entirely subordinate to authority and his country's
history. The ways in which a person can assert his independence
are never explained (though his God-given innate ideas probably
lie at the root of his possible independence), but the belief
that such independence exists must follow from a belief in
3-ndividual reason. Second, the country's history and traditions
are valued partly because they are old, but also, and primarily,
because they are seen as incorporating most of the reason to
which the human being can aspire. If a country's traditions
did not possess reason, they could not have any claim to respect
based on age alone. It shall be seen that Burke recommended
sweeping reforms for France, thereby showing he felt that coun-
try's absolutist traditions to possess little or no knowledge.
The country's traditions are, in point of fact, not very mys-
terious in their incorporation of reason. Traditions incorporate
reason simply because they are the accumulated experiences of
many men. The catalogue of the knowledge used in maintaining
a political society is rightfully deserving of great respect,
especially if that society has given substantial signs of ful-
filling the proper tasks of a society. To say that tradition
is the accumulated reason of many men (who are declared to have
only "small" reason in themselves) is to minimize the intrinsic
sanctity of conventional knowledge, and, more importantly, to
make the social component of knov;ledge a progressive and changing
process, and not a structure that is ever completed once and
for all. The knoxvledgo possessed by a society that does not
disavow its past is increasing constantly from generation to
generation, and it is this which causes Burke to be vdlling
to undertake some social renovation in the form of elimination
of old institutions (such as some of the offices in the king
of England's household retinue) that clearly perform no function
anymore. The knowledge possessed intrinsically by the current
generation is no less, and no greater, than that which was
possessed by any generation of the past, or vn.ll be possessed
by any generation of the future.
At the same time that he is certain as to what are the
sources of knowledge, Burko is equally certain as to v;hat are
not sources of knoy;ledge. As the individual human knowledge
that is innate, which is the most important knov;ledge, derives
from God, knov/ledge in opposition to true religion (however
interpreted) is a contradiction in terms. That this could
sabotage scientific inquiry is obvious, but it is safe to assume
that it would never have done so in the hands of Burke (who
was known to keep his friends v;aiting when they v/ished to dis-
cuss a question of state, while he dissected a frog). An initial
limitation is, hov/ever, immediatly placed on intellectual en-
deavor. The man who called atheism "a foul unnatural vice"
v/ould be ill-inclined to accept as intellectually respectable
any statement an atheist might maice on matters of morals.
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Atheism could be no source of knowledge, nor could a man tainted
by this vice. Purely abstract reason could also not be a source
of knowledge. For reason to be of any value, it had to be
grounded in the affairs of daily life and a keen understanding
of man»s actual nature, and be directed preferably to the in-
cremental amelioration of the hunan condition. Flights of fancy
aimed at the revolutionary reconstruction of society were most
definitely not sources of knowledge. It was this last point
that caused Burke to be always very uncomfortable v;ith the con-
cept of religious revelation, such revelation having the potential
of upsetting his carefully constructed edifice of knov;ledge
originating within an unbroken chain of human Irdstory. Burke
never actually disowned religious revelation, which as a believing,
though possibly unorthodox, member of the Church of England
he would not have v/ished to do, but the very form of his thought
on the origin of knov^ledge bespoke a downgrading of that con-
cept. Burke, however, had no ambiguity in his thoughts on
political revelation. He condemned it vathout reservation.
Burke's definitive statement on the subject follows.
Your ^he Frenc^ literary men and your politicians, and so
do the whole clan of the enlightened among us, essentially
differ in these points. They have no respect for the v.dsdom
of others, but they pay it off by a very full measure of
confidence in their own. With them it is a sufficient
motive to destroy an old scheme of things because it is
an old one. As to the new, they are in no sort of fear
v/ith regard to the duration of a building run up in haste,
because duration is no object to those v;ho thinl: little
or nothing has been done before their time, and who place
all their hopes in discovery.''^
1 2
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Two facts emerse from this rather long quotation. First, fully
individual decisions (especially those deriving from theoretical
conclusions, as opposed to those deriving from man's innate
ideas or his experiences) cannot be a source of true knowledge.
An individual understanding schooled in the academy of daily
life and the nation's traditions could be brought to bear pro-
fitably on concerns of practical importance, but a purely the-
oretical education, far from being a source of knowledge, was
actually a source of folly, and most dangerous folly. Burke
obviously considered the Jacobins to be fools, and this was
one of the reasons. A second and somewhat allied consideration
is that pure novelty can never be a source of knowledge. That
which is not founded on the intelligence of the past generations
can have but little right to be called intelligence at all.
Burke's views on the sources of knowledge ma^'' be called
libertarian, but in a most conservative sense. Han can, first
of all, have ideas of his ovm, since one's ideas derive both
from innate universal ideas (which ma^* bs disavowed, but not
destroyed) and from one's ovm personal experiences, which are,
of course, unique. Since the innate ideas are the most important
ones, Burke places severe limitations in practice on the poss-
ibility of free inquiry, but the possibility is not entirely
foreclosed. All those ideas wliich are not innate, and hence
not from God (Burke never clearly draws a dividing line, though
the implication is that non-innate ideas are also of importancej ,
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come from man, either in his current generation or in his series
of generations. This last point restricts again the sphere
of the individual as a source of knowledge, but does not tot-
ally efface it. Just what the sphere of the individual is when
it comes to examining the heritage of the past is never spelled
out, it not being in Burke's temperament to do so, but neither
iB man required to regard all of the past as being of equal,
and unquestioned, merit,
C. Maistre's Theory Of the Source Of Knowledge. A sig-
nificantly, though not entirely, different view of the source
of knowledge is found in Kaistre* Maistre agrees with Burke
that there are innate Ideas, Maistre *s notion of innate ideas
is, however, quite different from that of Burke, in that it
rests not on the belief that men reason in the same way, but
on the belief that men have the same basic ideas v/ithout reas-
oning,^^ To deny a role to reasoning (which is a process restricted
to man and the higher animals) in the formation of innate con-
cepts is to undermine very markedly the human factor in know-
ledge. Burke believed all men reasoned the same way about
moral matters, by dictate of God, Thi.s placed man in a dis-
tinctly subordinate position in the formation of innate ideas,
but did not remove him from the equation completely, Maistre
does so remove him* Men have the same innate ideas because
'^Maistre, Second Saint Petersburg Dialogue , in Lively,
Works Of Joseph de Maistre
, p, 210,
God injacts these ideas into their minds, v/ithout even the
slightest activity on man's part. Maistro also greatly expands
the dimensions of the innate ideas. All thoughts are derived
from the soul, v/hich makes the Architect of the soul the Ar-
chitect of all thoughts. Man is, therefore, quite in keeping
with the overall structure of Maistre's philosophy, incapable
of creating even the simplest of ideas. All ideas derive from
God, either immediatly or ultimately. The most basic ideas
are in man's mind simply because God put them there. These
ideas can be resisted (at the cost of madness and rampant evil),
but may never be resisted legitimately. All knowledge dealing
with morality, which Maistre interprets very broadly, is placed
beyond human judgement. This is because "Human reason is man-
ifestly incapable of guiding men, for fevj men can reason well,
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and no one can reason well on every subject," The other
broad source of knov/ledge to Maistre is one more or less doubted
by Burke. This is authority. Burke, of course, saw antiquity
as, in general, a reliable source of knowledge, but not because
antiquity v,ras supported by authority. Antiquity was generally
trustworthy because it was the record of the experiences of
men both as wise and as foolish as the men of today. Maistre,
on the other hand, sees an entirely different justification
for autnority. Authority is to be respected because it is
^^Ibid.
,
p. 208.
^^Ibid.
, p. 207.
ordained of God, and he who is in authority, be this authority
temporal or spiritual (a distinction not very clear, in prac-
tice, in Maistre's thinking), speaks as God's vice-re.-ent , or
vice-vice-regent (under the Pope). To make authority unques-
tionable as a source of knowledge, as Maistre does, does not
derogate from his skepticism about human beings, for human
authority does not and cannot exist, but is instead authority
from God at one remove. This is why, as shall be shown, man
may not judge those in authority. There is a third important
source of knowledge in Maistre's theory. This is divine revel-
ation, and specifically miracles. It was seen earlier that
Burke avoided this subject. A reason y;hy Maistre embraced this
belief, apart from his fervent adherence to what he took to
be Catholicism, was that it serves as a strong corrective to
human pride. All man's plans must be as nothing when the wave
of God's Hands can cause them to come tumbling down. IToodloss
to say, God's revelations and miracles may not be questioned
by men. Maistre never deals with the question of how to dis-
tinguish the false miracles from the true, being willing, one
v;ould assume, to leave this task to the Catholic Church, as
divine an institution as exists on the earth. There is one
source of knov/ledge that Maistre dismisses vdthout reservation.
He is unwilling to countenance the belief that sensory percep-
tions can ever be a source of knowledge, even to the subordinate
extent that Burke if;as walling to accept. Sensory perceptions.
Maistre felt, could not be a source of knowledge, unless one
restricted the sphere of God's pov;er. Maistre was incorrect
in this belief, because for sensory perceptions to be a true
source of knowledge, all that would be required would be for
God to be vailing to forego interference in man»s sensory per-
ceptions. If this thought ever occured to Maistre, he dismissed
it out of a desire to avoid second-guessing God. Science is
another would-be source of knov/ledge that really is not so.
Science has a role to play in human society, but this role is
the relating together of facts, not the judging of these facts.
Science, seen as a true source of knowledge, must result in
open or subtle opposition to God and could only end in debasing
man to the lowest stage of brutality. Considering the histoiy
of the twentieth century, it is difficult to argue with Maistre
on this point.
All the foregoing shows that there is really only one
source of knowledge in Maistre *s philosophy. That io, of course,
God. God, as the sole source of knowledge, appears in many
different guises, but they are all God, This leads inevitably
to the result that man is entirely ignorant in nlmself and can,
therefore, make no claim to a right, or even ability, to question
any aspect of the existing order, all of which is the work of God.
16
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D. The Meaning Of Reason In Burke. Burke agrees substan-
tially, but far from completely, with his age as to what con-
stitutes reason. It was seen already that he viewed much of
reason as deriving from sense perceptions, which makes reason
to at least some extent a thing of individual human cogitation.
This kinship Burke shared with the age of the Enlightenment
was, however, only superficial. Far more central to his def-
inition of "reason" was the traditional concept of Natural Law.
This view sees Natural Law, which in this case may be seen as
synonymous with reason, as deriving directly from God, or as
coming from God after being processed through the filter of
human institutions and common sense. Burke has problems with
defining "reason", largely because the idea of doing so does
not appeal to him. It is, however, possible to deduce certain
components of his concept of reason. Reason, to Burke, is in
some way united with God»s ultimate designs for man. This would
have to be so for such a religious man as Burke, but he is not
helpful in ascertaining just what these designs are, or hovi
this process of ascertaining proceeds. One thing that is clear
is that no institution or group of institutions, temporal or
spiritual, is able to hand down an authoritative definition
of reason. One owed to the institutions of his society a certain
respect, as their longevity had shown them to incorporate at
least some reason, but that which can be judged by reason, as
was seen, cannot itself set the definition of reason. Somewhat
surprisingly for a life-long adherent of an established church,
Burke includes the Church of England with all other institutionc
in this regard. ?Ie puts this very strongly when he says, "For
the Protestant religion, nor (I speak it with reverence, I an
sure) the truth of our common Christianity, is not so clear
as this proposition,—that all men, or at least the majority
of men in the society, ought to enjoy the common advantages
17
of It," What this says is that no particular Church, nor
even Christianity as a v/hole, can either be considered synon-
ymous with reason, or set the content of reason. Reason is
independent of Christianity, though not of religion as such,
and is universal in its sphere. This is because Burke ultim-
ately judges the presence or absence of reason in a community
based on how the members of that community are faring. Burke
chooses to defend the Old Regime of France not because of the
correctness of its governing principles (for he definitely felt
absolute monarchy to be an incorrect governing principle), but
because it had superintended a France which was thriving in
size of population, national vYealth, cultural level, and public
spiritcdness. As he says, "ITo country in v/hich population
flourishes and is in progressive improvement can be under a
very [Italics Burke mischievous government,"' That says such
a government must have at least a measure of reason on its side
17
Burke, Fr.lament Against the Anti -Fopery Laws, in Bur!:e
*
Works
,
VI, 33k*
18
Burke, Re flections On the Revolution In Franco, p. 1^o»
Tills approaches the task of defining reason frorr. the
back door. That v/liich turns out right is taken to be at least
somewhat in keeping v/ith the principles of eternal reason.
Despite superficial appearances, this should not be taken as
saying the end justifies the means, because Burke mentions these
accomplishments of the French monarchy as proof that it could
be reformed, not that it did not need to be reformed. A good
end could serve to mitigate the culpability of bad principles,
but could in no way excuse the absence of good principles.
Furthermore, one of the things Burke found most objectionable
about the French Revolution was its "end justifies the means"
attitude. In such a case, he would hardly have been likely
to embrace such an attitude himself.
Burke finally comes to -/iow reason as that which serves
the interests of all or most of the people, v/hich thereby, in
liis theory, connects reason to Katural Law, ITatural Eights,
and liberty. Burke believed that government should tamper as
little- as is necessary v;ith the workings of society, for need-
less tampering could not but be destructive to the society.
Since ordered liberty (this being Burke's definition of reason)
is good for the society, anything that departs from ordered
liberty in the direction of either one of its components must
be irrational, to at least some degree. Both the Old Regime
and Jacobin Regime of France were, therefore, irrational, with
the irrationality of the former being mitigated by the good
effects it either promoted or did not retard significantly. Burke
made much of the fact that the Jacobin regime was resulting in
the impoverishment of the mass of France's people to prove the
badness, and hence irrationality, of that regime.
Burke's belief that reason is social has several important
results. First, though society is to be judged as to how well
it meets the needs of individuals, whenever the needs of one in-
dividual conflict with the needs of society, the former must yield
to the latter, especially since the society generally does a tol-
erably good job of providing for the needs of all. There is a
community interest which can be pursued without seeking to add
up the interests of millions of people. Second, it is illegitimate,
and even irrational, for an individual to seek to assert his will
against that of the com.raunity, since the latter, when functioning
properly, incorporates his interests. The rational postures for
an individual to hold toward a properly functioning state are,
therefore, satisfaction and quiescence. Mass popular participa-
tion ought to ar.'.se only in time of crisis*
Maistre'G Concept Of Reason. From what has been seen
previously, one might expect that Maistre would declare himself
to be an unalterable foe of reason. Maistre, however, declares
this not to be the case* True reason has him as one of its greatest
supporters (so says Maistre). Reason is, first of all, not abstract
philosophizing. Reason is not, and even cannot bo, opposed to
intuition and common sense J ^ This suggests a limitation on auth-
oritarianism, for (Maistre agrees) all people are equal in common
sense and intuition. Maistre sees no firm division between reason
and what is generally considered to be unreason. This is because
common sense and intuition are innate ideas derived from God, and
therefore cannot be contrary to reason. Each separate sphere of
reason is, moreover, self-contained and governed by its own rules.
If a proposition can be proven by a "proof relevant to it", even
an unanswerable objection cannot be admitted against it.^ Tliis
places severe limitations upon the workings of human reason. If,
for example, it were possible to disprove logically the existence
of God (which may have been the case of which Maistre 7;as thinking),
the fact that the Church said God existed would constitute "a proof
relevant to it", and would thus silence all rational dissent,
'^at this points out is that authority, far from being unable to
set the content of reason, as Burke believed, is in Maistre 's re-
gard the essence of reason. For there to be sovereignty (which
is, of course, an absolute necessity).^ the ruler must be above
PIthe accusation of error, lest disobedience be permissible. It
necessarily follows that the sovereign must set the content of
Maistre, Fourth Saint Petersburg Dialogue , in Lively,
Works Of Joseph De Maistre
, p. 214*
^Ibid., p. 215
^^Maistre, The Pope , in Lively, Works Of Joseph De Maistre ,
P» 133.
reason, or reason could be used against him. Reason is not, how-
ever, changeable across national borders or from one reign to the
next, because there is one authority that infallibly sets the con-
tent of reason in keeping with the dictates of God and is ne-/er-
changing. That superintending authority is, of course, the Papacy.
The keystone of reason is, therefore, obedience to both king and
Pope, when they agree, and to Pope, when they do not. This eff-
ectively removes the individual from any role in reason. If he
thinks for himself, other than possibly finding arguments to support
the conclusions of authority, he violates the dictates of reason.
Truly individual reasoning is opposed to the will of God, and is
therefore both irrationality and heresy. It was this that convinced
Maistre that Rousseau and Voltaire were both fools and sinners.
Another component of reason, one in no way contradictory
to the above, is "The general sentiments of all men Iwhich! con-
_t
Btitute, so to spe,ak, intuitive truths."" Needless to say, Maistre
interprets "the general sentiments of all men" in a way supportive
of secular, and especially Papal, authority. A necessary result
of this is to see non-Catholic countries as lacking in reason.
The fact that Protestant countries can be felt to be lacking in
reason shows an interesting twist Maistre gives to the phrase "the
general sentiments of all men*" These sentiments remain valid
and universal, even if large numbers of people do not adhere to
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them, as was the case in France and, in many respects, all of the
non-Christian world. Not adhering to these "general sentiments"
merely proves man's willfulness, and in no way reflects on the
reason of such sentiments. These sentiments of men do not rely
on man, and exist up in heaven much as do Plato's ideal types,
which they resemble in many ways. In what must be a major blow
to a view seeing human intercourse as setting the content of reason,
Maistre declares man to be unable to even determine the content
of his own "general sentiments".
Emotion and reason are also not opposed concepts to Maistre.
In fact, emotion is a truer part of reason than that part of man's
nature which results from pondering a subject. This is because
emotions constitute a way in which God speaks directly to zan and
guides him. V/hen Maistre praises emotions as being in many cases
synonymous v/ith reason, he is not referring to the emotions of
contemporary man, which he felt to be a major part of unreason.
That which has caused this problem of unreason is the tutoring
of man»s emotions by such false prophets as science and non-Christia
metaphysics. The original man (v;ho, as was seen earlier, Maistre
calls the barbarian, not the savage) is in possession of untutored
emotions, direct communications from God without accompanying static
The great goal of Maistre »s life is to return man to this earlier
blessed state of true reason. The similarities to Rousseau are
quite astonishing. A.s vrLll be seen in a later chapter, the types
of freedom the tv/o men v/ish to reestablish are even fundamentally
the Same.
For Maistre, as well as for Burke, reason is connected
the workings of history, but the cause of this is not precisely
the same for both men. Burke sees reason as intra-historical
,
because history is the record of God^s designs for man. and because
it is the record of man's accomplishments. On superficial exam-
ination, Maistre might seem to feel the same way. His works are
replete ;7ith references to history as "the first and indeed the
only teacher in politics"^^, and "experimental politics."-'^ In
this historical experimentation, however, man is never the exper-
imenter. History is purely the record of God»s reason, never man's.
The very attitude of Eurke and Maistre toward the reason in the
historical process is different. Burke believes that the record
of history has, vd.th some detours, been the record of the increase
of human reason, and that this process is far from completion.
Burke shared in the optimism of his time, though his idea of reason
was intermingled v/ith religious concepts to a greater extent than
was true of many of his contemporaries. In contrast^ Maistre saw
history from an. early beginning point as constituting a retrogression
in real reason and its replacement v/ith false reason. Burke's
period of greatest reason lies in the future and Maistre 's in the
past. In this sense, Maistre may be considered a reactionary.
Maistre, however, does not seek to reestablish a past state
of affairs or maintain the status quo out of a blind adherence
^•^4aistre, Study On Sovereignty
, in Lively, Works Of Joset)h
De Maistre
, p. ll/f.
^^Ibid., p. Ilif.
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to atrophied forms of government. He sees traditional forms of
government (at least traditional Catholic forms) as having served
best the happiness of the people, which is a major part of reason.
Despite this, Maistre, as a strong Ultramontanist
, determined
in advance what constituted true happiness, and like many other
ideologues was willing to spread misery throughout the world so
that true reason and true happiness might be achieved. One may
assume that Spain was a happier country before the coming of the
Inquisition, but since true reason and true happiness were poss-
ible only through the true religion, any loss of false happiness
could not count for much. Maistre 's reason, or unreason, is the
same as that of the Jacobins. Both feel that what ought to be.
which is the only reason, must be realized regardless of cost,
and anything less than true reason is unacceptable.
The notions of reason held by Burke and Maistre fit in well
with their general theories. Burke is not enthusiastic about the
quality or extent of individual reason, but ho does believe it
exists and believes that any qualitative difference between social
reason, which he values highly, and individual reason, about which
he is more skeptical, stems from the greater quantitative extent
of the former. To Burke, in other words, reason is set on a bas-
ically human scale. To be sure, God's v/ill works itself out in
the processes of reason, but it usually does so through the actions
of men. Any wise individual should exercise very great caution
in criticizing the results of age-old reason, but vdth Burke the
possibility Of such criticism is not foreclosed. It is, however,
;vith Maistre. Rurnan reason, as such, does not exist, though
human v.dllfulness does. All reason is God's reason, and it
is authoritatively interpreted through an infallible institution
speaking for God. One can be considered to have reason only
to the extent he subordinates himself to this institution and
gives up all claim to individual reason.
r. Burke »s Concepts of Causation. For human reason to
be truly effective, it must be possible to be able to under-
stand cause and effect. Whatever reason man might have v.'ould
obviously count for nothing if he could not v;ork his vn.ll upon
the social and physical ^;.'orld. Burke takes an ambigaous position
on this very important question. He is convinced beyond doubt
that there is a chain of causation in history, but whether man
can know what this chain is, much less control it, is not clear.
The universe was not a haphazard affair to Burke, because God
decreed certain laws for it and adhered to those lav/s Hj.ri!self,
though certainly capable of breaking them. Burke never Qoes
into any great detail about what God»s laws are and where His
chain of causation leads, other than having a vague supposition
that the future vail involve increasing liberty and reason.
The ambiguity of Burke's attitude toward causation is expressed
well in his Speech On Parliamentary Reform. In this discourse,
he does not deny the possibility of carrying out reforms, but
urges that before one attempts to correct even an undoubted
abuse, the effects of this on all other parts of the constitution
must bo considered. This suscests that man is not pov;erless
to invoke changes in his environment, but ouf;ht to bo very
cautious in doinc so. lest, like a latter day Sorcerer's App-
rentice, he bo unable to control the forces he has set in motion.
This idea occurs throughout Burke's writings and expresses the
view that man may not bo able to affect his surroundings in
the manner ho wishes, at least most of the time. Man should
accopt his weakness in the field of causation, because of the
wea'.mess of his reason to achieve what he wants, and only ,vhat
he wants. This was not Burke's final word on the subject of
causation. There were two other atti.tudes expressed in his
actions and Iriis writings. As a practical politician of great
renown. Burke could hardly have felt that man could in no way
affect his lot successfully. That he, at least sometimes, held
to the opposite view is shown by his definition of "party" as
"a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors
the national interest upon some particular principle in which
they are all agreed." and of "politician" as "the philosopher
in action."^ If man can promote such a grand goal as the
nationaJ. interest, he can surely succeed in promoting lesser
and more mundane goals. This is Burke at his most optimistic.
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Man is seen here as a rational and decent creature quite able
to reshape society (to at least some extent), according to his
standard of what is right* A temperamental conservatism dic-
tates that such a reshaping be carried out with due caution
and with respect for the contributions of the past, but that
such reshaping is possible, and sometimes desirable, is con-
fidently affirmed. There is a third theory of causation in
Burke's writings. In the last three years of his life, when
ho was given to black depression over the death of his son (whom
he loved greatly and in whom he hoped for the glorification
and ennoblement of the family name) and over what he feared
was a hopeless struggle against Jacobinism at home and abroad.
Burke gave way to a dismal fatalism over the ability of men
to shape their own affairs. He saw Jacobinism spreading among
England's youth and felt this v/ould inevitably destroy England,
the English constitution, and Christianity."' Burke was quite
unwilling to give up the fight against Jacobinism, even with
this morose belief, for he was absolutely certain he was doing
what v/as right, and was literally prepared to die for it. It
is incorrect to feel this third of Burke's theories of causation
should be discounted as the heartsick utterances of a broken
and neglected old man, for his opinions v/ere actively sought
up to the time of his death, and this theory v/as, after a certain
27Burke , Fourth Let tar On the Pegicido Peace , in Burke '
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fashion, in keeping with Burke's general philosophy. Burke had
always believed that there was an overarching God-given destiny
determining the ultimate ends achieved, but up to this last period
in his life he had pushed these ends into the distant future and
had, moreover, seen them as benevolent. It is unavoidable for
one.s personal life to affect his philosophy, and this led Burke
to begin wondering whether the battle of Armageddon might be won
by the forces of evil, despite all that men could do, and whether
that last Tv;ilight of the Gods was taking place in his own lifetime
What is one to make of these three somewhat different theorie
of causation? It can be seen that they have very different ram-
ifications for the extent and applicability of human reason. The
first affirms the possiblity of man reshaping his world, but ad-
vises (in practice) against doing it, because it is a process more
easily begun than controlled. This surely places severe limita-
tions both upon man's reason and upon his effective freedom, but
does not declare him to be entirely a pam of forces beyond his
control. Man's power is great, but is only very weakly under the
control of his needs and wishes. The second theory of causation
is by any accounting the most optimistic for man's freedom and
reason. It is declared that analogies of the birth and death of
states are only analogies; the human mind is "the proximate eff-
icient cause" of states, and if there are any necessary "internal
causes" of the fate of states, they are "obscure and much more
.asm
difficult to trace. "28 3^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ practically anything can
Change the course of history. These statements suggest a vievr
Of man as in effective and fundamental control of his environment
from (one may assume) the grand developments of world history to
the mundane events of daily life. This burst of glowing enthusi
stemmed from the fact that at this stage in the French Revolutionary
crisis Burke was convinced the English nation was rallying to crush
the threat to civilization. However, even in this statement that
comes as close as Burke ever did to saying man is all powerful,
the bet is still hedged. It is said that man is "the proximate
efficient cause" of tiis world, and that any "internal causes" are
"obscure and much more difficult to trace." The first point im-
plies there is a cause which determines final ends and is beyond
man»s control, and the second point says this cause is probably
beyond man's understanding. Man does have total, or near total,
control over all of his everyday life and over much of history
as well, but the final ends are in the Rand of God. Man's freedom
and reason are very impressive, but are still limited in the play's
last act. The third theory of causation restricts man's freedom
very greatly. It does not, however, do so by any really new de-
partures in theory. It does so by moving the day of reckoning
up to the present* The underlying theme of all of Burke's theories
of causation (which are consistent in philosophy, but not in app-
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lication Of philosophy) is that
.an's freedo. and reason are real,
but limited. Short-run modifications, often centuries in length.
Of man's destiny by man are possible, but the final Determiner
of man's destiny is not, and cannot be, man.
G. Maistre On Causation. It would be pleasant to say Kaistre
clearly embraces either a determinist or inde terminist view of
causation, but such is not true. It is important, first, to ex-
plain what the terms "determinism" and "indeterminism" must mean
with regard to Maistre, for he sees two actors in the affairs of
men, God and man. In this discussion, "determinism" shall be seen
as the belief that the affairs of men are not haphazard in their
causation, and are, therefore, possibly under man's control. It
would not be entirely improper, based on this definition, to see
Maistre as an inde terminist
, for he feels God to be the primary
determinant of man's fate. Without God there is no cause of anything
in the universe. This is because, first of all, there are no causes
in nature, since nature is a result of God.^^ Maistre is adamant
against the view that nature is predictable. He declares that
there is no inflexible chain of causation, but only "complex forces"
based on the vrarkings of "free agents. "-^^ It is surprising to
see this phrase "free agents" (note the plural) in Maistre, as
his theory shows there to be only one free agent, God. One may
believe this phrase was an oversight on Maistre 's part. There
29Maistre, Fourth Saint Petersburg Dialogue, in Lively. Works
Of Joseioh De Maistre. p» 225.
^^Ibid., p. 216.
/
are no invariable laws of nature because "The splended theory of
invariable laws would lead us straight to fatalism and m.J.e an
automaton of man."; this belief in invariable laws "hardens the
heart", and is a ploy by philosophers to keep men from praying.^l
This charge is preposterous, but it does show Maistre realized
invariable laws of nature, however derived, would result in the
banishment of God from the realm of physical nature. Ke is not
entirely wrong in seeing such a view as a form of atheism, or at
least an attack on God's omnipotence. Both man and God cannot
stand at the center of the universe. It is, however, paradoxical
to have Maistre accusing those who say there are invariable laws
of nature and history of making man an automaton and causing fatalis
for a theory making God the architect of all would have the same
result. Such would be true, if not for the power of prayer.
Maistre has been accused of stating a form of religion more
pagan than Christian^^^ ^^^^ p^^^^ ^^.^ thought as his glor-
ification of war could support this. Ma5.stre, however, feels God's
often harsh decrees can be altered if one approaches Him with a
humble spirit. Prayer can move mountains. Maistre goes so far
as to say that if God were evil (a belief he does not accept),
it would be more necessary than ever to pray to lUm, in order to
Ibid., pp. and 216-217.
52Harold Laski, .^tnr^iP.Q Xa Iho. Prohl^m Q±
(PTew York: Howard Fertig, 1968), p. 223.
cal. Ili.: .rath.33 p,,,^, ^.^^^ ^^^^ ^^^.^ subordination in
.natters
Of causation and the great power he has v.dthin his subordinate
station. Maistre is sure God v^ll answer genuine prayer. This
could result in making man^s control over nature and himself al>
most absolute, for there are no laws of nature preventing a ,ust
and pious man from" achieving his desires, though a good man would
not pray for certain things and might even suffer temporal torment
so that he would take on others' sins and avoid punishment in the
afterlife. The realm of the possible is, nevertheless, unlimited,
for nothing can stand in the way of the ;vill of God.
As one can expect from the direct role God plays in the affairs
of men, miracles often break into the chain of causation. This
must interfere 'with human plans considerably, for a miracle is
by definition unexpected and great in its results. It follows
that man can make plans only provisionally, for he cannot kiiow
when a miracle '^all strike. Maistre, in other words, himself pre^
sents a fatalistic theory. If God brings on the results that He
wants when He wants them, paralysis of human vrill L':ay result from
this unpredictability. This tendency could be seen in Maistre »s
own life, in that, except for some propagandizing, he was willing
to leave the overthrow of Jacobinism to God.
Though there are no invariable laws of nature, there are
laws of nature. So that man might not be miserable through lack
•^^Maistre, Eighth Saint Petersburg Dialogue
, in Lively, Works
Of tJoseph De Maistre, p. 190.
Of prc-dlctabiUty, God. out of love for nan. decrees general laws
to v/hlch He usually adheres, with no necessity to do so. ^'^ Mir-
acles are very rare, and must be so if they are to be miracles.
An unbroken chain of causation does usually exist in everyday life,
and so the predictability that is absent in great affairs is present
m mundane events. Though this Is by God's sufferance, the average
man v.'ould lose no sleep over it.
It is important to understand what Maistre's theory of cau-
sation means for human freedom, for it points up again the tension
in his thought of Enlightenment and Christian elements. He is
unv/illing, in practice, to see everything as the work of God, as
this would make a slave of man and make him fear to take a single
step, .since man could not know if anything he did would lead to
the desired result. Maistre is equally unv.dlling to banish God
from His predominant position in causation. God is in much the
same position as Maistre »s sovereign. He is a legally unlimited
ruler Who is, however, morally bound by laws over which He has
ultimate power.
This leads to an unsatisfactory situation from the point
of view of human liberty. In appearance, man, when allied mth
God, has control of his world to an extent that would have been
deemed presumptuous by many a Philosophe. When it comes to the
scales of causation, however, man carries no real v;eight at all,
save to try to call on the overpowering weight of God, with
'"^^aistre, First Saint Petersburg Dialogue , in Lively, Works
Of Joseph De Kaistre
, p. 190.
no as.= arance of success. God is not merely the primary cause,
He is the only cause. Despite the ambiguity pointed out above,
it is clear that this is totally destructive of freedom, for
Kaistre at one point admits there to be no cause and effect
in human affairs.^^ Man can ;vork his vail upon the environment
only to the extent that God permits him to do so. To paraphrase
Burke, liberty on sufferance is liberty condemned. Fothing,
in Maistre's theory, is actually predictable in the v/orld of
man. The smallest detail of man»s life is completely under
the command of God's v/ill. The necessary result of Maistre's
theory of causation would be for .lan to be contemptible in his
own eyes, to completely lose heart in his own strengths and
abilities, and to fear to attempt the most trivial action on
his own. There is no room in Maistre's theory for human will,
for such will is not only vanity, it is the most absolute absurdity.
In the final analysis, it v/ould be correct to see Burke
as accepting the rationalist creed of his cen':ury, vrLth reser-
vations. There is such a thing as knowledge, it is to a large
extent a product of individual human intelligence and sense
experiences, and it is of power to change the world, v.dthin
'.^dde limits. The basic prerequisites for individual autonomy
and freedom are, therefore, established. There are, neverthe-
less, reservations as to the actual efficacy of human knowledge.
35Maistre, Study On Sovoroignty
, in Lively, V/orks Of Joseph
Do Maistre, p. 103.
This is a oualiried affirmation of the possibility of hu.an freedom.
Maistre, in contrast, despite trivial concessions in for. but not
substance, is an implacable foe of the rationalism of the eighteenth
century. Knowledge cones only from God and His infallible inter-
preters (which the average individual cannot claim to be) and is syn-
onymaus .vith total subordination to these authorities. To attempt
individual rational endeavor is only vanity and heresy, and is
also doomed to fail. This knocks the foundation out from under
human freedom, though Maistre does not (by his o;ra theory) see
himself as an enemy of human freedom.
H. The Natural Law. Before we enter the main body of this
section, a discussion of the theorists' views of Natural Law, it
will be well to get an idea of what "Natural Law" means, especially
in relation to the allied concept of "Natural Rights". The key
element in both phrases is "natural". One way in wliich zhe American
College Dictionary defines this term is "proper to the circumstances
of the case". This definition avoids an important question,
namely what are "the circumstances of the case"? This question
has two answers, these dividing those who hold to Natural Law con-
cepts. The first, the traditional Natural Law view, sees "natural"
as meaning "proper to divinely-created nature", a nature of which
man is only a part. The second, the proto-Enlightenment and En-
lightenment view, defines "natural" as "proper to man»s nature".
This is a basic conflict, pitting Burke and Maistre (along vn.th
^^The American College Dictionary > twenty- fourth edition, 1970,
traditional Natural Law thinkers such as Aquinas and others), hol-
ders of the first view, against Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and their
adherents, holders of the second. This dispute is based on the
question of whether Natural Law concerns the laws of man or God.
Based on thj.s dichotomy, the two Natural Law schools are
inclined to have different views as to the concept of Natural Riehts
these rights being rights of man. The man-oriented Natural Law
is strongly pushed by its logic to the view that there are rights
of man, rights of individual men. Even Hobbes, who is no indiv-
idualist, upholds this view when he affirms the right of an in-
dividual to defend his life against the state. It would be absurd
for a school of thought which believes the Law of N.-turc is, at
least somewhat, the law of the individual, to deny that the indiv-
idual has intrinsic rights. The God-centered Natural Law school
need not necessarily believe there are rights of man. God, not
man, determines what is lav; in heaven and on earth, and He is th3
One that determines the existence or non-existence of basic hunian
rights. It shall be seen that this traditional Natural L'av; school
can incorporate the concept of Natural Rights, as is typified by
Burke, but noed not do so, as is shown by Maistre,
That Burke did believe in a Natural Law involving Natural
Rights is almost impossible to deny (though some such as Sabine
have denied it). One of Burke's key complaints against the Anti-
Popery Lav/s of Ireland v;as that they violated both common and Na-
tural Law by (among other strictures) denying a Catholic the right
Of self-defense by denying him the right to own a weapon.^^ Like
Hobbes, Burke feels self-defense to be the most important of rights,
but unlike Hobbes sees a decent and happy life to be as important
as life itself. It vdll be seen that this requires a whole cat-
alogue Of Natural Rights. Further, a law transgressing against
the ends of just government is "void in its obligatory quality
on the mindM and is therefore no true law.^^ Civil society, Burke
declares, exists for "a conservation and secure enjoyment of our
natural rights", and no government has the right to suspend or
annul the rights of nature, except for very limited periods and
in very extreme emergencies, as these rights are paramount to the
39state. This was one of those places in Burke where the politician
got in the way of the philosopher, for how can a right paramount
to the state be suspended by the state for a moment, no matter
what the crisis? It should be noticed, however, that Burke did
not take the easy way out and deny these temporarily suspended
rights to be Natural Rights, this standing as proof of his devo--
tlon to the concept. Nevertheless, to allow the suspension of
a Natural Right opens up a Pandora's Box of dilemmas, the three
most important being that a practice once undertaken is easier
to undertake again, a time-limit on an extra-legal assumption of
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power is a loslcal contradiction, and. considering hu»an nature,
there can be no assurance that a dictator will give up power once
the crisis is past.
Men have rights to what the state can do for them, keeping
in mind that the state exists for the good of all tho people, not
just any part. Lest it be thought that this talk of Natural Rights
which may. as will be seen, be ^/indicated against the state by
revolution is the work of a youth and not the mature Burke, it
should be said that when Burke wrote this he was thirty-six years
old with five major ivorks written, and was the personal secretary
to the Prime Minister. Also, these ideas remained with Burke throughout
his life. In addition. Burke did not take this position because
the case affected his native land of Ireland. In 1783, eighteen
years after he v/rote the above-cited work, Burke began a campaign
to impeach and punish Governor-General Hastings of the East India
Company for his violations of the Natural Law in India. There
was nothing sectarian or mean in Burke's views of the Natural Law.
All men had rights under the Ifatural Law which rulers had to ob-
serve, lest their rule be treated as "void in its obligatory quality
on the mind." Burke's belief in Natural Rights was so strong that
he declared Negro slaves to have rights (among them property, marr-
iage and a family, inheritance, leisure time, education, and freedom
from physical cruelty) which were to be protected by the Attorney
General of the West Indies on frequent inspection trips, sale to
be arranged for any slave who had been unjustly deprived of his Natural
Rights. These strictures were to be in effect for only so long
as would be required to bring about the gradual and total abolition
of slavery. Nor was Burke willing to assert Natural Rights only
for despised groups long distances away. His services on behalf
of full civil rights for Catholics and Jews in England, the most
hated people in England at that time, forced him to endure the
terror of a mob intending to harm him and harmed his political
career. Natural Rights, as we have seen, are the rights of self-
defense (and of all that follows from it) and of a fair share of
the benefits of government. To disregard these rights is to leg-
itimize revolution. That his Natural Law position was the force
impelling Burke to a defense of the Americans in one revolution
and to an opposition to the Jacobins in another is difficult to
deny. In his Speech On Conciliation With the Colonies
, Burke says
that Britain's treatment of the Americans "is not reconciliable
to any ideas of liberty, much less with their's" and that a state
ought to promote the happiness of its people, which makes Britain's
actions further illegitimate.^^ Burke did not deal much with his
objections based on Natural Law in the American case, preferring
Instead to deal non-philosophically with what he viewed to be a
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fundamentally non-philosophical dispute, but it .ust be clear fro.
the above quotation that Natural Law considerations were very
.uch
in his .ind. Burke.s recourse to Natural Law is ^ch .ore explicit
m the case of the French Revolution, for here he was faced by a
crisis that was penulti.ately philosophical, and in which Burke's
antagonists were claiming the sanction of the Natural Law. A rather
extensive quotation is called for, for in it Burke states as clearly
as he ever did his concept of the Natural Law,
rffv,^n7^/'*°T
denying in theory, full as far is my heart from
holS? if ^^^tl^""^ ^'-'''^^ P^-^^'^ to give 01 to^?h-d) the real rights of menltalics Burke'^. In denying Seir
IhL^^'S. Of right, I do n6t mean to injure
wou?d tnt'^^"*^ ''r^' "^^^ ^^^i^ pretended r^gh^sl o ally destroy. If civil society be made for the ad!
loT.T. "i' ^''^ advantages for which it is made bel
fn^l institution Of beneficence;
Tri^hr ll^iV V ^^^^'"^fic^nce acting by a rule. Men havea rig t to live by that rule; they have a right to do justiceas between their fellows, whether their fellows are in pubUc*
f^n?^ ''^''fv,'-? °f^^"^^y occupation. They have a right to theruits of their industry, and to the means of making theirindustry fruitful. They have a right to the acquisitions oftheir parents, to the nourishment and improvement of their
offspring, to instruction in life, and to consolation in death.Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon
others, he has a right to do for himself; and he has a right
to a fair portion of all which society, wdth all its combin-
ations of skill and force, can do in his favor. In this part-
nership all men have equal rights, but not to equal things...
Bat he has not a right to an equal dividend in the product
of the joint stock; and as to the share of power, authority,
and direction which each individual ought to have in the man-
agement of the state, that I must deny to be amongst the direct
original rights of man in civil society, for I have in my con-
templation the civil social man, and no other. It is a thing
to be settled by convention. ^2
Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In France
.
p. 67.
This passage shaiLd, first, silence those, such as Cobban,
who have felt that by attacking the French view of Natural Rights,
Burke was attacking Natural Rights per se. a study of this passage,
in fact, shows Burke felt Natural Rights to be the basis of civil
society and of all laws. Men have, based on Natural Law, an ex-
tensive list of rights, but among these are not the "rights" to
equality of property or to equality (or any power) in the govern-
ment of the state. This second point should not be overstated.
Though Burke was cool to what has been called government by the
people, he was not prepared to rule it out in principle. The fact
that Burke, at the time he was fighting a philosophy declaring
the right to overturn the world in the name of the Rights of Man,
affirmed his total devotion to those rights more than ever before,
shows just how deep his feelings for the Natural Rights were.
The Natural Law pervades the views Burke held on economics.
The state is to stay out of concerns involving the economy, except
when (as in the case of the East India Company in India) an econ-
omic concern is acting in a way violating the Natural Law. B'-irke
held that the laws of commerce, whicn are supply and demand set
by the parties to a transaction, are part of the Law of Nature,
and are not to be tampered with by the state. One reason for
this is that Burke believes the government in the economy is the
proverbial bull in the china shop, but another is that Burke feels
fidmund Burke, Thoughts and Details On Scarcity
,
in Burke '
s
Works, V, 157.
government intervention in the econo.y necessarily harns libertv
and Natural Rights. Burke will never per.it this to happen. It
is possible to attack the views that Burke held on economics, but
not his sincerity in holding them, nor the degree to which they
comported ^.ell vrLth the other elements of his theory. They were
drawn up not to be of benefit just to any one class of society,
but in order to protect the liberty of all. This is shovm very
clearly by the fact that Burke was willing to violate his cherished
laws of economics when their operations in Itidia violated the Na-
tural Law. Burke was simply not the type of man to put his theories
above the good these theories were designed to promote. Thi.s is
not to say that he was no philosopher, for he was a great one,
but that he was no ideologue.
Burke's views on the origins of Natural Law are important.
The Natural Law concept, in various forms, had, after all, been
held by many different theorists. The difference between Burke
and Locke and Hobbes was that Burke held to the original aod-ccnterod
Natural Law, whereas the other two held to the newer man-centered
"Natural Rj.ghts". Burke believes God to be the source of Natural
Law. God sanctions the moral law and the social con bract, the
latter being the source of all human laws and the former being
the standard against which all human laws must be judged. Diff-
erent ideas of the Natural Law are found in Hobbes and Locke.
Hobbes favors an absolute sovereign because it is good for man;
Locke favors a representative system and safeguarding of rights, since
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these are good for man. Man, as Stanlis points out in Edmund Burke
and the Natural Law, is the key factor in Hobbes and Locke>^ This
is not so with Burke. Burke holds to the Natural Law not because
it is good for man (though he surely believes it to be so), but
because it comes from the Hand of God. Burke's belief in an
eternal moral order derived from God pervades all his thinking;
man cannot perceive perfect moral truth, and therefore cannot
be the arbiter of the human situation. Because this is so, Burke
felt that any claim by a man or institution to absolute power
was a clear infringement of the Natural Law and an attack on God,
the ultimate Legislator of the universe. It must follow that lim-
itations upon government are therefore an integral part of the law
of God. Many laws are, as has been seen, to be settled by convention,
but the roost basic goals and direction of government are set by God
in the name of liberty and the rights of the hunan being. In con-
trast to Hobbes and Locke, however, Burke values the Natural Law
simply and purely because it is the Natural Law, the law of God.
A rather different view of the Natural Law is presented in
Malstre, and the concept is put to a very different use. The slm^
ilarities between Burke and Maistre initially look greater thar. the
differences, Maistre, after all, does believe in a divinely-created
Natural Law that is centered on God and is irrevocably binding
on all men. A. national constitution, in point of fact, cannot
stanlis, Sdmund Burke and the Natural Law
, pp. 25-2?.
be written by men. The constitution of a nation is written
by God through the actions of divinely-inspired great men and
through the God-created traditions and geographical locale of
a people. The most important parts of a constitution cannot
be written at all vdthout endangering the state, for the very
act of writing a law would make people think they have power
over it (which Maistre heatedly denies). The essence of a true
law (as opposed to the code of regulations of a club or similar
group) consists of its ability to coerce all into obedience.
As such cannot be the work of man, for not even all men could
make a law capable of coercing all men, law is necessarily the
work of God. This renders all laws Natural. All laws are there-
fore outside the right of man to annul, interpret, or expand.
This goes far beyond Burke in the sphere alloted to the Natural
Law, for Burke left much to convention. Maistre leaves no proper
act of government outside the Natural Law. Sines the task of
a law is merely to declare a pre-existing custom (and this itself
is to be avoided), the legislative output of any state is necess-
arily as near zero as possible. All the legislating necessary
for any well-ordered state was done by God at the moment of
its creation. The most a human legislator can ever do is to
Maistre, i^ssay On the Generative Principle Of Political
Constitutions, in Lively, Works Of Joseph De Maistre
. pp. lU7-]t\3.
^Ibid., p. 151.
read the national constitution written into the body of the
nation by God, and act accordingly, v.'hereas Burke could say
"Early reformations are amiable arrangements with a friend in
power"^^, Maistre opposed any reform, for several reasons.
First, to seek reforms is to judge the work of God, which cannot
be permitted. Second, certain defects are inherent to the
nature of any constitution, because God knew the fallible nature
of the material for whom He was legislating.^^ Third, since
a true reformer would have to have unerring insight into both
the essence of a nation and its future (which is quite impossible
for any human), any reform carried out by human action would
necessarily have abuses attached to it, abuses greater than
those it sought to correct. Maistre, therefore, has identified
the Natural Law (which to him includes all laws) firmly with
the status quo.
It is, furthernore, impermissible for an individual to
seek to judge whether or not a state has violated the Natural
Law. A divine institution, the papacy, exists for that purpose.
Maistre never gives any hints as to how the papacy is to perform
this function, this being a matter between the Pope and God.
It is safe to assume from Maistre 's writings and temperament
Burke
,
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A. Robert Caponigri, Some Aspects Of the Philosophy Of
Joseph De Maistre (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), P
that as long as a ruler does not attack Catholicism, the rights
Of the aristocracy, or the customs of his country, he will have
little or nothing to fear from the Church. The common people
have no rights deriving directly from God, but instead receive
their rights indirectly from God, through custom. The rights
of the common people are granted by the sovereign in keeping
with custom, but the rights of the sovereign and the aristocracy
"are constitutive and basic, having neither date nor author. "^^^
Though the rights of all men (which are viewed by Maistre as
being corporate pri^/ileges) necessarily derive ultimately from
6od, as all things must, it is evident that the rights belonging
to the pillars of society do so in a much more direct fashion
than do the rights of the less exalted elements of the society.
This is a thought that would never have been found in Burke.
The question of the Natural Law in Maistre brings up the
question whether he may be considered a Catholic positical theoris
This is, after all, a central concern for the content of his
Natural Law. There has been much dispute on this point. Lebrun
sees Maistre as departing from Catholic thought by dOTOgrading
the role of human reason in the formation of government and by
treating sovereignty as an end in itself and Murray declares
Maistre, Considerations On France, in Lively, '.Vorks Of
Joseph De Maistre
, p. 77.
^ Lebrun, Throne and Altar : The Political and Religious
Thought Of Joseph De Maistre^ pp. 100-101.
"Maistre.B treatment of religion
.ay have been good sociology
and good statesmanship, but it was far fro. being good theology. 1
These statements would have hurt Maistre, who clearly considered
himself a Catholic theorist. Fortunately for the Count, there
are other ^iews expressed on this subject. An anor:.r.ou3 writer
in 185^ referred to Maistre as
-'the leading exponent of the
neo-Catholic school"52^ Edmund '.Vilson declared
-The whole of
de Maistre 's system is founded on the belief in a Catholic God
who has appointed a Catholic king"53, Orestes Brownson was
confident that Maistre was "sound and orthodox.
One cannot say with any real justification that Maistre 's
views on Natural Law either were or were not Cr.tholic. It is
my contention that his views on Natural Law were shaped both
by his Catholicism and by the ideas of the Enlightenment he
so despised. It should come as no s:oecial surprise that the
root of Maistre 's belief in the necessary coerci veriess of laws
and the great stress he places on sovereignty stem from his
belief in original sin, which is surely a sound Catholic doctrine.
51 John C. Murray, "The Political Thought Of Joseph De Maistre,
Heview Of Politics
. XI (January, I9i^9), 77.
~"De Maistre and Romanism," North American Review, LXXIX
(October, ]Q3k) , 373.
53Edmund Wilson, "Joseph de Maistre," rjew Remibli^, August
24, 1932, p. 33.
^ Orestes Brownson, "Joseph de Maistre On Political Con-
stitutions," Brownson* s Quarterly Review
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Lebrun takes Maistre to task for being non-Catholic in seeing
the state in a far less positive light than Aquinas does. The
second part of the charge is, as will be seen in a later chapter,
definitely true, but the first part, that of being (based on
this fact) non-Catholic is clearly not true. Maistre stands
here in the good company of Augustine, who viewed the state
as "a coercive order, maintained by the use of force and relying
on the fear of pain as its major sanction for compliance to
its commands." Augustine is certainly as much a Church Father
as Aquinas, and so Maistre stands vindicated here.
A more serious charge brought against Maistre 's Catholic
orthodoxy on the Natural Law question is that he does not view
the state as serving the needs of all, which is contrary to
56Catholic belief.' It is possible to give a qualified assent
to this charge. As was seen, the rights of all men are not
equally important in Maistre 's state. The rights of everyone
are, however, all protected to some extent, and are all under
the care of God, The state does, moreover, serve the needs
of all. Man's fallen state requires a strong coercive authority
over him, but this authority, by controlling man's baser instincts
provides for his moral and educational betterment. Maistre
expresses this in a rather striking fashion when he says "Man
55
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in general, if reduced to his own resources, is too wicked to
be free. "57 consequently, the chief virtue of the state, and
Of other institutions, is that by not leaving
.an to his own
resources, they .ay succeed in moralizing
.an to the extent that
he can be free. As has already been seen to some extent, and
shall be seen again, the definition Maistre gives to "liberty"
is a strange one. At any rate, it can be said that Haistre»s
state does serve all the people, but does not do so equally.
Maistre is, therefore, at most unorthodox on this count, but
not clearly non-Catholic.
Another serious charge that has been made against Maistre
is that he downgrades religion generally by using it, without
actually valuing it.^^ According to this charge, Maistre is
captivated by what religion can do to preserve the status quo,
and embraces religion for that reason. It is true that Maistre 's
view of Christianity is rather hard, but not any harder than
that of Augustine. The equation that harshness equals irrelgion
that Soltau attempted to draw with respect to Maistre Just does
not necessarily fit. rnile it is true that Maistre did recognize
that rolgion couIjS help preserve the status quo, it must be
evident by now that he viewed the status quo he wished to preserve
as fundamentally religious. This is no argument for the view
that Maistre 's theory, including his idea of Natural Law, is
57
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irreligious. The entire character of the .an also militates
against such a conclusion. A man who, as a religious duty,
as an adolescent passed the last night with condemned criminals,
was always a firm friend of the Jesuit Order, and was recalled
as Savoyan ambassador to Russia because the Russian government
suspected him of working for the conversion to Catholicism of
Russians, can hardly have his devotion to religion questioned
fairly. His view of religion was superficially rather cold
and harsh, and this is undoubtedly what Soltau sees as irreligion.
Maistre's coldness and harshness is, however, only in means
and not in goal. Maistre declares that "Nations have never
been civilized except by religion. "^^ The belief that civil-
ization, which is the only alternative to slavery, can come
only through harshness is not, at root, harshness per se. Maistre'
ideas about religion may be uncongenial to many, but, whatever
his relationship with Catholicism as a political creed, his
loyalty to Christianity as a religion is clear. Though he
recognized the socially conservative potentials of religion^^,
it is quite false to say, for that reason, that Maistre' s ad-
herence to religion was unscrupulous.
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,
in Lively, Works Of Joseph De Maistre
, p. 163.
^'^Maistre, Study On Sovereignty
, in Lively, V/orks Of Joseph
De Maistre
, p. 106.
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A charge against the Catholic nature of Maistre's political
theory that is not so easy to deny is that by stressing faith
over human reason in the creation of the state he falls into
the heresy called Fi deism (the lauding of faith over reason).
It has already been seen that, unlike Aquinas, Maistre reduces
'
to zero the independent role of human intelligence in the trans-
lation of God's law to human concerns. It does seem that there
is no way in which this can be reconciled with Catholic ortho-
doxy. To this extent, therefore, Maistre 's Natural Law doctrine
is more authoritarian than is traditional Catholicism.
Much of the complexity of Maistre 's Natural Law theory
stems from the complexity of the man himself. There is no
denying that Catholicism was an extremely powerful influence
on his thinking, but Maistre was also "a philosophe in spite
of himself, an eighteenth century man."^^ Tnis shows up in
many places through his whole theory, but never mere than in
his concept of the Natural Law. The first sign of this is Maistre 's
belief that, just as there may be knowable rules of natural
science (Maistre 's writings are replete with analogies to natural
science.), so there are knowable rules of morality and society.
The publicizing of these rules is the main concern of Maistre.
^^Lebrun, Throne and Altar
, pp. 110-111.
62Blisha Greifer, "Joseph de Maistre and the Reaction
Against the Eighteenth Century," American Political Science
Review, LV (September, 1961 ), 598.
For Maistre to be a true philosophe, he would have to feel that
man can manipulate these rules. It is obvious from the heart
Of Maistre 's writings that man alone cannot do this. This must
be so, because these laws are the creation of God, and are ever
under His control. ^;Vhen man works in concert with God, his
power is, if not limitless, at least greatly expanded. In a
case like this, man might indeed be able to realize the Natural
Law upon Earth. This is Maistre the Christian Philosophe speaking.
Since Maistre endorses the Augustinian belief that evil is "a
fissure in being"53, cooperation between man and God can remove
this fissure and realize the laws of morality. This "cooperation"
does require total subordination of man to God, but it does
place man in a position to hasten the establishment of God's
kingdom on Earth. V/hat one has here, then, is a combination
of Catholic and Enlightenment belief. It is not surprising
that this should be so of a man who could make an Enlightenment-
sounding statement like "I feel myself consumed more than ever
by the fever to know."^^ This could, paradoxically, have served
as the motto of the Enlightenment.
It is quite possible that Maistre 's authoritarian view
of the Natural Law stems partially from the Enlightenment.
It is known that Maistre in his youth was far better read in
Maistre, Considerations On France
, in Lively, Works
Of JoseT)h De Maistre
, p. 69.
^^Quoted in Lebrun, Throne and Altar
, p. 18.
are
the authors of the Enlightenment than those of the Scholastic
tradition. Furthermore, the similarities between him and that
authoritarian precursor of the Enlightenment, Thomas Kobbes,
great. The similarities appear in many places, though obviously
not in the way in which government is formed. As to the ends
and means of government, however, both thinkers agree that the
Natural Law is to provide for civil peace and civilization through
the actions of an authoritarian ruler.^^ possible that
Kaistre got his authoritarian concept of the Natural Law either
from his particular interpretation of Catholicism, from the
authoritarian wing of the Enlightenment, or, most likely, from
both together.
The key differences between Burke's and Kaistre »s views
on the Natural Law emerge from their different views on religion
and their receptivity to different currents of the eighteenth
century. Burke religious views, to the extent he defined
then» were probably more than anything else influenced by the
libertarian heritage of early Christianity, whereas Kaistre
embraced Catholic doctrine at its most extreme point of author-
itarianism. Burke was probably also influenced by his early
period as a Lockean, for though he broke with Locke, many Lockean
ideas such as limited government, natural rights against the
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Philosophers
From Bacon To Mill
, ed. by Edv/in Burtt, (New YorK: Random House,
1959), 202-203.
state, and ultimate right of revolution remain. It .as already
seen that Maistre was influenced by a very different current
of Enlightenment thought. Both these men were religious, in-
fluenced by the Enlightenment, and conservative, but what they
did differently with these three currents was often more decisive
than what they did the same. A concrete application of this
will be seen in the next section on the State of Nature.
The State of Nature. Burke's first known work, his
brilliant satire of Bolingbroke
, A Vindication Of Natural Society,
is in large measure an attack upon the concept of the State
of Nature, and the kind of thinking which follows from it.
It may not be a coincidence that this work was written one year
after the appearance of Rousseau's Discourse On the Origin and
Foundation Of Inequality Among Men
. At any rate, it is Boling-
broke 's style that is copied, and copied so well that when this
work first appeared anonymously it was generally thought to
be a posthumous work of Bolingbroke, as Burke intended it should
seem. Burke (as Bolingbroke) praises natural society, which
was "founded in natural apr^etites and instincts, and not in
any positive institution." This was a pre-political paradise,
but was destroyed by governors and priests for their ov;n good.
Since then, all people, even the rich, have been made miserable
^^Burke, A Vindication Of Natural Society ; Or a View Of
the Miseries and Evils Arising From Every Species Of Artificial
Society , in Burke ' s Works
.
I, 11.
by living under an artificial society and pursuing artificial
needs. The solution to this cannot be other than a throwing
Off Of these enslaving superstitions and a return to natural
society m the „a.e of reason.^? TI>e goal of this wor. was
to show that Bolinghro.e.s ideas on religion could be profoundly
subversive of society, and that abstract State of Nature doc-
trines generally „ere dangerous to society. Burke succeeded
too well, for this work has probably been quite instrumental
m deluding those who have thought that Burke rejected the concept
Of a State of Nature per se, and therefore rejected the concept
Of Natural Law.^^ ^^is work was really a satire on abstract
theorizing about the State of Nature, not a true attack on the
concept of the State of Nature. Burke's views on the State of
Rature were ambiguous. He did retain enough of his Lockean
background to feel there was at one time a State of Nature,
but as to whether the effects of this State of Nature extend
to the period of civil society, Burke is not entirely clear.
Burke does, as we have seen, believe that there are Natural
Eights, and since these rights derive directly from God and
not entirely from human convention, this would suggest they
^'^
Ibld .. p. 66.
68Two writers who have made this mistake are: Sabine, A
^^g^Q^y 91 Political Theory , pp. 607-609, and John MacCunn, The
Political Phlloso-Dhy Of Burke (New York: Russell and Russell,
1965), pp. 198-199.
were operative in the State of Nature, and carried fro. there
into the State of Society, m his KpOe^ On the Resolution
In France, however, Burke says "Indeed, in the gross and com-
plicated
.ass of hu.an passions and concerns the primitive rights
Of .en undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections
that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued
in the simplicity of their original direction. This is
simultaneously the most revealing and the most befogging state-
ment Burke makes on the relationship between the State of Nature
and the State of Society. It must be noticed that this state-
ment does not deny that there are "primitive rights of men",
or that these rights are carried over into civil society. In
actuality, this statement affirms just those points. It does
say, however, that one cannot be certain just how operative
man's primitive natural rights are in the State of Society,
or in what way they are operative. Burke recognizes the tre-
mendous potential the State of Nature concept can have for liberty
and limited government, in that it makes man's most basic rights
prior to any action of government, and he therefore embraces
it, but he is also distressed by the abstractness of the concept
and the multifarious ways in which it can be used. From his
very beginning as a writer. Burke understood the tremendously
subversive potential of the State of Nature idea.
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This may be the reason why Burke rhn.
' c ooses not to paint apicture Of the State of Nature 1 n t>,
Locke. Hobbes.
«nd Rousseau do. An allied reason 1= n,. *
, ,
probably his dislike
'or treating abstractions
.ireotly. It is a reasonable belief
nevertheless, that had Burke undertaken to paint such a pictur^
«ould have been intermediate between that of Locke a... that
Of ™an 1, intermediate between those of the other two theorists
.n Burke.s estimation, is neither so needin. of a firm han^
.bove him as was felt by Hobbes, nor so capable of autonomy as
was Locke's belief.
Burke does not really deal with the State of Nature ve-y
»uch. Instead, he much prefers to speak of the State of Society
While assuming that there is some (unclarified) linkage between
"
these two states. It is quite incorrect to say. as Cobban did.
that Burke believed that any effect of the State ,f Nature had
t» cease upon man-s entry into civil society.^O
„„„ ^^^^^^^
View Is that put forward by Canavan. who said that Burke felt
Katural Law to be superior to all human authority, but also
felt that it was mediated to society through the nation
-s trad-
itions. Institutions, and positive la, (This leads one to suspect
an influence of Saint Thomas Aquinas upon Burke.), civil society
is. therefore, both natural and artificial.^' Just how these two
Cobban, Burke and the Revolt /Igalnst the Eighteenth Century
, pp. 52-53
Canavan. Political Reason Of Edmund Burke
, p. 85.
Ploces 0. t.e p,..,e ru to.et.e. ,3 too
..eo.eUcaZ a ,.esU„„
for Bu..e.s U.ln, ana not ans.e.eO.
.ut t.e.
.0 at to.et.e.
and yet remain separate pieces.
In one sense, Burke does feel that the state of Nature
and the State of Society are inseparably Joined. Tnis is because.
Since "art is man's nature", the qt^fo ^-p c . .
.
S ate of Society is man's true
state of Nature.^a
,3
^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
is achieving all that God gave hi. the power to achieve. A
statement like this should serve to refute those who might see
Burke as some sort of reactionary. A strong strain of what
might be called conservative Christian humanism runs through
Burke
-s thoughts. One of the main reasons why Burke does not
especially like the State of Nature concept, apart from its
excessive abstractness, is that man could not achieve his true
stature as a man in any State of Nature. Burke did not question
the ability of man to be both civilized and free. Hobbes stressed
civilization ar,d Rousseau freedom; Burke sought to reconcile
the two concepts. Neither concept alone was desirable, or possible
Many theorists both before and after Burke's time have
seen war as an example of the State of Nature, a situation in
which there are no laws. Burke either did not believe war to
be an example of the State of Kature, or did not believe the
State Of Nature to be normless. It is not clear which of these
beliefs was Burke's. The Natural Law is an overarching concept,
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Burko, An Appeal From the Hew To the Old Whigs
, p. 1O5.
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which is interDreted by firot tD s the Law of Nations, and then by
the laws of particular states ''^ n^t^ ^l, ,. Both the Law of Nations and
the laws Of individual states are subordinate to the Natural
Law. The Law of Nations applies to international relation,
and war. The property of citizens in a con,uered state is in-
"lolable. and the conqueror
.ust assume a moral responsibility
for the conquered; if this responsibility is not performed
the conqueror ^ay lose the
.oral right to the sovereignty he
has won. ^ m this goes to suggest that Burke- s State of Nature
is more one with rules, like that of Locke, rather than one
without rules, like that of Hobbes. In his treatment of war.
at any rate. Burke has again sought to banish the primitive
State of Nature from the midst of man in the name of Natural
Rights and human liberty,
Maistre.s concept of the State of Nature is far more complex
than that of Burke, and simultaneously gives indications of
the authoritarianism and mysticism of Maistre's thinking. Maistre
begins by quoting approvingly Burks »s statement that "art is
man's nature." Whereas, however, Burke had not intended this
to be a generalized attack upon the possibility of a State of
rrature, Maistre feels that this is what it should be. Maistre
declares that as God wills the development of man. the developed
man is the natural man. By talking about man in an impossible
73Stanlis, Burke and the Natural Law
, pp. 88-89.
''^Ibid.
, pp. 91-93.
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Oo.
„ai3t.e
.eXieves Housseau to
.e, are also aXv-
orcea rro„
,00. sense.^^
.e 3a» in t.e seoon. Capter t.-.t
Maistre ™eans so»ethi„s very
.i„ere„t
-the aevelo.ea
.an"
than Burke does. It I3 not surprising that M.^stre turns ,vlth-
Thls Is because his writings are In .any „ays "a political
Philosophical, and religious Justification of the restoration
.ove.ent... As is therefore to be expected. Malstre had a
great antipathy toward any theory that could be seen to Justify
a belief in revolution. The very theory used by his ene.les
to Justify revolution was surely no exception.
Malstre singles out Rousseau as the arch-exponent of the
State Of Nature concept, and prepares to try to refute hln.
He begins this task by declaring that the existence of such
a Et.,te would have to be proven historically, which of course
cannot be done.??
.^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
Rousseau, though he sometimes gets carried away, uses the State
of Ifature as a logical construct, and therefore Malstre seeks
to refute it as such. The State of Society must be natural
Malstre, Stud^ On Sovereignty
. In Lively, Works Of Joseph
De Malstre, pp. 95-97,
76Hans Barth, The Idea Of Order: Contributions To a Phi.lo50t)hy
Of Politic s, trans* by Ernest Hankamer and William Newell, (IJew
York: Dordrecht, Reidel, I960), p. ^^^^
77Caponigri, Aspects Of the FhilosOT^hy Of Maistre, p. 103.
for three reasons: first, because God wills
.an's perfection
(which can take place only within society), second, because
society is part of God's creation, and third, because one can
tell what is natural fro. what develops.^^ These factors plus
man»s natural sociability prove the naturalness of civil society,
and conversely the unnaturalness of the State of Nature, to
Maistre's satisfaction.
Just after he has demolished the State of Nature concept
to his own satisfaction, Kaistre develops a theory partaking
Of the State of Nature in .any ways. As has already been pointed
out at several places in this dissertation, Maistre, though
at odds with the spirit of his age in many ways far more than
Burke ever was, paradoxically reflected its temperament and
theories, especially those of his arch-enemy Rousseau (in a
distorted fashion), more accurately than Burke ever did. Maistre
uses his belief in the Deluge of Noah to prove that men before
the Fall were far superior to the men of his time. Maistre 's
line of reasoning here gives a good insight into his theory
of punishment (of which more will be said later) and into the
way in which his thought processes operated. Since (Maistre
believed) punishment is proportionate to one's knowledge of
guilt, the fact that God handed down the harsh punishment of
the Deluge shows that man at the beginning had much greater
^^Ibid.
, pp. 112-113.
u.derst.„..ns an.
.no,I«a.e (including
.cienti^c
.„o„Xea,e)
than He po..,3.es toa^.^^
^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^
one debatable proposition (that there w=b = ^oi ^i La as a deluge) to give suppor
to a debatable conclusion (that the hu.an race fell to its pre-
sent state fro» a high pinnacle of knowledge). This is certainl.
extremely poor logic. Laski Is quite correct in saying that
Maistre^ would reach his conclusions before he even made his in-
quiries. This antediluvian State of Nature was one in ,hich
men were totally subordinate to God. and individualism of the
-ort Halstre hated was unknown. Men never engaged in atheistic
studies, aad everyone was happy. The collapse of this happy
state Of affairs stewed fron. man's heretical quest for knowledge
and fr,» his willful pride. This Maistrean morality play gives
an indication of Kaistre-s inconsistent use of the term "knowledge.
"Knowledge", m the sense of individual inquiry into all aspects
Of heaven and earth, was one of Halstre's greatest enemies.
On the other hand. Maistre used "knowledge" in a second and
unusual fashion. In his preferred definition, knowledge was
the subordination of the individual to society and the acceptance
of the status quo. religious and political, based on faith.
:t was the first kind of knowledge that had landed man in his
predicament, and it was the second that could extricate him
79Maistre. The Second Saint Petersbur;^ Dialogue
, in Lively,
*2Eils Of Joseph De Maistre
. pp. 201-202.
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Laski, Studies In the Problem Of Sovereignty
, p. 232.
>o™ n. Maistre,
,„ other woras.
.rtieulates a dialectical
theory or the State or
.ature. Man was ori^inaU. i„ a MissruX
State of Nature marked by a hleh ni=t<. , » ,y ig plateau of knowledge and union
with hi. Creator. The fact that
.an was in harmony with God
-SSest3 that this knowledge wa. of the second variety, that
Of submission. This divine state came to an end because of
the first kind of knowledge, and man has been suffering for
his sins ever since. The search for knowledge is, however,
legitimate, as long as it is the right kind of knowledge (Here
Maistre seems to includp i ni-oT i ^^-i-,, tx i e intellectual endeavor, within limits,
along vdth submission to authority.), and is, moreover, a sign
Of man's desire to return to his original «tate and escape the
degradation into wnich he has fallen. 8l ^ very crucial fact
to understand about Maistre, one uniting him vdth his Philosophe
foes and morally Justifying (in his own mind) the general author-
itarian cast Of his thought, is that this degradation can be
overcome and, unlike Burke's view that this must happen by
centuries of evolution heading in a direction that man probably
cannot comprehend, it can be done in the twinkling of an eye.
Here Maistre the fierce polemicist and Maistre the man who resigned
from the Savoyan Senate (a body with judicial functions) due
to an inability to hand down death sentences, become one. Maistre
was a personally I^ind man and did not embrace his authoritarian
Maistre, Second Saint Petercburg Dialogue
, in Lively,
Works Of Joseph De Maistre
. p. 198,
theory out of any cruelty in his nature,
.ut (,uite the contrary)
because the redemption of .an Tro. eons or tor.ent was constantly
within reach, and .ust not be permitted to slip away. The great
goal to be achieved would make almost any action morally per-
missible. Hobespierre undoubtedly would have agreed. Maistre
the Philosophe is never more evident.
Underlying Maistre's belief in ^ io.=f «^u«xj. i a l st and regainable State
Of Nature is the concept that government and society are sep-
arable,
.^ether this belief stems from August inlanism or eight-
eenth century theories (especially those of Locke) is uncertain.
It is not, however, unthinkable that the man who once said
..contempt
for Locke is the beginning of knowledge." could have himself
been influenced by Locke. This is true both because of Maistre's
incongruous division into both Christian and eighteenth century
thinker and because of his tendency to use excessively tough
language as a means of getting the attention of an audience, ^2
In all likelihood, in this as in so many other things, Maistre
was both Christian and spiritual contemporary of the Enlightenment.
Several things necessarily follow from this division of society
and governm.ent. First, society is (in Maistre 's theory) seen
as chronologically prior to government. The State of Nature
was a condition with society, but without government (except
in the broadest sense of direct rule of men by God). As must
emerge from this belief, government is morally inferior to society,
Lebrun, Throne and Altar, pp. 22-23.
and (though ordained by God) Is ordained in order to orovide
for .an in his
.tate of corruption. A certain stand-of
.ishness
toward political authority Is the result. It is a reasonable
assumption that this was a .ajor source of Halstre-s Papalis„.
for here was an authority that (in Kaistre-s belief, was entirely
(or primarily)
.oral, and not political.
.«,en mankind makes
its return to God and to its primitive state, the need to control
Ban's imperfections will pass away, as the imperfections pass
away, and so government will cease. This point ought to be
carefully considered by those who would like to see Maistre
as a true fanatic for authority, for. without do^gradins the
authoritarian components of Maistre's theory, the use of pol-
itical (as opposed to moral) authority was always instrumental.
Maa, as he ought to and could be. would have no need for political
authority, because moral authority would be wholly secure.
It is most unfortunate that even those who have some kind words
for Maistre (of whom Matthew ,u-nold is one of a select ?roup) down-
grade this aspect of his thought. Arnold, In fact, declares
Maistre to be "altogether inferior" to Burke in his imaginative
power, but to have "fewer superfluities."^'^ If by "superfluities"
one means the willingness to make a radical leap of faith into
uncharted regions (at least In theory), the reverse may, to
some extent, be the case. Maistre 's views of the State of Nature
Matthew Arnold, "Joseph De Maistre On Russia," London
Quarterly Review
, CXLVIII (October, 1879), 229.
sho» hl„ to Share, i„ an in.iroct fashion, the opti^is. of his
aso. There lo a «oal to history, an. It Is right over the horizon
and magnificent. One can somewhat forgive those who ignore
these Utopian segments of Halstre-s theory, for he himself did
not like to .a.e the. too explicit, due to their obvious sim-
ilarities to the philosophy he was combatting. They do. never-
theless, pervade his theory and serve as the moral Justification
for his authoritarianism. That this contradicts fundamentally
Haistre.s stress on the necessity of preserving the'entire status
quo (social, religious, and Eolitlcal) Is certain, because his
belief in the non-political quality of the returned State of
Nature was nothing less than a formula for the ultimate political
revolution, to be carried forward by faith. It is not likely
that Malstre understood fully all the revolutionary Implications
of what must be called his State of Nature theory. To eliminate
government, even by total reliance on God and faith, would be
about the most revolutionary activity imaginable, and would he
profoundly disruptive of all aspects of human life.
It may be said, therefore, that both Burke and Mals'.ro
embraced their particular theories of nation, Natural Uw, and
the State of Nature with a view to human betterment. Burke
felt this could be best achieved by reconciling order and liberty,
because both were necessary to the pursuit of the good life,
and both could come simultaneously. These beliefs led Burke
to support a system of Independent states existing within a
general fra.ewor. of
.o.al law. a Natural La. a.rlvea fro. Ood
Which wouia serve to maintain both liberty and order, and a
State of Nature which, how-ver vas-nol ,, v, ..
.
. gue y bestowed certain right£
which were to hi enlovsH «ri t n.j y.d nthln the social state. In these
aspect. Of Bur.e.s theory, it is impossible to place either
liberty or order before the other, be It chronologically or
in degree of Importance. The situation In Maistre is rather
different, with this theorist, order must come before libertv
m point Of ti.e. so that liberty (which is signlfica;.tly dif-
ferent in Maistre than in Burke) might be achieved at all.
Ih the realm of International relations, this requires the sub-
ordination of all stat(=«? t.-> fv^o ^v,^ ^-x czazes o the one state which is not a true
state, the Papacy. The Papacy, as the incarnation of God's
law, is to so order all the states that they will achieve their
true liberty despite themselves. Maistre, as a good theist,
does believe there is a Natural Law, but he also fuzzes the
issue by identifying God's law with all laws, so long as they
are in keeping y;ith a country's God-given traditions. This
follows necessarily from Maistre 's belief that God is sole
Legislator, and certainly places a high premium on order. This
order, however, being God-given, must include all the liberty
man is capable of having, for no one knows the nature of a
creation better than the Creator. Finally, Maistre debunks
one theory of the State of Nature that seeks to set liberty
against order, and upholds another that seeks to achieve liberty
an M..re.
.en„..o„,
^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^e.o™. ea„ Us o„
^e.ou.. 3......
....
...not understood by Maistrp =,r,^ ^'^a-LST^re, and does not altpr uxiut e the chronological
ore.
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^
liberty as inextricably interwoven, and Maistre saw the achieve-
ment of liberty through order.
That this is more than a tritH^i
^ ^
^ ^""^"^^^ difference should, hopefully,
be Obvious,
.^ong other things, it bespea.s a rather basic diff.
erence in the two theorists^ views of .an, which is a subject that
necessarily pervades their entire theories thi . . .uu , s dichotomy having
been seen in the last chapter.
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Chapter IV: Sources and Nature Of Sovereignty
A. origin Of Positive Lav,. As was seen In chapter three.
Bur.e believes there Is a relationship between natural law and
positive law. The case of Hastings showed a positive Uw couM
not be legitimate unless it was reconciliable with natural law
but beyond this it is difficult to really understand the re-
lationship between the two types of law. One would ^hlnk that
the strong ethical and religious cast of Burke's mind would
cause hi. to say there were principles against which one could
Judge the content of positive law, but on this point he is
ambiguous. This .ay be the only case in which the French Rev-
olution succeeded in working a major change in one of Burke's
basic ideas. At about the age of thirty. Burke penned a crit-
Icisn, Of the seventeenth century chief justice Sir Matthew Hale,
one of the great proponents of the case-by-case approach in
com:=on law. Burke said that one can understand the historical
development of the law. and that this development often derives
from principles outside the common law outside.' It is a safe
assumption that Burke meant such principles to be ethical and
religious. By the time of the French Revolution, however, the
concept that common law was derived from laws outside of itself
had vanished from Burke
-s vn-itings. One of Burke's most Important
J.G.A. Pocock, Politics
. Language
. and Time ; Essays On
Political Thought and History (Hew York: Atheneum, 1971), p. 221^.
statements on the subject follows.
to inoculate any scion alien fn tt ^^""^ ^^-^^^
plant. All the'^relormaLons we ^^v/h'^^ °' ^^^^inalproceeded upon the princJ
^e\lren f? ^^,ffand I hope, nay, I am persuaded, thaJ ail tLT^^'^l^'possibly may be made hereafter iill be cLe^u^v'^?^'^ .upon analogical precedent, autnorityfanfexa^pLfr
This statement is followed by a careful analysis of the major
reformations of British history, detailing how the architects
Of these reforms made a point of showing how any changes they
instituted derived not from any abstract principle, but from
previous positive laws. If Burke is to be believed, therefore,
the legitimacy of a law derives from its antiquity, and nothing
else. It is a bad idea to say a thinker did not really believe
what he claimed to believe (for who should know better?), but
Burke »s own writings of the same period and his temperament
permit us to discount what he says of himself on this point.
It io quite impossible that Burke, who was morally outraged
by what he perceived to be the atheism of the Jacobins, would
have said that the basic laws and institutions of his society
were secular in nature. fTaturally, if laws only derive from
their antiquity and from no innate principles, secularism is
perfectly legitimate. Burke had by no means become a secularist.
In his letter on Protestant rule in Ireland, written to his
son in 1793, clear evidence of this is given. It is said by
^Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In France
, pp. 35-36.
hi. that Protestant tyranny in ireUna I3 an evil and ought
to be put to an end. but that the established Anglican Church
»as Of t„ hundred years duration in that country and had there-
fore beco.e an indissoluble part of the Irish landscape.^ No
theory basing positive laws on their age alone can possibly
reconcile all parts of this last statement, for Protestant
tyranny in Ireland was every bit aq olH oo^^y Dxz s O d as was the establish-
-nt or the Anglican Church there. Ti.e, however, did Justify
the latter, but could not Justify the for.er. This was because
the former was manifestly unjustifiable, violating as it did
the law Of God and the ends of proper government. The estab-
lishment Of the Anglican Church, though a mistake in a primarily
Catholic country, did not have this tyrannical quality. Time,
therefore, can grant no right to an immoral law, practice, or
institution. Principles outside of the common law and knowable
to the human intelligence remain central to Burke's concept
Of the positive lavu It may be assumed that Burke made his
false declaration to the contrary because he was fighting an
armed ideology that arrogated to itself the right to Judge all
laws and institutions based on independent principles. Though
the Reflections On the Revolution In France is rightly consid-
ered Burke's philosophical magnum opus, it must be remembered
that it was by no means written as an abstract articulation
^Burke, Letter On Protestant Ascendancy In Ireland
, in
Burke *s Works, VI, /+03.
or Eu..e.s philosophy, a. .as true of
.ost of his wor.s (ex-
cepting only his Philosophical In^ Into the 0^ Of Our
Ideas Of the SuMl^ and Beautiful, a very early
.ork)
, a con^
Crete goal was being pursued. The existing order in England
was to be preserved, and this could be done best by denying
principles had anything to do with the legitimacy of laws.
To accomplish this goal, Burke says time alone validates laws
and institutions, and laws and institutions arise to cope with
specific problems and show their continued worth by their sur-
vival.^ By trying to articulate a belief he did not hold, Burke
landed himself in a logical contradiction. He said a law is
good because it is old, and also old because it is good. This
would say that age and worth are parallel factors, but it gives
contradictory answers to the question of whether goodness is
an independent quality. Burke, naturally, did believe it to
be so, and moreover felt it to have no necessary connection
;d.th age whatsoever. That which was old commanded Burke's
respect as an example of the accumulated vdsdora of generations,
but it did so only in the absence of any other relevant infor-
mation. Age would give no weight to a law or institution when
it could be demonstrated convincingly that the law had become
useless or harmful. A very powerful demonstration, however,
would have to be made before this conclusion could be reached.
^Pocock, Politics
, Lan,quage « and Time, p. 229.
In the case of Maistre, there is not this common la. notio
that laws, and consequently institutions, work themselves out
in a pragmatic fashion over a long period of time. The most
common way for laws to be established is for either God Himself
or a di^rinely-inspired lawgiver to create the state and its
national character. If this character is sound and the state
is at peace, there will not be any special need for laws, and
such laws as are needed
.vill arise automatically from the nation
Character. ;Vhat this shows is that, unlike' Burke, Maistre does
not hedge at all about the relationship of principles to the
laws. The principles which form the heart of every nation's
laws must be Catholic principles. All states m.ust be religious,
and Maistre, unlike Burke, does not see his faith as being in-
eluded in the general cause of religion. Catholicism is the
highest religion. One state need not be the carbon copy of
all others, because, for example, one may be a monarchy and
another a republic, but the strictures of Catholicism must rule
in all. This removes for Maistre several problem:.- that are
very real for Burke. First, what is to be doae about an out-
dated law? In Maistre's scheme of belief, there can be no such
thing. Any true law must rest on immortal principles and must
therefore be itself immortal. As Catholicism will have no end,
neither will the laws dependent upon it. A second question
that somewhat agitated Burke was whether a bad law can gain
anything from longevity in way of respectability. As was seen,
can
abh-
Burke answered in the negative. Fop Kaistre, the question
have no meaning.
, i„ „ i„3titutio„ that does not have C.
olicisn. and ,ntra»ontanis.. (Gallicanis» is unacceptable.) at
its heart cannot quallly as even a bad lav,; it is no la. at
all. This reaches the point of Maistre discounting the per.-
an.ence of Protestantism in England after tv;o and a half cent-
uries and speaK-ing quite seriously of England's return to Cath-
olicism.. It v,as one of Maistre's great fears that the nations
Of Europe vvould come to consider Jacobinism a permanent part
Of the French landscape after it had remained in po,,er a number
Of years, but he himself was never willing to do so, no matter
how long it might exercise its sway. This makes Maistre- s view
Of laws a good deal less flexible than that of Burke. Burke,
as was seen, based his notion of law on the common law tradition,
modified by the need of these laws based on a country's slowly
Changing traditions to adhere to a basic standard of morality.
Burke was no more rilling than Maistre to consider the French
revolutionary experience as ever being able to become a part
Of that nation's tradition. The Snglishman, however, because
he did not believe In an established Infallible guardian of
rectitude on earth, provided for gradual alterations in a coun-
try's traditions, and hence In its laws. He was, moreover,
quite aware that these incremental changes could become radical
over the centuries. The Savoyard, on the other hand, certainly
did believe in such an earthly guardian of rectitude, and he
thereroro saw the role or
. .oral „a„ a. resistance to an. Can^e.
V/hat is is sanctmea in Catholic countries. Change is entirely
1-oral, as it can only be change fro. a .ore just to a less
dust Situation. That this contradicts fundamentally the Hi31-
enarian element of Malstre's thought related in chapter thr„
is obvious.
All this soes to show that neither Burke nor Maistre can
actually be considered a traditionalist. Neither one is .villing
to grant any legitimacy to a law or institution based on its
longevity exclusive of adherence to proper 'principles. This
is quite clear in the case of Burke. The Protestant Ascendancy
in Ireland was two hundred years old, and could have been two
hundred ti.es two hundred years old
.vithout gaining a single
day»s legitimacy, because the principles at its core were fun-
damentally illegitimate. The age of a practice granted it no
right unless it was joined to justice. Only the right tradition
could cla2.m prescription. Strange as it may seem, this was
exactly the position of Maistre, except for Maistre 's belief
that no new right traditions were being developed. The Catholic
Church itself, though Maistre was impressed with its longevity
and considered this an argument in its favor^ was not revered
by him because of its antiquity, but because of its righteousness.
This is shown by the fact that Maistre praises the Church highly
Maistre, Considerations On France
, in Lively, y/orks Of
A:2^2Ilh .Pa Maistre, pp. 71^-7^,
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r
for it3 abolition or slaver., an Institution he adults to have
been of even longer duration than Chrlstianity.6 slavery
therefore
.
couia not clal« to t,e a tradition
.ortHy of protection
any
-ore than the Protestant Ascendancy could for Bur.e.
.elthe
.an .as going to hold to the incorrect doctrine that ,,hat
Old was necessarily good, nor was either going to nake hi.solf
an a.oralist by holding to what
.,as old regardless of its
.o^al
nerit or den.erlt. Despite this. Burke felt longevity could
contribute to a la.-s legitLacy, and Malstre felt it could not.
Maistre is far from clear as to the exact source of sov-
ereignty. As was already seen, man is not able to create by
himself, and one would therefore assume with good reason that
sovereignty Is entirely the work of God. This would be a fair
overall assessment of Haistre's position, but for the fact that
he himself is not willing to strip man of all importance In
the formation of sovereignty. He says that sovereignty and
laws derive from both God and man.^ It was seen that the form
sovereigaty takes is entirely the work of God, and yet the ex-
istence of sovereignty is entirely man's doing. Just as human
evil was no part of God's design, so sovereignty (which exists
only to control human evil) was no part of this original design.
Wstre, The Pone, in Lively, Bforks Of Josenh De Haistre,
p. Uih.
7Haistre, Study On SoverelCTtv
. in Lively, gorks Of Joseph
De Malstre
. p. 94.
eorios.
This does 3ho„ the pov,or of the hunan being In Malstro's th
Han ,uite literally forced God to do oo.ething He had not in-
tended
.hen he required God to create aovereisnty. n.Utr.
wao. in other words, not being deceptive when he pictured sov-
ereignty as a joint undertaking of God and »an. The ultS^ate
responsibility for the existence of sovereignty is. in fact,
^an.s. This is not »uch of a testimony for ™an. hov,ever. be-
cause Maistre feels sovereignty to be a necessary evil and in
no sense anything to be happy with. His attitude toward sov-
ereignty is much the same as that of the dgnkey in Orwell's
Animal Farm toward his tail: he appreciates having a tail to
keep away the flies, but he would rather have no tail and no
flies. Man created the flies and hence bears full responsibility
for the tail, but had no say in the design of the latter.
Burke sees the state as originating to cope with certain
problems inherent in the nature of human association. The ques-
tion of whether it was founded by men or by God is one that
Burke does not care to tackle expressly, but the temper of his
thought suggests a mixture of the two. vdth God creating the
initial state to be a help to man and with man modifying it
to cope vdth new problems that emerge. The way sovereignty
originates in Burke's theory thereby shows both man's weakness
and his strength, in that man needs help and can profit by it,
and that he does not create sovereignty, but can modify it
rather radically. For Maistre. the state also exists to solve
cert^n p.oblo.s. but they are not problems necessarily i.,=rent
xn the hu..a„ condition. T.i^ gives rise to a basic ambiguity
toward the state in Maistre's thought.
B. Moral Justifiability Of Sovereignty. As can be seen
fro« the above, both Burke and Halstre feel sovereignty to be
morally Justified, but their reasons for feeling this are so.e-
What different. Both believe the ultimate Justification to lie
in the fact of hunan imperfection. Burke sees the state as
necessary to »ore or less complete v,hat is a reasonably good
and Just social arrangement. The state must repress those who
would endanger their fello,v citizens and must also carry out
a number of positive functions. The thing that more than any-
thing else causes Burke to see the state as justified is his
belief that it is an intrinsic and necessary part of society,
and Of the Justifiability and merit of society he has no doubt.
There has never and could never be a society vrithout sovereignty,
and the two are inextricably intermingled. Like Hobbes. Burke
sees society and sovereignty as permanently Joined, but unlike
him sees society as the more important of the tivo. To Burke
it makes no more sense to question the Justifiability of sov-
ereignty than it does to question the Justifiability of morality,
whose seldom used guardian sovereignty is. The case is rather
different with Malstre. It is, first of all, impermissible
in his view to question the morality of sovereignty, for God
has created it, and that must answer all questions. In a larger
aonso. however. Kalstre gives the question ^oh n,ore
.oanlng
than Bur.o was wlllln, to. Thlo is becauce coverois.t. only
exists duo to man'^. c-nn-oi ., and these sins (chiefly the sin of
disobedience) are not necessary and did not .1cixj a a always exist. Sins
sovereignty is associate, with hu.an sin in a .uch clearer way
in Haistre than in Bur.e. This cannot help but lower the Sav-
oyard»s overall opinion of soverei^ntv cg y. Sovereignty is also
not necessarily part of society. If society were what it ought
to be (an assemblage of truly religious and .obedient
.en), no
sovereignty would be necessary. It would, in fact, not e^rist
at all if society had not voluntarily corrupted itself. Sov-
ereignty is something imposed on a partially corrupt society,
and not an actual part of that society. Maistre is in full
agreement with Rousseau that sovereignty ought not to e^ist,
but differs from him by feeling that immorality caused sover-
eignty, rather than the other way around. Burke and Maistre
part company on this count primarily because Burke feels sov-
ereignty to be a Justifiable and permanent part of human exist-
ence, whereas Maistre feels it to be justifiable, but transitory,
In one way, therefore, Maistre is less authoritarian than Burke,
and in another way more. Maistre, unlike Burke, does not feel
political authority to be a permanent fixture of the human con-
dition, but Maistre 's political authority, while it exists,
is of a far more authoritarian nature than that of Burke.
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C. THe Varlabiiu. Or PolUioal Po™.. Both Bu.,o
tHou«. personal!, aevote. to
.onarcK.. a. r„XX.
.UX.
to accept otHe.
.0™. or
^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
tx^es. For neither, however, doe. this i.pl, 3 right for a
nation to erect a for. of government of it. o,,„ choosing. Both
traditions and geographical consideration,
.iutate against
thio. Bur.e and Maistre held to Montes^uleu-s view that a ^ar^e
state oust necessarily be a monarchy, though Maistre accepted
this in a .ore absolute sense than did BurI.e. Burke remarks
on this subject that anarchy had always been felt to be the
propcr^governmental form for France, due to the country-s ex-
panse. ' Monarchy
.ould, after the crushing of the
.Jacobins,
have to be reestablished.? This is not to be taken as saying
Burke had any general antipathy to republics as such. Ke, in
fact, declares that he has none at all. but that a governLnt
™.st be suited to the nature of its nation. By this, Burke
is not referring only to the expanse of the country or to its
climate alone, but to the character of Its people as well.
Burke showed this by his analysis of the equalitarianisn of
the American character, which, he probably suspected, made tLe
g
Burke, Thou/^hts On French Affairs
, in Burke's V^orks,
in, 315.
^Burke, Remarks On the Policy Of the Allies IVith Respect
To France, in Burke's Works
,
IV, 405.
tiurke, An Apncal From the ITew To the Old limits
, p. /^6.
Americans poor material for monarchy dest^itp ^ v.idx ;.ny
,
a pi e the expanse of
their territory. „u„an factors are show, to be
.oro'in-.portant
than the factors or eeography and cli.ate when those factors
conflict. Bur..e, ho,ever. ,oes not consider all governmental
arrangements to he of e,«al merit. Two forms are singled out
for his attack. The first of these is absolute monarchy. E.on
in the height of his defense of the Ancien Regime of Prance.
Burke was prone to refer to it as a "monarchical despotism.""
He adds that one of the virtues of monarchy is that it is easily
tempered, thereby implying that it is good only if tempered.
The other bad form of government is absolute democracy, a form
of government inclined to nart" tvrannv „„iud. i,j i,yran y and only acceptable
When naxed vdth other forms These points show a very strong
dislike on Burke »s part for all forms of government that involve
unrestrained power. It is possible that some peoples are at
a stage of historical development where a form of despotism
is unavoidable, but such are very much the exception, and this
does not render the fact morally justified.
Maistre holds to geographical determinism in a much more
striking way than Burke. Form of government is strongly joined
to climate, as Maistre accepts Montesquieu's belief that liberty
is somehow most natural in Northern regions. The tendency
^Burke, Speech On the Army Estimates
,
in Burke's ',7or!:c, m
1 2
Burke, Refloctions On the Revolution In France
, p.
^ Maistre, Study On Soveroi^n ty . in Lively, Wort:s Of Joseph
De Maistre, p. TOO,
Of one countr. to Have a certain ro™ o. ,o.c.„.ent ronao.o.
ernmcnt for it hv /n'-in-v,o. 4.uby sxvins the people their particular national
Character a„a territorial locale. r„at 3od has
.ecrooa i.
course, beyond the right of
.an to ,ue.tion. Though HaistL
has a strong preference for monarchv (u,u^^uy (which, among other things
leacs hi» to a positive detestation of America), he is entirely
unwllllns to support its adaption in countries that have not
had it traditionally. Just as certain countries are unavoidably
monarchical, others are unavoidably republican or despotic,
such
.atters are beyond the control of .en. Governmental for.s
are not too important any.ay. so long as they adhere to the
proper nor.s of morality. As Kalstre himself (rather surpricinsl
says. "It Is just the same to be subject to one sovereign as
to another.""' Despite this, there are certain forms of gov-
ernment Maistre would rule out, as was the ca.e with Burke.
The two polar opposite forms of government, pure democracy and
absolute despotism, cannot exist, the first because it is "an
association of men without sovereignty", and the second because
every power has some limits, Even the greatest despot is
still a man. and Is, therefore, unable to establish a true
despotism. All forms of government are between these two extremes
Maistre's opinion of republics is quite ambivalent. To be a
^^Ibld.
, p. 113.
Ibid., pp. 119-120.
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republic, a state must be small, so that the n •, T^na "spirit of asso-
ciation", which i c; Trn-fol 4-^
.s vital to a republic, can be strong, and it
must also be very
.dse and public-spirited It^}:>j.r±zea. IS unnecessary
for the government of a republic to ao
..ch, for all the peop'.e
recpect the co^unal property an. the society it.elf t.*es care
Of .uch that would othervase be left to covernnent. The only
serpent in this Eden concerns the administration of Justice.
The =ro,,d has too n,uch po>ver in a republic and demands harsh
punishments for aristocratic offenders and lenient punishments
for non-noble ones.'^ Aristocracy rules in a republic, Just
3.S it rules everv.vherp hnf -sj. •ry.m e, but since it is not openly affirmed
it has a tendency to be galling to the people. It is astonishing
that Maistre,
.ho is v^.3wed as an arch-royalist, has so much
Sood to say abcuc republics. It could be that when he arrived
in Lausanne, Switzerland as a virtually penniless middle-aged
war refugee, the peace and order he found there softened the
sympathetic heart of this royalist. Man, of Maistre's passages
on republics could have been written by Jefferson.
In dealing wxth democracy, Maistre in many ways stole
a march on Tocque/ille. Democracy is a form of government with
very few restraints on it, and is consequently one that can
be very oppressive. It is also a very unstable form of govern-
ment, as there is great divisiveness between the aristocrats
who rule in fact, but not in nar.e, and the people who rule in
Ibid,, p. 122,
na.=
.
.ut not in UcU
.o^oc.cies onen ao
..la rooXH.,.a.
thin... ana a
.a^istrate of Justice in one is ,,ea.. because he
has to depona on Ms equals for carrying out (One cannot say
o.forcins.) his decisions. The e.ualitarian spirit is capable
Of
.u^onins up great exertions in the people. The people are
willlne to surrender everything to the state. These factors
make a democracy brilliant, but its intern-,! „ ,
,
u i
_ ernal weaknesses cause
it to bo only transitory.'''
All other forms of government are openly aristocratic.
An elective ariatocracy is a form of government ,uite similar
to a republic, but very weak for reasons that can easily be
discerned. The class tensions in such a society can easily
build up to an explosive point. An hereditary aristocracy is
essentially a monarchy with no monarch. It is a less vigorous
form Of government than monarchy and has less splendor than
monarchy, but there is no other forn of government as wise.'^
Its vigor is less than monarcliy's because it is a plural exec-
utive, but on the subject of this form of government's wisdom.
Maistre seems to have in mind the Roman Senate in its prime.
The form of government to which Maistre pays the most
attention is monarchy. He feels this to be almost synonymous
with government as such and to be the form of government proper
for practically every nation. It is a governm.ent both vigorous
1
7
Ibid
. . p. 127.
I
o
Ibid
. . p. 119.
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and splendid, and .ore importantly, one in
.vMch a'astice is
equally administered. Monarchy is not to be confused „ith one-
»an rule. First. "It is always the Ung-s council that rules "'9
In a monarchy, as in every other state, the aristocracy is th=
ad^nistrative class. Th.is serves as a .ajor check on the Ung-s
power. Second, the king is also checked hy all banner of trad-
itions and corporate privileges. Formal checks are. however
not permitted. Despite his overall preference for monarchy.
Maistre's vlev, on different governments is summed up by the
statement that "Thp hpcf -Pr>-r.«,.ne best form of government for each nation
is that Which, in the territory occupied by this nation, is
capable of producing the greatest possible sum of happiness
and strength, for the greatest possible number of men, during
the longest possible time.-^O ^.^^^
^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
Of pragmatism exists in Maistre's judgements of governments.
It is now evident that despite the very great differences
in theory between Burke and Maistre on the limits co be placed
on the state, there is very little difference in practice be-
tween them. Both men are advocates of limited government.
Burke feels this limitation can and should be achieved because
of man's generally decent nature. Man is not overpoweringly
given to the desire to oppress his brother. It was already
seen that Maistre does not hold to this optimistic view of man.
Ibid
. , p. 115.
Ibid
. « p. 126.
to .e.t.o.
.Hon U
.00.
.o.ona ito
...Ural U™u....
proviaoo for U.Uod
.ovorn.ont
.trescln, n..-. enp-
aclty for liberty. M.^.^re proviaoo for ll„Uo„
,ov.rn..„t
by strocsm. hlc bouof t„..t authority Un t„o
.Uapo of Co,,.
commands it.
D. The Separation Of Powers. On the
.ubjoct of the formal
separation of powers. Burke and Malctre could not bo further
apart. Burhe expro.oly afflr». a reparation of eovorn.ental
powers, in hi. theory of what the Britlch Bovorn.ont lo and
ouGht to be, executive power and moot legislative power are
vested in kinc and cabinet, both of which are to bo
.oparate
from the irou.c of Co.mono. The Commons is to vote on, but not
orlcinate, legislation, and to serve as ti.e people's voice In
Covernment. The basic theme of Thou,,hts On the C^urc Of the
Present Discontents is that the executive branch has been un-
constitutionally cooptinc the House of Commons and thereby
brlncing disorders to the nation. It would bo good if it co.ld
be said that Burko was entirely consistent in his theory of
separated powers, but he was not. Burke was very attentive
to infringemonts of executive on loglalature, but not so att-
entive when the situation was reversed. In fact, when the
second Rockingham administration was about to cone to power.
pi
" Ibid
. , p. 113.
Burke v,as one of the leading proponents of the view that it
Should accept nothing less than an all r„ig cabinet. This
constituted nothing lo„ than a .ajor seizure of executive
power by the legislature. It is in .i IS m a way comforting that even
Which can beset all of us when our prejudices are at stake.
There is, despite this, no reason to thinl. Burke did not really
believe a separation of powers was right for Britain. His ad-
vocacy Of a separation of powers goes beyond the case of Britain
All nations ought to have separated powers. As Burke puts it:
"States rnay, and they will best, e^st with a partition of civil
powers. That the French revolutionary government had no
such separation of powers, but was instead a government of
extreme fusion of powers, was a major count against it in Burke's
estimation. Burke, therefore, feels that man's degree of good-
ness makes limited government possible, and his degree of evil
makes separated government necessary. No man or small assem-
blage Of men can be trusted with even formally absolute gov-
ernment. This is one variant of government Burke could not
countenance,
Maistre, though nearly as much an advocate of separation
of powers in practice as Burke, would not tolerate it in theory,
and did not believe it to be possible. Maistre was not blind
to the fact that power is not totally in the hands of one man
22
Burke, Speech On the Army Estimates
, in Burke's Works,
III, 224.
or group Of „en. He. in fact, r.rer. to Kn.lana ap.rovln.l,
as a "complex unity and a ".o.t delicate e,ulU.riun of pol-
itical fo.ce = ...^:3
^^^^^ ^
.ust li.e one sovereign
.aking up ™ind; „Hen the individual
parts work together (as they
.ust eventually, if it i^ to be
aaxd there is a sovern^ent at all), their decisions are i.ple-
.ented^as absolutely as if they
.,ere the ,^11 of a single
.on-
arch. It is difficult to question Maistre-s contention f.at
all sovereignty i. one and absolute. This is rendered even
ot^nger by his very perceptive observation that in every gov-
ernment povrer inevitably cr.n-^^^^^^"oj.
„ra.,itates toward one man or institution
that is. in essence, the sovereign, and is beyond appeal.^?
It seems that observation of the trend of all governments must
force one to accept the first part of this state.,ent, but one
might protest that the second part (that some part of govern-
ment is beyond appeal) is not necessarily true. The case of
the American President, who is clearly the center of this gov-
ernment, night be Cited as counter-evidence, l-mile it is true
that the President of the United States is probably held to
account for his actions as much as any central institution in
^^lalstre. Generative Principle Of Political Constitutions,
in Lively, Works Of Joseph De_ ^!ai^tr^, p-
-f;.
Wstre, Studj; On Soverelrrntv. in Lively, Works Of Joseph
De Malstre
. pp. 112-113.
2'Malstre, The Po^e, in Lively, 7/orks Of Joseph Do Kaistre, p
195
the .orl., this
„ot amount to ,roat accountabiUty. n.-t
a President is reelected or defeated based on Ms s.in i„
'
<.efe„din. Ms actions, and not because of t.ose actions them-
selves. Tbe President is ultimately regarded or punished for
.•-s campaign ability. Vftetber this can be considered b»ins
held accountable to the voters is highly doubtful. Second.
an American President does so murh th.i-c at any campaign can scru-
tinize only a tiny percentage of his actions. The rest so
entirely without exanination in the fullest Maistrean manner.
If there could be any doubt that Maistre had proven his case
for the unavoidable unity and absoluteness of sovereignty, it
would have to be deemed eliminated by his canny observation
that anyone
.,,ho could Judge the sovereign would himself be the
sovereign.26
^^^^^^^^^ ^..^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
Presidency, it can be said that the principal would-be judge
Of the President is his major party rival. If the voting public
accepts this Judgement, or articulation of Judgement, the chall-
enger replaces the incumbent as sovereign. This, however,
derogates not one whit from sovereignty, which remains as ab-
solute and united as before. The final proof of Maistre's
theory of the unity and absoluteness of sovereignty may be
given by pointing out that he did not intend "absoluteness"
to mean that government pervaded all of society (for Maistre
was no more a totalitarian than an Dltramontanist necessarily
Is), but merely that sovereignty is absolute when "constitutionally
Ibid ., p. 136.
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.-'xerci.e...
.xt^.„ t.e
..Xe.iti„ate circle tracoa the
.uMa-
-nentaX la... o. eac. count... ..^7 „
^^^^^^^^^^
at all, someone must decide , „„_ •a given issue, and he >,ho decides
that issue cannot be restrained
,,hcn he is acting rightly.
One cannot help feeling that Maistro is trying hero to recon-
cile hi. authoritarian impulse and his distrust or hu.an nature
and is not doing a very good Joh of it. It does not really
say very much to sav a <?t-.fo -to v ^o y state is absolute within certain con-
stitutionally circumscribed svhere^ nnd -? n . ^ •opn . s a m certain constitution-
ally prescribed v/ays. Maj^-i-rf. -; ^ ,•/ ., h iot e is, m other words, a believer
in limited absolutism, with all the illo-ic -h.f iii g o at phrase involves.
The difficulty he n^ver qoluo^i ^v,^. s ved, and never could solve, was who
could .eep this formally absolute sovereign vathin his proper
bounds without, as Maistre himself observed, then becoming the
sovereign. Halfway absolutism is an impossible position, yet
it is one that Maistro tries to hold. Despite this, his ana^.ysis
of the necessary unity of so^-oreignty is excellent.
Neither Burke nor Maistre was at his best in the treat-
ment of sovereignty, even though the latter took the subject
as one of his most important themes. That is because both seek
to reconcile a defense of the status quo in practice
.vitb lim-
itations on sovereignty (though Maistre was chary to admit he
was doing this). This gives social critics a handle with which
to criticize the status quo, despite what Burke and Maistre
27i^«> pp. 139-140.
wanted.
...1,.,, 3,,,,
^^^^^^^ ^^^^
erexent.
.Uo.. fo„ fundamental dirrero.ce. betv,oon the two.
Both wanted t)oTit-'r-ii c^^-w-ti-x.
-
- t.cal stability and limited government and
sought to Iciplement them In wav.s th=ti B y that were not too differentm practice. The theoretical differences must not h„l uou , owever,
be considered in<^i mi -p-; -.xs„ificant as indicators of the general diroctt
Of their theories.
Chapter V: Ways Of Checking Authority In Burko and Kaistre.
Burke and Maistre recognize that authority does net li..it
itself. Ho. It is to be limited is a major concern to both
of them, and is a major difference between them. It rtll be
sho-»n that their solutions to this problem fit into the generally
libertarian inclination of the one and the authoritarian in-
clination of the other*
A. Burke's Theory Of the Party. Burke's concept of gov-
ermnental limitation sees this limitation as partly taking place
within government itself, and central to this view is Burke's
theory of the party. Burke agreed with Bolingbroke that the
great ideological parties that had disturbed the state in the
previous century had passed away, but whereas Bolingbroke saw
this as an opportunity to eliminate parties entirely, Burke
realized that the resultant social peace made it so parties
could be domesticated and used both to check authority and
preserve the harmony that they had once destroyed. Until Burke,
no theorist had ever seen parties as anything but avoidable
or unavoidable nuisances. It was he who showed parties had
a vital role to play in the state. It was in opposition to
Bolingbroke »s theory that a party under a Patriot King should
put down parties forever that Burke wrote his Thou.^hts On the
£ause Of the Present Discontents
. Burke felt parties were to
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beco.,
.n l.tesral pa.-t of government, and he defined ^art,
as: "a body of „en united for promoting by their joint endea-
vors the national interest upon
.o„e particular principle in
Which they are all agreed."' By thus institutionalizing dis-
content, both tyranny and rebellion were to be avoided. Par-
ties were not to be revol n-t-i nr,^>,„lu onary armies in Burke's view, but
they .ere to be centers of at least possible discontent. It
was in a party a public-spirited citizen could work to frustrate
the abuses and unconstitutional designs of authority. Being
a party member does not make one less loyal to his country,
for it proves one capable of loyalty to something beyond him-
self. The party member, moreover, does not have to subordinate
his Judgement to that of the party, for he -^11 choose a party
he can agree with nine times out of ten.^ This last point shows
Burke was not only advocating the existence of the V/hig Party,
but of parties as such. He recognized that many people did
not share the ideology of the Whig Party, and many of these
people, such as Lord North and Doctor Johnsor, were personal
friends of Burke. Burke, therefore, realized that men of good
will can disagree on what is good for the people, but that such
disagreements can be absorbed within an ongoing, peaceful, state.
Parties were to be fully law-abiding institutions, and yet by
^Burke, Thou^;hts On the Cause Of the Pronont Discontents
,
in Burke >s lVor!:s
.
I, 530.
^Ibid., p. 533,
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reading between the lines It-Line can be assumed that in time of
-JO. crisis a part, could be the spearhead or revolution, as
this earlier use of narty but ^- f c. ,
.t is an event he would rather
not see reneatpri r>^^4.-Peated.
.artxe.
„„t to check the government byboms a^ed bands of desperadoes (as »any 1„ Burke's ti
inclined to see the.), but by organizing the House of Co^on
in the „a.e of the people and of liberty, and by voting do
assaults on the constitution by either crovm or cabinet. If
necessary, this policing function could take the for. of sub-
jecting cabinet
.enbers to i.peach.ent
, "that groat guardian
or the purity of the constitution. "3 The Me.ber of Parliament,
v-orking through his party, is to have "a strenuous resistance
to every appearance of lawless T)Ower- a -t^iri t n-r ^^a^uwyjcj., opi of independence
carried to some degree of enthusiasm; an inquisitive character
to discover, and a bold one to display, every corruption and
every error of government."^ The M.P. is to be a pest on the
public payroll determined to make miserable the life of any
member of government performing in a way contrary to the trust
bestowed on him. A party organizing the Commons is tc bo a
control for the people on the government; it was the reversal
of this formula that was the fundamental
-cause of the present
discontents." Burke has the fullest confidence that if this
^Ibid., p. z,95.
^Ibid.
, p. L97,
day-to-aay inquisition of ,ovorn„ont is carriea out.
.oth rev-
olution and tyranny can usually
.e avoiaed. T.ere is every
reason to believe him to be correct.
B. Burke.
s
Theory Of Revolution. Ifespite all this, a
revolution may become neoessarv it v."cesi y. I , however,
"will be the
very last resource of the thinking and the good."?
actions Of eovern.,=„t which justify revolution. As Burke sa,s
Of
,688, "The Hevolution was made to preserve our ancient, in-
disputable laws and liberti'^^s and fh^+ • ^xu«rx,i. that ancient constitution
Of
.^overn^ent which is our only security for lav; and liberty"^
(italics Burke's). The attempt of Ja..os II to change Britain's
traditional constitutional order and establish a royal absoluti
Justified his Violent overthrow. Burke probably saw the sim-
ilarity between this case and that of America, where Britain
was seeking to alter the ai^rangemenL which had grown up between
herself and her colonies over the years. If the preservation
of the status quo were the only justification Burke saw for
revolution, this v.ould surely be a conservative enough theory.
He was, however, quite vdlling to judge the worth of a status
quo according to questions of content. Burke, at the outset,
did not know how to judge the French Revolution, for he knew
the status quo it overthrew was one eminently deserving of
overthrow. He, however, refuses to say exactly what acts permit
Burke, Reflections On the Revolution Tn Franco, p. 35.
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~~"
"
Ibid., p. 35.
?o:5
a .evolution
.gainct the statu., ,.o. Hi.
.e.initivo statement
on thin issue follows.
to
^^^^.^'Z^^r^^^^^l otoaience cu.hteasily deflneable. It i^ not ^ obscure, and not
Which determines It/ Go;ernnent'':£' T'' " '^^^"^^^ ^--^indeed, before it can be ^^Sugh^o ? an^'iT"''' deranged,future must be as bad as t e exxlrlinL o' ^'''''^f'things are in that lament-^blo ^o^J.f t ^^'^ ^^^^^n
disease is to indicLTtL remerto ^'^^qualified to administer in extre^itL^ ^^^^^^^ure hasbitter potion to a distempered s^ate!? ^^^^^^-^l* ambiguous,
Burke was not in the habit of giving lessons on revolution
and he did not desire to do so here. The gist of the foregoing
^
quotation is that when revolution is required, the need
.vill
be recognized. Nevertheless, the basic configurations of Burke's
ideas on the principles whoso violation justifies revolution
can be discerned. Not surprisingly, they revolve around the
Natural Law. It stands to reason that the violation of the
principles upon which sovereignty is founded will entail the
more-or-less violent restructuring of a particular sovereignty.
What these principles are has already been discussed. It will
be remembered that they constitute an impressive catalogue of
individual rights. One can now see that the violation of one
or two of these i-ights is to be vindicated by appeal to Par-
liament; the wholesale rending of these rights, which would
logically include an elimination of the right of appeal from
the acts of government, could be set right only by the "bitter
potion" of revolution. Burke's foregoing statement can be
7Ibid,, p. 3^,
compared to one bv T.nnircy Locke
.eclarins revolution to be Justified
by "a Ion, train of abuses, prevarication.,, and artifice., all
tondins the .a.e ,„ay, Ovhic§ .ake the do.ign
.i^ible to the people
they are soi„s." The similarities between Burke's statement
and that by Locke are too great to be coincidence. This is
another case in »Mch Burke-s early attraction to Lockeanis™
Shows up very strongly.
, fundamental difference between the
two concerns who should decide v,hen revolution Is Justified.
I.ocke declare.:
-If themselves aggrieved and think
the prince acts contrary to or beyond that trust, »ho so proper
to Judge as the body of the people?"? Burke is unv.llling to
grant the right of determining the necessity of revolution to
the people. His
-.ore elitist opinion is as follows:
the gravItro'^tL'f'™^:'! '^^^ necessity of revolutioia fromnc farayity Ox ne case; the irritable, fro-: =onslbnitvoppression; the higb-n-,lnded, fron, disdain andlndi'^^^tlon nt
lovt. of honorable danger m a generous cause, 10
A revolution is right when the leading individuals and classes
of the society determine the concrete conditions Justifying
it to exist. This is what Burke pictures as having taken place
in 1688. Though I am no student of seventeenth-century British
8John Locke, The Second Treatise Of Governr.ent (Uev York:
Bobbs-Merrlll, 19=2), p. 126.
Ibid
. . p. 139.
Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In France
, p. 35.
history, it
.00.. unlikoly to no that Jamos II had boon .ban-
donoa by all the influentialc of Britain. Thlo pointo up tho
fallacy of Bur,... viow a. to
.,bo 1. to thro,, ,o™ tbo gauntlet
Of revolution. It is not to be exopctpd tv,nfpe e that any large group
Of people, such as the leading classes of society,
.ill over
be entirely united about a concern of trivial importance. It
is far less to be expected that they vail unite on cuch a risky
undertaking as revolution. If one hundred percent of the great
men of England declare James II has committed crimes deserving
revolution, it is a reasonable expectation that he has done
GO. If, however, seventy- five percent of the natural leaders
01 a society would convict the king, and twenty-five percent
would exonerate him, v;hat is to be done? It would seem that
if one-quarter of the great men of a society are convinced the
ruler has acted both legally and morally, one cannot embark
on revolution
.ith an entirely clear conscience. The only way
that Burke can justify revolution to himself is for all the
nation's natural leaders to deem it necessary, and, despite
Burke's views of 1688, this just will not happen. A further
problem with Burke's justification of revolution is that it
begs one very important question: who are the natural leaders
of a country that are to determine the existence of factors
justifying revolution? It is all too easy, if one wants to
justify a revolution, to say that one's friends who support
the revolution are the natural leaders of the country. It is
an unfortunate concluoion, yet one th.t „nst be
.ade, that Burke
probably ai. exactly this ,vith regard to the ,688 revolutlor
Bur.e feels that, when it is necessary, resolution should
be carried out for strictly limited purposes. The assault on
the constitution is to be foiled and situations returned to
the state they .ere in before revolution beca.e necessary.
In the case of ,638. for example, Burke says that after the
deposition Of Ja.es II. "They |he .'hig revolutionaries, left
the crown what, in the eye and estimation of lav,, it had ever
been-perfectly Irresponsible.
^
.^ether or not this is true
as a matter of historic fact is a secondary consideration; what
is important is what it ,,hows about Burke's whole theory of
revolution. One of the aspects of the Revolution of ,688 that
most recommended it as a model was that, in Burke's estimation,
far from altering the constitution, it left it the same, but
strengthened. A revolution should bo carried out to remove
the tumor or cluster of tumors that has required it, while
harming the healthy surrounding tissue as little as possible.
In sose cases, this may require radical surgery. In the case
of Fra-.ce, vhile denying the right to meddle in France's purely
internal affairs, Burke recommends sweeping changes. As Cone
observes. Burke recommended for France a constitutional monarchy
vrith a froely-elected Estates General sharing vdth the king
power over taxation, guarantees for liberty and security for
, 1,, . ,
the people of France, and the establishment of a Catholic Church
purged of the abuses that had helped to bring on revolutionJ
Cone holds these recommendations against Burke, feeling that
they were unrealistic and violated Burke's own strictures about
the limited nature of reforms. Burke was indeed recommending
revolution, and what he called for may have been unrealistic
for France, but he understood that the Revolution, though in
his view the work of conspiratorial brigands, had been brought
to fruition because of the widespread abuses in the system it
was attacking. Social reconstruction was not a favorite occ-
upation for Burke, but when he saw it to be necessary, he was
not averse to recommending it. If possible, revolution should
constitute nothing more than the throwing off of a light deposit
which has accumulated on the surface of the body politic,
but if some change is necessary, it must be undertaken. This
may even require radical reshaping of the system. Burke did
not think this would usually be necessary, but his hand did
not tremble to hold the knife if it had to to save the life
of the patient,
Burke»s notions of checking authority, by various means,
are nothing if not libertarian. 7/hen at all possible, any check
on authority should be made moderately and non-violently
, in
response to very concrete, correctable, abuses, and with an
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of Kentucky Frees, 1964), 379.
eye to it. concrete ePfoct on tho people. UnliUo
.o.e of the
people Of .is tine. Burke was painfully of the oufferings
to Which the JacoMns „ero
.u.Joctin, the people of Prance i„
pursuit Of a theoretical Ool.en A.e. Ho.erate reforms are those
TOien revolution was npcG^R-:,r>v ^r.^ t-uo ecG.sa y, and the cause of liberty might
^ake it so. it was to be carried out in a fashion that would
not bo unduly damaging to the body politic. As was already
seen, Burke »s concern for the security of the body politic is,
while undoubtedly influenced by a conservative temperament,
primarily the result of his view that a staters traditional
laws and institutions are the best safeguard for its liberty.
Abstract reforms carried out with a view to theoretical perfection
are likely to be destructive of liberty in fact. In this aspect
Of his thinlcing. libertarianism definitely talces precedence
over conservatism. Conservatism is upheld as the best means
to liberty. There is no reason to doubt Burke Ts honesty in
declaring that he placed liberty above conservatism. His whole
life was a testimony to his probity.
C. Maistre»s Vie^vs On Limiting Authority, a very diff-
erent concept of checking authority is found in Maistre. It
was seen in the previous chapter that Maistre declares authority
to be absolute, and even refers to it as being able to "co.imit
evil vdth impunity." A Id.ng, Maistre 's model for a sovereign,
iG so splendid that before him all subjects, both noble and
?.09
co«o., are as ,ood as e,ual.'J Thl. „as ,uito a
.tato„e„t
for a convinced aristocrat like Malstre to
.al.o. Revorthel...
it is implied,
..rf.thout ever belns actually stated, that the
^r., v;lll be subject to institutional checks that the v^so
^vlll heed, r^aistre declares that the king cannot i.poso death
or corporal punishment, as that power is transmitted by hi.
(Haistre. as a magistrate, was very sensitive to the importance
Of an independent judiciary.), cannot Judge in civil cases,
maj- order imprisonment or exile, but should do so publicly and
have the advice of an "enlightened council" in doins so. and
Should not deny the people the right to denounce abuses to hlm.'^
There, however, are not and cannot be any formal institutional
Checks on a stupid or evil king who seeks to flaunt his respon-
sibilities. The aristocracy and privileged classes would doubtless
try to hinder such activities, and probably could do so in the
short run, but the l^ng. if he sought to be a tyrant, could
sain the upper hand over the aristocracy. The king has the
power to ennoble men and families, which moans he would have
no difficulty in bringing into the administrative class people
who would serve him. There are, therefore, no indestructible
intra-societal limitations upon the king. This is because no
one may depose or even judge the king.'-^^ The king is God's
'^Maistre, Study On Soverel,-ntY
. in Lively, fforks Of Jo-nnh
Do ilaistrc
, p. n6.
lit,.
.
I PJ-d .. p. 117.
15Ibid,, p. 117.
annointed, and so to Judge the Ung would be to Judge God,
.hich
is ob^^ously unacceptable to Maictre. At this point, the sit-
nation becomes quite complicated. One would think that to say
the v^ng could not be judged or deposed would be to say he was
entirely independent in whatever he did. Such is not the case.
First Of all, Maistre, as an IIltra..ontanist
, declares the Pope^
to be "the natural head. ..of universal civilization", and says
the Pope has the power to check and nake bearable temporal power.
Though no member of a national society may Judge his king, the
Pope, as the leader of universal society, may and must. How
Maistre is able to reconcile this vdth his earlier statement
that the king may not be Judged is a good question. He does
not exi^ressly answer this question, but one can hazard two
possible answers. First, though no man may Judge a king, in
the same way that all men are the same before a king, so all
men, both kings and subjects, are the same before the Pope.
When, therefore, a sinner's case is before the Pope, the holiness
of the Judge eradicates all claim to merit by the defendant.
In other words, though this individual who is before the Pope
for Judgement is a king to all other men, he is no ld.ng to the
Pope. A king may not be Judged, and when the Pope Judges this
Kan, a king is not being Judged. A second possibility is that
the Pope does not do the Judging. The Judging is done by God
1 ^Maistre, The Pope
,
in Lively, Works Of Josoi^h De Maistre
,
pp. H2-1/1.3.
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through His earthly intemodiary
, the Pope. No one could possibly
deny that Cod, Who is the Creator or all sovereignty,
.ay Judce
that which He has created. Maistre is of the opinion that this
power Of judgement exorcised by the Pope, either directly or
as the servant of God, would eliminate both tyranny and the
need for revolution. There is no reason, given Maistre's view
of the Pope, to doubt that such would be the case, if the Pope
possessed sufficient military power and a sufficient emotional
hold over a believing population. In the Middle Ages, it must
be rerr^ombcred, the disapproval of a Pope caused an Emperor of
the Holy Ronan Empire to stand in the snow imploring forgiveness.
Maistre refuses to give any hints as to how the Pope judges
whether or not to disapprove the actions of a king. He declares,
in fact, that the Pope is "limited only by the blindness or
bad faith of princes" and that it is foolish to judge by abstract
rules in place of experience. The matter is left entirely
up to the conscience of the Pope, and Maistre has perfect faith
tliis povror will not be abused.
If mere disapproval by the Pope does not bring an erring
sovereign into line, there are more potent weapons to bo utilized.
In the ultimate extremity, the Pope could excommunicate the Icing
and give his subjects a dispensation from sovereignty. This
would, of course, cost the king his throne, if the Pope could
make his verdict stick. I'/liat is remarkable is that Maistre
^'^Ibid.
, p.
.
does not seem to understand the revolutionary nature of such
an act. I-Ie goes so far as to say this pov.er of the Pope per-
r^its resistance vd.thout revolution and without denial of sov-
ereignty; the Pope has even increased the respectability of
sovereignty by coercing it into doing rightj^ 3^^^^ ^^^^
^
probably
.any, people v/ould continue to stand v;ith the formally
dethroned king, such an action, far from avoiding revolution,
would instead touch off ci.-il v;ar. Further, whatever the abuses
of a particular sovereign, it is ludicrous in the extreme to
say that sovereignty can be rendered more respectable by it
being shovm that a sovereign can be undone by a nod of the Pope'
head. An employee ;;ho is on minute-to-minute tenure is notice-
ably lacking in respectability. Maistre, who stresses the im-
portance of sovereignty, would destroy all sovereignty (except
that of the Pope) by rendering it contemptible.
D. Maistre»s Treatment Of Revolution. Perhaps because
of the unbelievd.ng nature of his epoch, Maistre realizes many
people will not accept the authority of the Pope as a sufficient
check on authority. Rather against his v/ill, Maistre is forced
to discuss the subject of revolution. His attitude toward rev-
olution is rather ambiguous. One of the greatest faults he
finds with Protestantism is that it permits rebellion in both
religion and politics. ^ Maistre is convinced Christianity
1
8
Ibid
. , pp. l/fO-lZf1.
^ %bid
. . p. 137.
cannot Justify
.evolution. On the other hand, ho.ovc. he also
holds to the inconsistent view that there are two choices for
an individual
.1th regard to sovereignty, obedience or rebelUon
furthermore, the sovereign may be killed, but not Judsod.-^^
This is a very peculiar statement. One would thinl. that nothing
implies a Judgement of a sovereign ,uite so much as overthrov;ing
and murdering him. People who are satisfied with their gov-
eriments seldom undertake the risk and bloodshed of revolution.
There seem to be three possible explanations for this anomaly.
First, Maistre may have been caught nodding in this part of
his theory, and simply did not realize how absurd it is to
spealc Of revolution without Judgement. Maistre was a human
being, and would have been capable of error. A second poss-
ibility is that Maistre was quite aware of the apparent conflict,
and sought to use it to demonstrate his belief that revolution
is an act of irrationality. In this explanation, revolution
would not necessarily imply Judgement, any more than a lion
implies Judgement when it devours a man. A government which
had Maistre 's great respect, that of France, was overthrovm
in what he considered to be the irrational culinination of an
irrational age. V^nat Maistre saw as abuses in the France which
existed prior to the Revolution were the penetrations of the
Enlightenment philosophy into the court and aristocracy. The
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. in Lively, '.Vorks Of Josenh
runs
.'he
traditional French system was sound, and there certainly was
no ground for its overthrow. The third possibility is ti
this conflict is but another example of that conflict that
through so .uch of Kaistre-s thinking: that between Maistre
as man of the Bnlightemnent and Maistre as consorvatiTe.
second aan wanted earnestly to place all authority beyond Judg.-
ment. but the first knew this to be impossible and ultimately
destructive of good government. This conflict was never resolve,
and never could be, because it reflected a duality within the
thinker himself.
Yet another cause of Maistre 's strange ambivalenc.^ to
revolution stemmed from his theory of human uncreativeness.
Man could not really create anything, least of all a revolution
against divinely-instituted authority. The reason the French
Revolution broke out in the first place, and later proved so
powerful, was that God, not the Revolution's nominal leaders,
was actually controlling its course, in order "to regenerate
g^ranci by punishment", because "terrible means n:ust be used
to set her on her true course again. "^^ Maiscre took second
place to no man in his desire for the end of Jacobin tyranny,
and probably had more faith than many that Jacobinism could
not succeed (for God v;ould destroy it when He was ready) , bub
unlike his fellow exiles in Lausanne, he was in no special hurry.
PI Maistre, Considerations On Franco
, in Lively, Works
Of JosGDh De Maistre
, pp. 48-50.
>va. •o.cau.e tho Revolution
.as a cign of
.o.e divine
.Ian
that .an could not ultimately foil, the attempt to foil it being
as .uch heresy as the attempt to
.al.e a revolution. Haistre
»ust have infuriated his compatriots hy saying that God had
prevented an early counter-revolution so that all guilty parties
m France might be punished. Here were the eddies chafing
at the bit to get back to France, or so.e other place (like
Savoy) ,vhore the revolutionary amies had penetrated, rebuild
their estates, settle scores, and talce up where they had left
off, and one of their most prominent leaders was playing the
part of a MenshevUi of the rieht Thi = . j-i-nc ij.^nc. ihis is an indication of
'.vhat happens when it is believed hiunan beings are impotent
before some all-encompassing force, be it God or historical
materialism: paralysis of v/ill results. Kaistre felt he could
speed the end of Jacobinism in just the same v;ay as he could
seek to prevent the collapse of his house in an earthquake and
keep his body from being ravaged by smallpox: he could pray
to God, It is paradoxical to say that revolution is, at the
manimum, morally suspect, but human opposition to revolution,
unless one be unmistakably a tool of the Lord, is also morally
suspect. Such, nonetheless, was Maistre»s position.
Maistre gives no instructions as to how the necessity
for revolution is to be determined. Even though he may permit
revolution against a sovereign (but without judging him!), the
22
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idea Of ..iting a pri.erfor revolutionaries would not be es-
pecially congenial to Maistre. It was seen earlier that on
this problem, and .any others, Maistre stresses the superiority
Of experience over abstract rules, but experience of what?
Apparently religious persecution does not Justify revolution,
for Maistre never suggested the revocation of the Edict of
^rantes to permit such extreme action, and even expressly upheld
the legitimacy of the Inquisition as a way for the embattled
Church to defend itself against heretics and unbelievers. Even
When the Jesuit Order (for which Maistre always had a passionate
regard) was expelled from France under the monarchy, he was
not prepared to call down the fire and sword of revolution upon
the evildoers. Deprivation of property rights would also not
justify revolution. Under no state did regressive taxation
deny property rights to the mass of the population more than
vms the case in pre-revolutionary France. It was already seen
that Maistre was highly aware of the necessity for an independent
system of justice, but even this lack did not merit resort to
political violence. The Lettre de Cachet was a funda^mental
institution of the French monarchy and could in no way have
been reconciled to Maistre 's ideas of the adininist ration of
Justice. It was also seen that Maistre felt it was important
for people to have the right to denounce abuses to the king
through a somehow elected body. It need hardly be belabored
that the French Icings had succeeded in destroying the Estates
General as a viable institution of cocioty. T.e French
.nonarchy
Whatever its potential for refor., in its .ain outlines stood
as an insult to Maistre^s theories of what a state should be
and do, and yet he .as un.illinc to sanction its replacement.
If even the ultimate atrocity (in Maistre»s view) of expelling
the Jesuit Order can pass without sanctioning resolution or
at least a Papal suspension of sovereignty, how can it be said
that the state must observe any rights, be they individual or
corporate? It is incredible that Maistre, who possibly more
than any political theorist who ever lived, looked at the specter
Of human evil full in the face, could merely say to the sovereign
"Bo good!'., and remove in practice any rights about which he
must be good. Maistro v/as not willing to say about a tradi-
tional sovereignty: 'M^re it committed a punishable offense."
Just xvhat can be beyond the rights of an originally legally-
constituted state ip a complete mystery. As impossible as it
seems to reconcile this to much of the rest of the body of
MaisLre's thinking, it seems unmistakable, since no concrete
cases of legitimate opposition to authority are given in prac-
tice, that any resistance to authority, oven resistance by the
Popo, is a more act of will, which cannot be understood or de-
fended logically. This opens up two likely possibilities with
regard to the subjects of a state: either unrestricted obedience
or unrestricted opposition. In view of the nature of man, about
which Maistre had no illusions, unrestricted opposition is the
far more likely eventuality, though not the one Maistre favored.
As could be expected from the fact that Maistre gave no
hints about the reasons
.hy revolution could be undertaken,
he also gives no instructions as to .ho is to announce and carry
out a revolution. One would anticipate, given Maistre's elitist
bias, that a revolution would be the ;vork of an upper-class
minority. The case is, however, not certain. One idea that
Maistre considers and rejects is that the call for revolution
can be given by a permanent tribunal of government. He rejects
this idea because revolution is the destruction of sovereignty,
v/hich would be the destruction of the authority of the insti-
tution that declared revolution. ^3 There is a large measure
of truth to this statement, but it may not be as compelling
as Maistre believed. It is true that the declaration of rev-
olution would have to be this tribunal's last official act,
at least for the duration of the interregnum, but this would
not eliminate its authority for this last act of suicide, nor
would it dissuade a sufficiently public-spirited institution.
Three problems, rjowover, emerge. First, membership on this
body would carry eome prestige and salary, and its members
might not want to lose these, especially since the revolution
might fail, vvith its champions losing thereby not only their
offices, but their heads. Second, an agency such as this would
become one of the most vital institutions of government, and
^Maistre, The Po^e
, in Lively, Works Of Joseph Do Maistre
,
p. 133.
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its ,r,or consent to acts of govennnent would proWy ,e socunoa
exther by elving it a .etc over legislation or by bribing its
r.er„bcrs with money or po.er. Once tfds institution became
formally or informally involved in the day-by-day business of
sovernins. which would probably be inevltablo, the specific
function for .hich it had been organized would tend to atrophy.
Finally, as was a problem with Burke, a less than unanimous
verdict for revolution, v,Mch would be the likely event, would
be of a dubious binding nuaT-ifv t« ^-hxiux q lity. In other words, an institution
like this would be possible in practice, but uncommon nonetheless.
Maistre did not, however, abandon the concept of niinority-led
revolution. He was very definitely of the opinion that the
people do not decide revolutions, but are at ..iost a passive
instrument; as Maistre puts it very succinctly, "Perhaps four
or five people will give France a IcLng.-'^^ This statement,
however, raises more questions than it resolves. First, it
may not refer to the carrying~out of a revolution. It could,
instead, suggest a mode of choosing a king after a revolution.
If this does refer to the carrying-out of revolution, the prob-
lems are still extreme. First, what four or five people are
to carry out revolution? Maistre had no high regard for either
the morality or intelligence of those who opposed him (He said
of Locke that "Contempt for Locke is the beginning of knowledge.",
and of Voltaire that "Paris crowned him—Sodom would have banished him."),
"Slaistro, Cgnsid^rntl ^nn Franco , in Lively, Work,^ QS,
Joseph Do Maistre
, p. 36.
but .any ether people considered the. among the groat .on of
the tine, my should not these people be the ones to lead a
revolution, as in Kalstre-s eyes they had7 Allied to this first
question is the one of ho„ these men are to he selected. If
rules for the selection of revolutionaries were
.ade, a long
step «ould have been taken toward the setting up of rules of
revolution, a task Maistre wanted absolutely to avoid. Just
as Kaistre gave no useful instructions on the rightful causes
Of revolution, so he is not helpful on how a revolution is to
be led.
Finally, there is the question of ,.hat should be done
after the revolution, '^at should be its goals? It is susgested
with regard to France that the counter-revolution is to rein-
stitute all Of pre-1789 French society, minus those Enlighten-
nient accretions that helped lead to revolution. It is not
certain, however, that this is typical of Maistre 's vic-v; of
revolutionary goals as such. Some change as a result of rev-
olution may be permitted. At one point, Maiscrc says that a
few wise men can make political improvements.^^ mo these few
wise men are, what these improvements are, and when and under
What conditions they can be m.ade, are nowhere Qxpllcatsd. Maistre
is v/llling to entertain the idea of reforms, but then drops
the subject,
25,, . .
^^aistre. Study On Sovereignty
, in Lively, Works Of Joso-h
De Maistre, d. 104.
It .u.t be ob..Lous that taio Is probably tho
.o.t frun-
tratins and perplexing part of all Maistre's thinking, m no
other place does the basic tension between Maistre as Enlight-
en.ent thinker and Kaistre as Conservative (or reactionary)
she, up noro strongly. The issue of resistance to authority
»-as. after all. the issue which »ost disturbed Kaistre about
the Enlightenment. Maistre wanted to do everything he could
to eliminate resistance entirely, or to tie it to a conservative
and respected authority (the Papacy) which would not abuse it.
Maistre hir,self. however, recognized that the need for revol-
ution could not be as easily eliminated as he would like, and
he was therefore forced to legitimize in principle
..hat he
despised m fact. This caused a basic tension in his thinking
on the subject, which resulted in his inability to create rules
to limit the genie he had unleashed. He could not boar to stay
on the subject long enough. Maistre
-s position on restricting
authority may therefore be referred to as authoritarianism vdth
a guilty conscience. As was seen, Burke's position on resist-.
ance to authority, as opposed to institutional checks on authorlt;
has serious problems (as an attempt to produce a logical pos-
ition on such a subject almost certainly must), but it is at
least understandable. Maistre 's position is not really under-
standable-
Chapter VI: Helationship Of Church and State
A. Church and State In Burke' - Ph-ii. . ^iiurk o Philosophy. The religious
vic». o. Bur.e
... ext.e.eX. important to an unae.stanai., orhis overaXX pMlosop.,.
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
the nature of these views. Stanlis. for exair,t,le» a/npi , declares that
"Burke.
s
own religious convictions
„ight well ,e described as
Catholicism qualified hy British nationalise...' of his British
nationalise there can be no doubt, but. despite an appreciation
Of the historic Importance of Catholicism and a willingness
to unite With the Catholic countries in a co^on alliance against
the enemies of religion, it must be said that Burke's views
Of religion and of religlon-s relationship to the state were
fundamentally Protestant. «T>atever his admiration for the crown
and (sometimes) for the king. Burke certainly never looked u^on
the monarch of Great Britain as the de facto head of religion
m England, much less as an infallible source of spiritual
pronouncements. In addition to its lack of an Infallible head.
Burke has other views about the nat.ire of the English Church
that set it off from even a Galilean Catholic Church. In opp-
osition to the petition of dissenting ministers to be permitted
to be paid by the Church of England, while not subscribing to
its beliefs. Burke goes out of his way to declare that he agrees
Stanlls, EdBund Burke and the tfatural Law, o. 201.
2,?3
v^ith Loce that the Church is a voluntary association
.hie.,
as such, has a right to set ter.s of
.e.bership.^ Tl^s st.t.-
-nt is positively shattering to any notion or infallihle church
authority, in that it has a .ar.ed tendency to reduce the status
Of the Church to that of a long-established and
.enerablo cri^.^t
Club. The Church is run in a certain way by priests selected
in a certain
.ay si.ply because this is ho. the people through
their representatives in Parliaraent have desired tl^ngs should
be.- God did not organize the Church in any particular v;ay,
ap.d so Parli,ar.ent is free to reform Church structure and org<
anization in any way it chooses, though, as vath any other major
reform, this po-.yer ought to be handled temperately. The very
status Of the Church as an established church is subject to
the control of Parlia^nent, though Burke strongly supports this
status out of a respect for its longevity and from his oppos-
ition to secularism. The Church is not an ordinary voluntary
organization, in that, as a result of history, it is intermingled
with the state, there bly gaining grandeur and losing independence.
The exalted status of the Church of England is in no v;ay
interpreted by Burke as giving it a monopoly of religion within
the territorial limits of Britain. Burke's activities on behalf
of religious toleration have already been related, and these
were by no means motivated by the sort of attitude that shows
Buriie, .Speech On the Acts Of Uniformity
, in Burke ' s -//ork-s,
VII, 17.
•^ Ibj d . , p. 16.
rorebearance to that
..ich it despises,
.ut ste.ned instead
fro. a genuine regard for the legitimacy and sanctity of other
relicicns. This was rather natura"- from . m.n -ciouxa- I u a a wno was a comm-
unicant of the Church of v^a-i^^^^n O England, was raised in a half Catholic
hone, and was educated by Quakers. This leads to Burke's state-
.ont that "Toleration is good for all, or it is good for none..-'^
This Shows that the Church of England is exalted above all other
religions in relationship to the British state, but not in re-
lationship to sanctity as such. The power of the state over
religion in general and the Church of England in parfcicul,^
is real, but nonetheless limited. It does not extend to matters
Of religious conscience, as that sort of control, far from being
part Of Christianity, is actually an attack upon it.5 Limits
upon religious freedom are permissible only when one dissents
not out of conscience, but out of a desire to raise factions
and destroy the peace of the state.^ The foregoing is, naturally,
a major qualifier upon religious liberty. Religious conscience
is and must be entirely free. The only power a magistrate
.lay
have over roli,.ion is in its external ceremonies, for true rel-
igious observance cannot be compelled. The foregoing few state-
ments show a moderately libertarian side of Burke in regard
to religion, but there is another side. It was seen that Burke
Burke
,
Speech On a Bill For the Relief Of Protestant
Dissenters
, in 3url:e *
s
IVorks, 1^.1, 29.
5Ihid
. , p. 25.
^Ibid
. , p. 30.
CO Lin-
h.. no u:a„s ror pollticl.,d rollslo...
,,,, ^„
to.cd
.uch a reunion in the Torn of t.e Unitarian Society.
BurUe sa. t.e tenet, or thio sociot,- (a.on,
.Hich v.-ere a de.and
for tue cU30sta-oli3hnont of the Cl.urch of England) a. being
/ and .a.Ifully subversive of the state, and he
wa. therefore unv^lU., to cLLsavo. the staters ri.ht to exa.ine
the opinions of nominally rolicious bodies.^ At the point
.hen
a religion demands not only the right to abstain fro. what it
considers evil, but also the right to reshape society forcibly
m adhoronco to its standard of rectitude C.l^ch is the way
Burko, correctly or incorrectly, pictured the case at hand),
arsunents based on the right of religious toleration cease to
have relevance. Traitors and persecutors, or .ould-be perse-
outers, cannot claim religious inmmity. Here again v;e see
Burke as the hard-headed realist unwilling to endanger the
community in the nar.e of even his most valued principles.
There is one group in society that by its very existence
is a nionaco to all order and virtue sjid whJ.ch is never to re-
ceive Che slightest shred of toleration. This group is the
atheists. The loathing and hatred of Burke for atheism is un-
mistakable
• Tn his ST^cech For the Pelief Of Protostont Diss-
ejitors, which is in large measure a paean to the virtues of
religious liberty, atheists are referred to as "outlaws.
. .of
'Burke, Spooch On... a Petition Of the Unitarian r.'ocLotv,
————— —
— — — I II >
in Burko »s IVorkc, ^711,
Che nu.an racC..
..g.eat ^inl.tc. or
.arknose in the
..,oria „ho
a:-e ondoavorlns to s.a.e off all the
.or.= of God ostabliched
in oMcr and beaut,", and „en v,ho "are never, never to be aupp.
orted. never to be tolerated. "3
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
1'73. almost twenty years before Eurke v,as to vdtness the full
effects Of revolutionary atheism, but not before he had visited
Paris, conversed with so.e of her leading intellectuals, and
come to a shocked realization of the meaning of revolutionary
atheism. The reason, for Burke- s violent hatred toward atheism
were f.vo in nu.ber. First, religion v,as such an integral part
Of Burke's whole life that the disavowal of the existence of
God could not but fill hi. „.ath horror and the belief that the
holder Of such a doctrine was alr.ost irremediably evil. It
v.-ould be impossible to over-estimate the depth or sincerity
Of this gut reaction. Second, Burke saw the state as religious
to its foundations, which vrould make one denying the existence
of God a political revolutionary, whether he desired to be one
or not. The atheist was an enemy of morality by the very nature
of his creed, and was an enemy of civil peace because of the
unavoidable tendency of atheism to attack the very basis of
the social order. Burke's hatred of atheism was, therefore,
both ideological and practical.
It can be seen from what has been said that Burke saw
church and state as separable concepts, though the two would
g
Burke, Relief Of FrotcGtant Dissenters , in Burke's Tories,
VII, 36-37.
oru-n
-oe inte^inelea. as in
,
^^^^^^^^
^V^on Church an.
.tate are ,oinoa. which
.a. he henericial a^
an e^roosion or the religious character of the state, hist-
orical tradition ,,in dictate
.^^ch or the tv.-o i. to he pre-
dominant. In the case of
.ngland, Burke saw the
.articu^ a.
ootamshed Church as subordinate to the state, possihly hocau-
he relt rolisious liherty to he „ore secure in this situation
than in the opposite arrangement. Though church and state are
distinguishable, religion and the state are not. Burke feels
that a true alliance of equals hef.een church and state is
impossible, as one must predominate, but v,hen the state has
predominance over the church, it is not a case of a secular
state controllins a church; in Christianity, religion and the
state are one, and the laity (including the nagistrates)
, as
an equal part of the church, have a share in its government
and must care most of all for the needs of religion.' The
Protestant aspects of the foregoing statement are unmistakable.
This unification of religion and ohe state nay «oll derive from
Burke's early studies of Aquinas, for the latter declares that
"Every human law has just so much of the nature of las as it
is derived from the lav, of nature", which is. of course, a rel-
igious concept to Aquinas. '° The similarity of thought is
9Burke, Petition Of tlio Unitarian Socioby
. in Burke ' g
Works, VII, 2|3,
^^The^ Political Ideas Of Saint Thomas Aquinas , ed. by
Dlno Bigongiari (Hew York: Hafner, 1965), p. 53.
rather striding.
,3 both Burke and Aqulnac clearly bollovc In
sanctified states.
Burke tended to think of the unity of religion and the
state in a v:ay favorable to liberty. Fi^st, the fact that the
state
.as a sanctified institution did not
.alee it above crit-
icis.. In a larger sense, the very religious significance of
the state deepened its responsibilities to liberty, as it
.as
to be conducted as an institution worthy of God. A second con-
sideration was that the state v;as to act against persecutors,
and certainly never er.brace persecution itself, persecution
being Viewed by Burke as an anti-religious act. Despite the
vraj in which religion is used by Burke, the very idea of a
sanctified state has certain results chilling to liberty. At
the very outset, a sanctified state will, as Burke realized,
probably necessitate a state church. Even if all other religior
are treated with toleration ("toleration" being in itself a
term wonderfully expressive of the anomalous position occupied
by a non-conformist religion in a land witr. a state church),
they are still the "dissenting" religions. The social, pressure
to conform to the dominant church can be very considerable,
even in the absence of any overt discrimination or persecution.
Moreover, discrimination or persecution may be unavoidable in
state with a douiinant or established church, for he who does
t adhere to it is by that very act out of step with the nation
and very possibly looked on, therefore, as unpatriotic. The
a
no
extent to
.Hich ua. 1« so is
.ado evident
.
,.otation fro.
Burke,
.ho, it .u^-t bo remembered, put political career
on the lino for religious toleration for Catholics and Je>,s.
the Bastille for thos; nho da^e ?o lSe?1, "'""'^France. In tliis spiritual reS^eat ^ctf °^lord George Gordor.; a convert to kd^s--l ?'na°n r'""''"there meaitate on his Talnud nnt-ii hfT^ *beconlng his birth and part- ^nd n^^ ^
the ancient r-l-' .^i °^ diagraceiul to
or until'sLe
-
JeisSns frryourVthfFrJnc^l^ ^ .--"-l^^^ =water, to Please your nev/Hrbre„^S;e h":"^ TAlLn""hin. He rnav thf^r. ho ono-xT^^ 4. '^--^'^^xen, snail ransom
of the syrSorue^and Tloll ^^f-^^^^^e vdth the old boards
compound int°rp!t o? ?J f^-^^f^^^ poundage on the long
a^-r;iir-^d
.fr^.rp-tL^-rL^^^^^^
Even with the testimony of his fight for religious toleration
and his state,.ont that Gordon should act in a way v;orthy of
his religion, it nust be said that this quotation by Burke sho.s
a clear strain of xenophobia and of at least some anti-semitism
as v;ell. Furtherrnoro
, statements of a similar anti-semitic
nature appe,ar in other places in the Reflections , though Uioy
are, fortunately, entirely absent from his other v/ritings.
If, hov/ever, such a good and noble spirit as Burke can give
v/ay to these ideas (v;hich may bo, to no small extent, connected
v/ith the atmosphere created by an established church) under
the pressure of events, v;hat could one expect from a less ;vorthy
individual? The penchant for discrimination exists in all men
at all times, but an established church, v/hatever its favorable
Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In Franco, pp. 95-96,
results. p„-oa-oly does
..oh to bring out this trait,
."s
therefore. austifiaWe to as. whether BurKCs goal or a J,,,
religious state «lth an established church, but ,^thout di=cri„.
ination, j.s even possible.
I>3spite its results in practice, there is little reason
to doubt that Burke intended the association of religion with
the state to be one favorable to liberty. Religion is, first,
to be a Check upon the actions of the state and its governors!
Burke^s state .as a Christian state, and was to act as such,
in the best sense of the word "Christian." Due to the Western
religious idea of the moral equality of all .en, no subject
of the state is to be outside the sphere of its concern and
solicitude. Religion is favorable to liberty in .ore ways than
this. Liberty requires an advanced and cultured civilization,
and Burke believes such a civilization is necessarily religious.
There is one basic reason v/hy religion and civilization are
associated: only religion is truly capable of disciplining and
controlling the base instincts of marJcind, as was the case after
the fall of the Roman Rnpire
, v/hen the Catholic Church succeeded
in turning tribes of marauding barbarians on horseback into
Cin Burke »s view) gentle and chivalrous knights. This is one
reason why Burke never supports toleration for atheists: he
cannot think of them as other than irremediably uncivD.lized
people, and hence dangers to the community. There is no doubt
1 2
MacCunn, The Political Philosophy Of Burke
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that the actions of the French atheiots ,789 and afterward,
cemented hi. ,n thi.
.elief. Libert, i. connected >.^th religion
for several reasons. Fire.-!- 1tv^>,+.xrst, liberty can exist only m a civilized
state,
.hich Cas was seen) to Burke
.eans a religious state.
A strong, possibly despotic, hand would be necessary to control
a depraved and wild populace, but by ennobling the entire pep-
ulation, religion makes it fit for liberty. Religion, Turther-
-re, instills in the great of the society a sense of the heavy
responsibility under which they labor, and helps to curb "the
3tench Of their arrogance and presumption."13
^^^^
ment may serve as a further refutation of any belief that Burke
was a blind ad.ircr of the aristocracy. Religion, and especially
an established church, also raise the sense of dignity of even
the poorest man in the community, by allo^.rlng him to identify
with the ponp of a r.agnificent institution of which he is a
valued member. Burke recognized that an entire society could
be free only to cne extent that all of its members were seen
as having personal worth, and Burke felt an established church
to be conducive to this attitude. This is an example of the
pitfall into which Burke sometimes falls when he treats the
British experience as universal. Though the British established
church may have had this happy tendency to treat all men as
morally equal, there is no reason why an established church
woul.d have to have this benign effect, as Burke, being acquainted
^-^Burko, Reflections On the Pcvolution Tn France
, p. 1 iG.
With the affairs of India, should have realised. One of th.
sroatost ways in „hich religion servos li.ert. is promoting
order.
..^oh Bur.e sees as a pri.e necessity for liberty. Only
a religious consciousness can appreciate the significance and
continuity of national life, and thereby hold the nation together.
It ha. already been seen that Burke prefers to deal
..,1th liberty
.Ithln a concrete social context, which necessarily i.pUes
the existence of the nation. He who sees the Hand of God in
the history and traditions of the state will be hesitant about
promoting changes and innovations destructive of civil peace,
and henco of liberty. Hero again the British experience is
'
treated as universal, vath unacceptable results. The traditions
or Britain since Magna Cl.arta v.ere favorable to limited governnent
and liberty; religious consecration of these traditions could
only be to the credit of liberty, but in many or m.ost countries
the national traditions were (and are) distinctly hostile to
liberty. Religious consecration of such traditions could only
be destructive of both liberty and religion. Burke did not
seem to be aware that this was one of the causes of the French
revolutionary attack or. religion in France, Religion in the
form Of a financially-independent established church is also
seen by Burke as serving the function of Aristotle's middle
class, that of an intermediary between upper and lower classes
(Burke Is ambivalent toward the middle class itself, seeing
it as a source of much wisdom, and yet recognizing its predominant
role in the French Revolution.). The church is to be independent
him-
'0 have
Of both arxs.ocra=, people. to .0 able to re,u,o attests
at tyrann. fro. either quarter. It is true that this role Burke
asolsn. to the church, that of the guardian of civil
.eace ani
Of the liberty of all the people of the state, is possible,
as it has bee. performed at „any ti.es in history, fro. the
ti.e Of the Bible to the present. There are certain conditions
inseparable from a state church, however, that nilltate against
a Ions continuation of this buffering function. As 3urk<
self realized, a state church must be ,ealthy in order t<
the respect of the aristocracy, this respect being necessary
for the church to be able to perform its sacramental functions
toward the aristocrats, and, if need be, to command thorn. A
poor church vdll not have the respect of the v;ealthy. This
necessity of the church to be ..ealthy vdll, often enough, give
Churchmen the temptation to act In ways conducive to wealth.
This would, of course, fatally compromise the church in the
eyes of all. Including the wealthy. The status of the church
as an Institution vdth great power in the state would also cause
many members of the aristocracy to enter the priesthood, especially
since the requirements of primogeniture would bar the role of
landed gentry to all but the eldest sons of the aristocrats,
thereby requiring all younger aristocrats to search out some
respectable alternative means of livelihood. It need hardly
be stressed that the average higher clergyman would not be
likely to be too strict toward that class vjith which he was
associated by ties of kinship. The church itself could not,
in 30.0 cases, function as an integrated body, for Just as its
upper echelons
.ould be composed of the offspring of aristocrat,
so its lo.er echelons would be .ade up of somewhat lo.er elc.enl
Of society, which would tend to favor their social equals.
This div-isiveness within the church could seriously, perhaps
fatally, weaken it as a device for upholding the liberty of
all, for different parts of the church would strike harshly
at the tyrannical designs of some classes (or at their struggles
for liberty), while ignoring the depredations of other classes.
This pulling in opposite directions by parts of the church could
result in its paralysis as a socially- significant institution,
unless the top hierarchy succeeded in coi^anding its lower
echelons, in which case the church would usually be an agency
for the preservation of the tyranny of the aristocracy and not
for the preservation of the liberty of all. It is likely that
Burke »s ideal of a strong and socially-independent established
church acting to uphold both liberty and order would .-nore often
be honored in the breach than in the reality. Whatever the
practical effects of a state church upon liberty, however, there
is no reason to doubt that Burke intended it to be a chief
guarantor of liberty and moral equality.
B. Church and State In Maistre»s Pliilosophy. It has already
been seen that the relationship between Maistre»s church and
his state is that of total subordination of the latter to the
fcr^er. Tn. st.te
.ay ao whatevo. it „ls.es. 30 ,o„g
.3 t.e
Church
.oe. „ot disapprove. TMs. or course, robs U,e state
Of all true independence, all the nore so because the local
church is SUbiGC-!- f i r-^f rsf^ -y-y ±.jcc, .t of all. to a supranational eartiily
authority. The Catholic Church is "the best and .ost
.errect
or sovern,nents"'^; nn^er such conditions all other governments
must yield to it, and by "the Catholic Church", Kaistre never
»eans a national Catholic Church, which could be subject to
effective state control. Beyond this subordination of state
to Church, the relationship or the t>vo is one or alliance.
State and church are to work together to maintain an orderly
and Christian civilization. Maistre does not call ror a com-
plete absorption of state by church, because under the dictate
or the doctrine of the two swords, the church may not use mill
force or carry out the death penalty. Such actions are barred
to a wholly spiritual authority like the church. The relation
of religion and the church to liberty is ambiguous in Maistr..
The church does basically stand ror the preservation of che
existing order, but not ror just any existing order, irresp>>ct:
of its attributes. Protestant or atheistic countries can cer-
tainly never have the blessings or the church. Gallioanism
is also anathema to Maistre, though he himseir rilrtod ivlth
it in Ms younger days. Even a suitably Ultramontane Catholic
' Vaistre, The Po^e, in Lively, Works Of Joseph De Kaistre
P» 13?..
.t.te
..St „eet certain requirements Ir it is to got the sanct^'on
Of the ohurch. It .ust adhere to its customary tradition, and
corporate privileges, must be based on tbP t^mto a he rule oi law (especially
.dth resard to matters of crinanal Justice), and must per.it
the people to denounce abuses through a popular assembly vdth
a narrov, franchise (if such Is part of its traditions) . '5 This
Shows ^faistre.s church not to he entirely indifferent or hostile
to the cause of liberty. Such liberties as are traditional
and corporate in nature have the church as a zealous guardian.
This, however, leaves much to bo desired on the subject of liberty,
for Maistre sees 'Tbnrtv a^. r^o^.-;
^ -. c y o derivmg m essence from inheritence
stretching back to the divine creation of the state. Several
considerations derive from this. First, since pedigree is the
primary consideration in the value of a liberty (being synonymous
;vith its Godliness), no one has the right to judge the social
usefulness of such a liberty. This is, in a way, absolutely
libertarian, as it malces such rights perfectly inalienable.
Tliat, however, aligns the church firmly vath the liberties of
both ki.ng and aristocracy (both collectively and in opposition
to each other and the people), but by making these rights so
absolute, it creates a situation in which these may well become
oppressive to the liberty of the bulk of the population, for
one man's perfect freedom can only be bought by the perfect
Maistre, Study On Sovereignty
, in Lively, Works Of Joseph
De Kaislre
. pp. and 117-119.
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unrreedo. of others. The Philosophe-U.e tendencies or Maistro
are again evident in his willingness to treat certain rights
Of certain people as absolutes, irrespective of consequences.
The Church will support for the average
.an (at best) a benev-
olont despotism, for. v.lth the exception of the right to rep-
resentation in a purely advisory council, the b.ak of the pop-
ulation has no rights which the church vd.ll enforce, due to
the fact that the average man was absent when rights were being
handed out. Maistre is, moreover, absolutely adamant on the
point that written laws can create no rights not existing in
a nation's natural constitution, which, considering the change-
lessness of customs (in Maistre's view), freezes legally-protected
liberty into the position of a prerogative of the favored classes.
It need not even be stressed that vdthin the church itself the
average layman's position was that of absolute submission to
authority. The church also does not function as a protector
of the lihorty o.f individuals, for Maistre does not think of
liberty iri terms of individuals. Such rights and responsibilities
as one has derive from his family, his class, or some corpor-
ation to wnich he may belong, but not from himself. Man as
man has no liberties which the church will protect or the state
must respect. Maistre positively denies that there are rights
of men, quite in contrast to Burke, who quarreled \n.th Jacobinism
about their content.
^^Maistro, Considerations On France , in Lively, Work s
Of Joscrjh De Maistre
, p. 73.
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A derivative of the fact that Malatre. i„ contrast to
Burke. 3003 church a3 superior to state. i= that freodo. of
relxgion is not counted by f.aistre as a ri^ht te be defended.
This follows necessarily fro. the facts that a state cannot
be subordinate to several churches and that the Catholic Caurch
is (in Halstre.s estimation) clearly the superior of all other
relieions. Just .hat the position of other relleions is to
be in Haistre.s Catholic state is never made clear, but con-
version by the s™rd is eschewed. This is because '^here is
not and even cannot be an ont-i r.«-» -,r ^- t -. . . 17G L rea.y false religion,"'^ That
is based on c.e belief in man^s uncreativenoss,
.hich in this
case neans all religions are God-created, and hence deserving
Of some respect. It aould be acting against God to seek to
eradicate all religionc but the .= crue" one by force, though
discussion and argu..ent are to be used to bring all back to
the Church. Force n-ay be used by the Catholic Ciaurch only to
defend itself against the assaults of other religions, but what
constitutes an assault can be difficult to define, as Kaistre
himself learned v;horr ho got in trouble in Russia for the charge
of causing the conversion to Catholicism of subjects of the
czar* A proselytizing religion is likely to see the conversion
of one of its members as an attack upon it. The relationship
airtong religions is no neat coherent package in Maistrc»s theory.
17
^^^^^^"» Anli.^htonmont On Sacrifices
, in Lively, \yor!-s
Of Josorh Do Mgist re
. p. 297.
one religion is cloarl, superior to all ot.er= an. Has t.e state
at Its oor^and, but .ust forebear the tenptatlon to conv»>-t
people at t.e point of the sv.ord; raiding the ne.bershlp of
the less true religions by rational argument is. ho,,over. ,er-
..issiblo.
..my it is right to seek to undo God's ,vork (v.ach
all religions are) ,,on-violently. but not violently, is a real
puzzle. A me.ber of a dissenting religion in Kelstre-s state
is in a highly uncertain position. He has no Irrefutable right
to practice his faith, for to countenance such a right v,ould
bo to sanction error, but neither muct he fear for his life
(nor. presumably, fear unequal trea.^ent) if he wishes to adhere
to his faith. At the sa<ne tine, all the forces of church and
society
.,111 be brought to bear to secure "voluntary" conversion
to Catholis.,,. It goes v.-ithout saying that this social pressure,
and the social stig-aa attached to dissenting froia ivhat is more
a church state than a state church, ivould, despite Maistre's
sincere assurances to the contrary, constitute repression and
make persecution essentially inevitable. This is despite the
fact that the state ought to have a moral responsibility to
safeguard all peoples from religious persecution, since, to
repeat, all religions are the work of Sod. The tension in Maistr
thought between libertarianlsm and authoritarianism is again
evident. De facto religious toleration is taken as the proper
relationsidp bctiveen the religions in a state, and then condition
are. vattlngly or unwittingly, established that make religious
sm
ng
toleration i.po.si.le. I„ the final
.naly.l., authcitarianl
out. A. a loyal
.on or Mo c.urch. Maistre unvdlu.-
to accept a religious settlement that ,ri.lX give per.anonco to
the enemion of h*" s f^^lth fn- lai n (.or he perceives tho=.. to be such).
It can be seen from this chapter that Buri.e and Malatre
arc poles apart on the arrangements they fa.or betv.-een church
and state and are vprv fs-\ o-n-i -r- ^ ^a-i -.-r.^. e y slgnifxcantly different in their attitude
toward freedom of religion. As ought to be expected from the
basic configurations of their thought. Malstre Is inclined to
be hostile toward religious pluralism and Burke is inclined
to be favorable toward it. As has been shovm, hov,ever, the
fact that both men uphold a state church renders religious
liberty rather tenuous in both of their theories, though
.„ore
so ivith Maistre than v;ith Burke.
Chapter VII: The Theory Of War and Empire
A. Burke's Beliefs About War. It must be said at the
outset that Burke.
s theory is not the best of places to look if
one Wishes a full-dress exposition of the concept of war. This
is true because it was not in the style of the mature Burke to
sit down and write an organized philosophical treatise. Conse-
quently, it becomes necessary to search throughout Burke's writ-
ings for those moments when he touches on this subject, and one
must Often resort to interpretation. It is a fact that Burke was
not a friend of standing armies. As was good Tnig doctrine, he
saw them as inevitably fatal to a country's liberty, and for that
reason rejoiced in the defeat of the British in the American Pev-
olution, because he felt that British success would have required
the establishment of a large standing army to hold down the dis-
gruntled Americans, with all of the many unpleasant consequences
this would have had for England.^ Such should not, however,
be interpreted as saying Burke was any sort of pacifist. He,
first of all, openly declared the right of one nation to inter-
vene in the affairs of another, under certain conditions. Since
there can be no such thing as an entirely domestic enactment,
because what happens in one state necessarily affects others,
a new practice in a state, if it is deemed by that state's
^Burke, Appeal From the New To the Old mir.s
, p. ifO.
noishbors to bo harmful to the.,
.ay be put dov^ by force of
arms.
2 It can be seen that war is a per_nlsslblo response to
a nation that thro.s off the yoke of morality and plots evil
asainst her neighbors, or permits the continuation of practices
laarmful to the... ,,hich has the sa..e result. Burke articulated
this la.t concept under great stress, soeklne to n,ake the
.oral
case for v,ar v,dth revolutionary France as strong as possible.
This is ,vhy he
-.vent really further than he would have vrtshed
and er.braced a point of view that would tend to justify war
under any and all conditions. Eurke-s nore basic attitude
tovard what constituted a proper justification for war was
somewhat more li.ated. A state had a right (and probably a
duty) to undertake wai- not for the sake of plunder, but "for
the sake of our fsiiily, for our friends, for our God. for our
country, for our :dnd."-^ A truly offensive war ..as, therefore,
unacceptable. Tkis is surely a broad enough definition of what
constitutes a just wai-, but 3urke probably realized that with
good faith ajnong nations payer restrictions on the right of
war mould bo unnecessary, and without good faith such restric-
tions would be unavailing. Burke was one of the first in England
to realize that peace with Jacobin France was impossible, since
it ecbraccd as an article of faith its duty to subvert all other
2
Burke
,
First Letter On the nagicidj Peace
, in Burke's
Works, 7, 320-323.
Ibid. , p. 305.
statos. and therefore had to totally triumph or be totally de-
stroyed. A war to the death between
.ystemo could, therefore,
bo just.
Fortunately, such Armageddon-like wars are the exception
rather than the rule. ^ reference to the war with revolutionary
France, Burke says that peace is not possible, since the v.ar
is over systems of government, not objects. This clearly
implies a normal offensive war to be limited in its goal, con-
corning, in all likelihood, some one disputed city or province,
and thereby subject to mediation, or at least not unlim.ited
in its consequences. There is still another kind of v;ar, one
fought for the defense of the existence of a family of nation
states. In hAs Speech On the Arn^ ^^stimatos (given on February
9, 1790, before the Jacobin armies began the forcible export
of their creed). Burke argued against a larger military budget,
saying chat such v;as not needed for the defense of the balance
of pov/er.^ There is no doubt that Burke recognized the advan-
tages for Britain of a European power balance, since Britain
was the balancer, but the fact that Burke supported national
autonomy as a laudable goal (even to the extent of having once
supported Corsican independence), shows that his support of
'Burke
,
Second Letter On tlie Pegicide Peace , in Burlie '
3
Worths, V, 3/1,3.
^Burke, STPcech On the Amy I^stimates
, in Burlap ' s '.'/orks,
III, 21i+-2-!5.
-ance
a balance of po-.vor was not meanly motivated. The pov,er bala
vas to b= maintained because the national pluralism it supported
was good and worthy of support
»
It is now worthwhile to ponder the philosophical content
Of Eurke.s cheory of war, and its relationship to the rest of
his theory. It was seen that Eurke is hostile to the idea of
war, due to the ^litarization of society, and consequent loss
Of liberty, that it can engender. There are, however, no en-
thusiastic schemes for the abolition of war to be found in Burke.
Seeing
.an to be what he is. Burke knows the less pleasant parts
of the huraan personality will lead to war, but this is a fact
to be accepted, not applauded. There would be no wars if t'
world were what it ought to be, but Burke is v/riting for th€
real world, and that is a world that contains wars. Wars can
even be legitirna-ce
,
as was the war against Jacobinism, which
Burke urged on his countr.ymon vath great zeal, but such wars
are to be fought only to preserve the rights and independence
of one»s nation an;^ its friends and the religious bases of
European civilization. '.Vithin the European context, a war may
not be fought for ir.oro aggrandizement and be considered to be
just. It vrill bo seen later in this chapter that rules varied
somewhat outside of Europe. As is the case in the rest of his
theory, Eurke in his treatment of war takes man as he is, and
seeks to place him vathin an environment that will limit his
base instincts as much as possible. In this regard, that means
;ne
ae
xn^tiUin, ia,„ or a co^on
.uropc,^ olvlUzation
.0 a„V
that wars .lU be United in nu.bor an., t.oy occur, m
r-ocit,.
^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^
Of nations v,ill
.0 a. littlo threatono*
.-ar ao i= nocccsary.
B. BurUc... Viov; Of the Proper Domestic CUn.ato In '.Var.
Burko.s ideas ac to ho» the citizenry should act during
a v,.ar were, one »ust ad.it, influonced by
.Aether he believed
the particular
.ar
-.vas Juot or unjust. In regard to Ar.erica,
Bur:.o declared that the war's supporters called for unanimity
in its prosecution, but that a nation ought not to be unanimous
in irrationality.^ L^st it be thought that Bur!« embraced the
concept that business as usual should continue during a v.ar,
his «ords and actions vAth regard to the war against the French
in the ,790>s must nov, be examined. In this latter case, Burke
declares that ,ar cannot be "long carried out against the will
of the people" and that the present uar requires the zeal of
the majority; he bitterly denounces the British govermr.ent for
not awakening the zeal and perseyerorxo of the nation for what
would be a long ,var.^ Burke was rilling to use all the instru-
ments of criminal justice, including a partial suspension of
habeas corpus, against those who wore aiding the cause of Jacob-
Burko
,
A Letter To^ John Fnrr and John Ilarrir.
.
F.cqr:; .
,
^^"-^^^^ ^ li2£ £itv Of BriGUOl , On tho Affaire Of Ai::eri.ca
. in
Burke *s '.VorkG
, 1 , 2 ]
,
n
'Burke, First Letter On t^ie Regicide Peace, in Purke ' s
VforkG
,
V, 233 and 2;2.
xn.s., and engaged in a type of bitter, and often hysterical
Vituperation that allowed his opponents to picture hi. as a
^
dyed in the .ool reactionary. One should not thinl. that there
.as any essential conflict between Burke^s behavior in theso
t.o .arc. The defining characteristic in each was his devotion
to liberty, and to the requirements necessary for liberty.
In the
.^.erican case, Burke was convinced Britain
.as pursuing
an insane policy v;hich, if victorious, ,vould doom the freedom
Of both Britain and A:.erica. An upholder of liberty, therefore,
was .orally bound to do everything in his po.er, including ad-
^
here to his governr.ent
•
s enemies (a possibility Burke briefly
considered), to crush the designs of King George III and Lord
Korth. There v;as surely no requirement to unite behind tlie
cause Of tyranny, in the case of the v;ar against France, how-
ever, the conflict concerned a drive to strike do^^vn the enemies
of ci'/ilization and religion, both of which are necessary, as
has been seen, for liberty. One who did not give his full efforts
to the cause in Uils latter war, or who allied 'vith the other
side, could not but be deemed an enemy of licerty, and be pun-
ishable as such, irnity was, therefore, morally obligatory in
a just vrar, and morally reprehensible in an unjust one.
C. The Imperialism Of Edmund Burke. It would have been
rather strange for a leading British politician of the eighteenth
century to assume an anti-imperialist stance, and this Burke
did not do. Burke was indeed an imperialist, but, as will be
seen, an imperialist of a so.ewhat enli.htoned variety. The
very fact of his imperialism, however,
.eant that Burke did
net grant to non-European nations that i^ity fro. total con-
quest which he granted to European ones. Burke believed, first
Of all, that the British Enpire v;as not a case of .ere conquest,
as it woald have been if Britain conquered France; Providence
(vdth a capital "P") had granted the Enpire to Britain.^ Thi.s
God-given right of Britain to rule the Empire carried with it
the responsibility to do so for the sake of the people ruled^
and in a way conforr.able to the traditions of the colony; this
latter point is shovm by the fact that Burke declares an Indian
native ruler should have "a good education, conformable to the
ir^axims of his religion and the manners of his people. "^^ The
rimt of the British Parliament to exercise direct day-to-day
rule in the colo.ni3s is denied. It is said by Burke that uany
of the problems oi India stemmed from the fact that Parliament
thought it could issue decrees against corruption from a dis-
tance of nine thousand miles, rather than leaving the matter
to a native government which, though subordinate to Britain
in both law and fact, would have the pc.ver to carry out Britain's
general directives and provide for the prosperity and well-being
Surke, Spooch On Conciliation '71th the Colonies
, -n.
^IMd., p. S7.
BurKo, ElevenLh Porort Of the Select Co-riittne 0^ the
House Of Commons On the Affairs Of India
, in Burke's ^Vorks
,
VIII, 26 1.
2/+8
India. p..,,e.n Bur.e decUr.d
.is idea of the
..pire
to be that or a federation of states having local privileges
under a co..on headJ^ The true independence of the states
in the Empire is not, however, permissible. Bur.e did not even
Offer ^.erica full de Jure internal self-govern.ent until her
war for independence was already under way, and that offer «ust
be seen as a departure from his ideas of proper colonial admin-
istration designed to save America for Britain at the eleventh
hour. All colonies, from the most advanced to the most prim-
itive, may have a local government designed to implement Par-
liament's dictates in the most moderate fashion and to promote
the economic development of the country, but they may not have
independence, '^at Britain may get from her colonies is economic
wealth, to the extent it can be gained from improving, and not
degrading, the economic conditions of the local countries, and
allies in war, which will come from uniting the Empire through
bonds of common interest and sympathy.
It must be said that Burke's imperialism is a mixture
of libertarianism and authoritarianism. There is, as was seen
in chapter three, a Natural Law which is as valid in Benares as
it is in Bristol. Men everywhere have a right to a government
that looks out for their interests and seeks to promote their
^ ^Burke, N[inth Peport Of the Select Committee Of the House
Of Commons Oja the Affairs Of India, in Burke's Works
.
VIII
^
82, 165, and
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Burke,, Speech On Conciliation With the Colonies
, pp. 8^-83^
gov-
happiness. The existence of universal principles of good
ernment does not, however, stand as a justification for the
existence of one unitary government for the Empire. Unlike
some other imperialists. Burke realizes the Empire is not one
nation. Charleston cannot be governed as one would govern
Canterbury, and Calcutta cannot be governed as one would govern
Charleston. This leads to a recognition by Burke of the leg-
itimacy of local customs and sensitivities, which he (often
incorrectly) believes must be reconciliable with the Natural
Law. anyway. At a certain point, however, the reins of empire
become pulled tight. Though Parliament is to exercise only
a general supervisory authority over the individual states of
the Empire, this authority is never renounced (save, as noted
above, in the pragmatic attempt to douse the already out of
control fires of the ^erican devolution). That this renun-
ciation was contrary to the general temper of Burke's philos-
ophy of empire is shown by his reaction to the passage by the
Parliament of Ireland of a tax on the estates of absentee land-
owners (who resided chiefly in Britain). Burke declares that
a "superintending authority" is needed for the Empire, and that
by "the very nature of things, and the joint consent of the
whole body", it was proper that imperial legislation should
originate in England. When thj.s "joint consent" was given
is, of course, a good question, but it is clear that Burke may
^•^Burke, Letter On the Irish Absentee Tax , in Burke's
Works
,
VI, 12Zf-125.
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-t, except 1„ a .ost attenuated sense,
.e seen a. a
.u.porto.
oi- the iaeas later to cause the creation or the British Co^on-
wealth or Nations. The
.„pire is or.ainea or Ooa an. inseparaUe.
but ie not to be an exploitative relationship. It is a case
Of diversity within unity, but unity nonetheless. The colonies
»ay have all rights, except that of independence.
D. Maistre.s Beliefs About
.,Var. Maistre-s treatment of
the subject Of war begins with a question Burke more or less
neglected. Burke felt war to be a disagreeable, but natural,
part or hu^an existence. Maistre is not so sure about the
naturalness of war. He is a benevolent man (to the extent an
ideologue can be), and asks himseir why man. who le blessed
with compassion, goes to rar
-with "a certain gladness" to kill
his brother."* Unlike Burke. Maistre confesses openly that
the fact of war torments him. He asks the basic questions or
.hy people (most certainly including Maistre, as will be seen)
ascribe glory to the military, why no nation seeks to break
out of the state of nature manirested by war, and why. most
importantly, God has never allowed man to attempt a "society
of nations."'^ T>,o,jgi it would seem highly unlikely after this
introduction, Maistre answers these questions in a way that
amounts to a nearly complete defense of war under existing
%aistre, Seventh Saint Petersburg Dialogue
. in Lively,
''orks Of Joseph De Maistre
. p. 245.
15
Ibid., pp. 248-249.
conditions. Men admire soldiers because they are unquestionably
worthy Of admiration, possessing such qualities as virtue, piety.
religion, pleasantness, courage, and inability to be hardened
even by "the terrifying sight of carnase...'^ „en look up to
soldiers because they are a superior breed of men. It appears
that Maletre has taken all of the favorable legends of the noble
knights of the past and applied them without diminution to the
soldiers of his time. As to ivhy there is war, Maistre gives
three distinct answers. First, a "truly national •,,ar". one
for the establishment or preservation of a nation, is completely
understandable. Such wars are, however, few in nu^^ber, and
certainly would never include, one nay assume, a war to throw
off the authority of the Bishop of Rome. Second, man often
goes to war because there is a "great law of the spiritual
world" which dictates that all animals, including men, should
kill one another. It is safe to assume that man is in this
lamentable condition because of his Original Sin. Had man not
disobeyed the ivill of God» he would not be stained by a blood
lust. The final cause of war is when man acts as an instrument
of God's justice; in such a situation "God comes forward to
exact vengeance for the iniquity committed by the inhabitants
Ibid
., pp. 250-25
U
^^Ibid., p. 246.
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Of this «rld against >^„..,19
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
course, to cases such as the war against the Jacobins.
Not only does Halstre see war as something r.an deserves
for his evil, but he also sees It as having beneficial results
for manldnd. He feels that a nation reaches its height only
after a "long and bloody" „ar. ,,hlch constitutes "an invisible
hand.
..continually pruning" the tree of the nation to ensure
Virtue and genius. 2° It may be assu!.ed that Maistre felt God
used ,ar as a way of eliminating the evil and the stupid. How
he could have believed this except as an act of blind faith
is, indeed, a real puzzle. It may not necessarily be the best
of the nation that die in war, but it is not necessarily the
worst either*
E. Imperialism In Maistre 's Theory. One does net find
in Maistre a treatment of imperialism such as one finds in
Burke. So far as strictly political authority is concerned,
the principle of national sovereignty is taken as inviolate.
This reaches the point of Maistre hailing the victories of rev-
olutionary France, seeing them as determined by God to preserve
the territorial integrity of France against the coalition of
allies which would have partitioned that country. It has
Ibid., p. 25^.
20
Maistre, Considerations On France, in Uvely, Works
Of Joseph De Maistre, pp. 62-63.
2U, . , .
been seen, however, that Maistre, in effect .mh.
' "
ii , embraces an imper-
lali.. far „ore
.weeping than that of Burke. The „oral sway
Of the Papacy is. or ought to be. entirely universal in its
.cope. The political leadership and the very customs of all
societies are subject to the authority of the Pape. To Maistre
therefore, the world ought to be one monolithic Catholic e.pire.
despite the national sovereignty he officially upholds.
It ,ould no, be well to compare the contents of these
two theorists- philosophies of war and the relationship they
have to the overall theories of libertarlanism and authoritar-
ianism. Burke, one may assume, does not like war. but sees
It as an omnipresent and unavoidable part of human existence,
and. therefore, does not make his disapproval manifest. It
is simply m the nature of the human creature to seek to get
his way through war. though this trait can be somewhat moderated
by the belief that one shares a common humanity with those against
whom he is nghtlng. This comes down to the belief that man
Is, as was seen in chapter two, a most mixed creature to Burke,
but one that can, within certain limits, act rationally and
fairly decently. The question of war or peace is, moreover,
in the hands of man. Burke does not seek to revolutionize the
environment man lives in, both because he takes It as a given
•nd because he believes it to be one permitting a reasonable
approximation of liberty. Very few wars are inordinately de-
structive of order and national life, and man Is, in the final
a human scale, and in dealing with it Burke does not see any
need to bring in philosophical themes directly.
Maistre, however, expressly brings in his central themes
Of evil and redemption when dealing with war. Had man not
sinned by disobeying hie Creator, the corruption of man's very
soul and the resulting v^ath of God, which are the causes of
war, would never have occurred. Man is, however, responsible
for wars only in a secondary fashion. Man's criminality led
to the establishment by God of the institution of war (note
the ex^dence of man's simultaneous power over God and. none-
theless, his uncroativeness), but individual wars are by no
means any outcome of man's deliberation, but are instead either
the results of the uncontrollable animal-like qualities of fallen
man or are the results of God's ;vill to destroy evil men. For
Maistre, however, war need not exj.st, and will surely pass away
when man ropents of his sins and subordinates himself to God
and to God's authorities on earth. The cure for the evil of
war, and all other evils, is acceptance of a rigidly authoritarian
society.
Chapter VIIT: Theories o-p r^ o^.i . Of Class Structure and Attitudes Toward
Social Mobility
The «ays in which BurRe and Maistre treat clas« structure
and social
.oMllty are indicative of their attitudes toward
society and change in general. These tv,o theorists lived In
an age not only of political revolution, but of a sodal rev-
olution that fueled the political revolution. Throughout Western
Europe, the middle class was beg1.nnine to feel its strength
and demand at least equality v;ith the historically Privileged
classes, and incidents like the Chartist Movement also bespoke
a stirring in the lower classes. No political theorist could
afford to ignore these facts, especially after the French Hev-
olution and the resulting world war blasted them into unmistak-
able view. To see how Burke and Maistre vl.ewed these problems
and sought to cope with then is the next order of business.
A. Burke's Perceptions Of Class Structure. As one might
expect from the general temper of Burke's views on politics,
he felt the class structure of a society to be rather complex.
At the top of the social structure was the aristocracy, but
the aristocracy itself was divided into two components: the
men of apparent merit and those of actual merit. As Burke put
it, contrasting himself »jith the Dulte of Bedford, a titled ad-
vocate of Jacobinism who opposed the granting of a pension to
Bur'ce,
..I,
.erita,
.hatever they are, are original and personal:
his arc derivative...^ It .ust be stressed that those of der-
ivative nerit, who are primarily the titled aristocracy, have
their rights to social and political importance secured by pre-
ccription and the right of property^, even when they are ignorant
and obnoxious pipsqueaks like Bedford. Burke's actions showed
that he felt the top political posts in the nation, certainly
including all cabinet positions, should go to this class. The
second echelon of the aristocracy, which certainly also included
a number of titled aristocrats (such as Lord Roc]d.ngharn, Burke's
patron and a man of great political ability), is the one into
which Burke places himself and people like him, commoners of
great political ability. ITnat the relationship is between the
commoners in this class and the class of aristocrats of derivative
merit above them is never rendered perfectly explicit in Burke's
theory. It is clear that these gifted commoners are to be ad-
visors, but are also to be more than advisors. They are not
to issue recommendations that may be heeded or not heeded, but
are to possess real power. Though barred from the highest posts
in the land by the lack of titles, they are to have their pos-
itions in government, and may (like Burke) even become important
officials of party and government. Submission to their betters
is, however, required of them. Burke always knew his place
^ Burke, A Letter To a rioble Lord, in Burke ' s Works
,
V, 199-200.
^Ibid.
, p. 209.
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in British society, and If he ever aspired to a cabinet post,
he never made this aspiration manifest or attempted to achi
it. Below the untitled aristocrats lie the middle class, amon
whom are the merchants. It would appear from Burke's v^itings
that these men are not to be members of the government, oven
in subordinate posts. Burke says of the French Estates General
that the merchants vdthin it "had never known anything beyond
their counting house, "3 thereby implying this to be poor trainin
for the business of government. Merchants are not, however,
entirely insignificant when it comes to politics. They may
have good ideas to give to the members of government, and it
may even be ^;ri.8e to solicit their opinions.^ Despite the con-
siderable wealth merchants nay have, the liquidity of which
makes them "the most effectively rich and great in society, "^
merchants as a class are to be both socially and politically
subordinate to the classes above them. A merchant naturally
has a vested right to all that he possesses, as do all men.
and may be a very intelligent fello;v, but the style of life
he leads denies him the time for reflection needed to govern
a state. As shall be seen later in this chapter, however, this
barring of merchants from membership in government does not
^B-jpi^e^ Reflections On the_ Revolution In France
, p. Zf9.
^Burke, A Short Account Of a Late Short Adminir.tratlon
.
In Burke ' s Works
.
I, 266.
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Burke, Second Letter On the Regicide Peoco , in Burke's
Works
,
V, 330.
neceBsarily extend to the sons of merchants. Burke is ambiv-
alent about the position in society of the lower classes. At
one point he declares that "no class or description of men-
is to bo excluded from county meetings discussing the subject
of Parliamentary reform^, and yet at another he quotes appro-
vingly Chapter Thirty-Eight, Verse Thirty-Three of the book
of Ecclesiastes as follows.
They (the common peopl^ shall not be sought for in public
counsel, nor sit high in the congregation: they shall not
sit on the judge's seat, nor understand the sentence ofjudgement; they cannot declare justice and judgement, and
they shall not be found where parables are spoken.
7
The harshness of this latter quotation may be explained by the
pressure Burke was under in attempting to eliminate the French
revolutionary philosophy, root and branch. He probably did
not intend to shut out the lower classes from government quite
as totally as one would think from the foregoing. The lower
classes are, nonetheless, subordinate members of society, due
to their intellectual and cultural inferiority. Their role
in society is not to govern the state (which is the prerogative
of the two classes of aristocrats) , nor even to express their
opinions on matters of government (v/hich right belongs to the
middle class), but to declare their unformed grievances. This,
of course, means that the lower classes do have a real, though
strictly limited, role in the governing of the state; they are
^Burke , Letter On Parliamentary Reform , in Burke ' s Works ,
VI, 296.
7
'Burke, Quoted in Reflections On the Revolution In France
, p. %,
un-
not merely hewers of v.ood and drawers of water. As will be
seen later, this, nonetheless, rather lowly status is not
shal!:eably passed down from generation to generation.
It has now been seen that what Burke viewed as the proper
society is pyramidal in nature. It has classes with varying
rights and responsibilities, and, by the nature of things, these
classes become more populous as one descends the pyramid. All
individuals are, however, valued members of society and have
a role in the governing of the state, for even the limited right
of the lower classes to express their discontents is important
for the functioning of government. Moreover, the dividing lines
bet\veen the classes are not totally distinct, nor are they impermeable
B. Social Mobility In Burke's Theory. Burke is aware
of the fact that people are able to rise from one social class
to another. This awareness stems from the fact that what Burke
advocates is essentially an aristocracy of talent, though a
noble title is taken to be presumptive evidence of talent.
Even the highest echelons of society are not barred to one of
common birth, for the power to ennoble a family alv/ays lay in
the hands of the king. Without it ever being specifically stated,
it is a fair assumption that Burke believed there was a right
for a talented man to advance socially. Burke himself purchased
a landed estate at Beaconsfield (going heavily into debt to
do so) and did not feel it presumptuous to hope that he and
his line would be ennobled for his services to the state. This
260
right of advancement does not, hov/ever, co.r.e automatically.
Those who are already in the top aristocracy have a right to
set the rules for entry. It is right that mobility into the
pinnacle of society should he rendered very difficult; Burke
says vdthout self-pity that he was forced to present his cred-
entials at many places along the road and that he was not "swad-
dled and rocked and dandled into a legislator."^ It was right
and proper that it should have been so, but once a man has passed
all the tests, his right to a title ought not to be questioned.
One of the few criticisms Burke has of the French aristocracy follows.
Those of the commons who approached to or exceeded the nobilityin point of wealth were not fully admitted to the ranlc
and estimation which wealth, in reason and good policy,
ought to bestow in every country, though I think not equally
^.-ith that of other nobility. The two kinds of aristocracy
^
\that of title ?.nd that of talent) were too punctiliously
kept asunder.?
This v/as objectionable both for the injustice of it and because
it turned the most important potential allies of the tiled aris-
tocrats into their bitterest enemies. This is not the proper
situation.
Everything ought to be open, but not indifferently, to every
man. do not hesitate to say that the road to eminence
and power, from obscure condition, ought not to be made
too easy, nor a thing too much of course. If rare merit
be the rarest of all rare things, it ought to pass through
some sort of probation. The temple of honor ought to be
seated on an eminence. If it be opened through virtue,
Q
Burke, Letter To a Moble Lord , in Burke '
s
7/orks, V, 193.
9Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In France, p„ 159.
let it be rejTiembered, too, that ^n.rtue is never tried butby some difficulty and some struggle. 10
It was necessary to give this fairly long quotation so that
the full flavor of Burke »s ideas might be transmitted. One
may assume that passage from the lower classes into the middle
class is simpler than passage into the aristocracies, both because
less talent is required, being primarily financial in nature,
and because the gate-keepers do not compose such a formidable
guild.
One problem of social mobility Burke does not consider
is that of downward mobility. It has already been seen that,
in regard to Bedford, he declares the position of the titled
aristocrats to be inviolate. This is despite the fact that
he realizes Bedford hardly has the intelligence or character
which would properly place him in the nation's governing elite,
if, indeed, his ennobled ancestor did, having received his title
for being a syncophant of King Henry VIII. The fact that Burke
always supported the custom of primogeniture^^ ^neans that those
fandlies which have once ascended into the ruling class probably
will not fall out again. A certain amount of social stagnation
is, therefore, provided for in what Burke considered to be an
eminently good social structure. Not only does this have a
tendency to derogate from the liberty, which Burke wished to
^^Ibid., p. 57.
Burke, Appeal From the New To the Old Whigs
, p. 85.
promote, of people to rise in the social structure, for one
can honestly ask the right of a piece of deadwood like Bedford
to judge the qualities of a man like Burke, but it also damages
conservatism, because it saddles the government v/ith incompetents
in its highest echelons. If Burke ever realized this problem,
he did not make his realization manifest, for to do so would
have been to question the vdsdom of hereditary aristocracy,
which was a central element of the British constitution. Never-
theless, this lack of provision for dovmward mobility must be
regarded as a major flaw in his theory of society.
C. Kaistre's View Of Social Structure. Maistre sees society
in a monarchy divided into king, aristocracy, and commons, mon-
archy being the most natural form of government and society.
At first glance this appears to be essentially Burke's view,
and surely there are great similarities, but there are striking
differences. First, to be part of the aristocracy in Maistre 's
estimation means to have a noble title. There is only one aris-
tocracy. An untitled aristocracy, which Burke forthrightly
declares to be a key element of society, is a contraaiction
in terras to Maistre. He who does not have a noble or clerical
title is, in law if not in fact, a member of a socially undiff-
erentiated mass. In Maistre 's estimation, a lawyer is, in the
eyes of the constitution, no more socially elevated than a peasant.
Burke, as was seen, was quite aware of the legitimate social
grievances of the top men in the Third Estate that helped fuel
?X->3
the French Revolution; Maistre, qatte obviously, was not. He
declares that a nation has all it needs to be happy in its an-
cient lav;s and customsJ ^ ^his cramps the complex social reality
of a nation into three somewhat artificial divisions corresponding
to those of the Estates General. The rights one possesses are,
moreover, strictly determined by which of these artificial div-
isions one belongs to. As has been seen in chapter three, the
rights of king and aristocracy are much more central to the
society than are those of commoners'"^, even though many nominal
commoners may well be richer, and conceivably more influential,
than many aristocrats. All commoners, regardless of actual
rank, have only the right to express their grievances, if such
is a traditional right in their society, v.lth their "betters"
determining what, if anything, is to be done about the grievances^
Maistre, as is usually the case v/ith ideologues, has become
so fascinated with formulas, in this instance that of a tri-
partite division of society, that he has been unwilling to ex-
amine the actual social reality the formula purports to describe.
Because of this, Maistre, in effect, ignores the existence of
the middle class, one of the major social realities of his time.
He, in other words, gives a reasonably accurate description
^Maistre, Study On Sovoreif^nty , in Lively, Works Of Joseph
De Maistre
, p. 128»
''Maistre, Considerations On France, in Lively, V/orks
Of Joseph De naistre, p. 77.
of the social structure of the early Middle Ages and sees it
as a reliable picture of eighteenth century Western Europe.
D, Social Mobility In Maistre's Theory. Though he may
not have been entirely happy with the fact of social mobility,
Maistre could not deny the existence of social mobility. It
became necessary, therefore, to explain this phenomenon in a
way that would not be too disturbing to the primarily ascriptive
society Maistre favored. At the outset, it is necessary to
limit the araount of social mobility by reserving certain offices
for certain descriptions of people, so that there might be
"mobility vathout chaos. "^^ Maistre feels, with good reason,
that the type of society he favors could not survive if men
had a right to aspire to all of its offices based on talent
alone. If nothing else, that v/ould eliminate the feeling of
awe for offices and office-holders that most men have and that
is so essential for holding the society together. Consequently,
it is important that social mobility not be looked upon as some-
thing that a man can claim as a matter of right. The first
way in which social mobility takes place is for a king to lift
a family into the aristocracy. ^ Unquestionably, this is done
as a reward for great personal merit or for service to the nation
but the key consideration is that only the king knows the criteri
^^Ibid
., p. 91.
^
^Maistre, Study On Sovereignty , in Lively, Works Of Joseph
De Maistre
, p. ]16.
he uses, and he is answerable to nobody (except God, of course)
for the selections he makes. No man is really able to act in
a fashion that will unerringly improve his chances for ennoble-
ment, nor can he complain if he is passed over. In this way,
social mobility v/ill take place without needless disruptions
or jealousies, as long as the people accept the legitimacy of
learlnff the decision for mobility entirely in the hands of the
king. There is another way in v/hich social mobility takes place.
Maistre, after all, had to be aware of the fact that some in-
dividuals and families rise in the social hierarchy (though
only unofficially, as was seen in Part "C") with little or no
assistance from the king, as through success in business, for
example. If Maistre admits this really takes place through
individual effort, the ground\vork has been laid for a compet-
itive society, something Maistre ^vishes to avoid. His solution
to this dilemma follows. It is asserted that a talented man
will somehow reach his predetermined place in society, and that
society ;vill, furthermore, reject a man who is dangerous to
it.^^ This shows again Maistre 's mystical conception of society.
Society is a living organism, a mind, that recognizes those
individuals who ought to be advanced, and casts off those in-
dividuals who are as poison to it. It is permissible to believe
that the controlling intelligence in this process is that of
God. This method of explaining social mobility is even preferable
^^Ibid., pp. 12Zf-125.
to the first from Kaistre's point of view, in that it leaves
nothing to any man, not even the king. The two methods are
not, ho^,ever, contradictory, in that in the first the king also
acts for God, The second method, nevertheless, puts every person
on notice that no ambition of his can possibly affect ids standing
in the social structure. If one is destined for advancement,
no endeavor need be taken to bring it about, and if failure
is one's lot, no amount of striving vail alter the fact. A
better formula for social rigidity and stagnation could hardly
be imagined. Man's fate is in no way in his own hands, and
so he had best accept the best of all possible worlds.
The problem of dov/nv/ard social mobility, which was not
considered in Burke, was, after a fashion, considered and solved
in Maistre's theory. It has already been seen that society
repels those who would endanger it, and there is no reason to
believe this refers only to those who are attempting to ascend
to the top of the social ladder, and not to those who, through
inheritance, are already there. It is both unjust and foolish,
therefore, for lower social classes to envy and hate those in-
dividuals above them, for if they remain on their elevated perch,
they do so because of the blessings of God, and if it is right
that they be pulled lov;, man has not the power to do this, but
God unquestionably does, and shall. It would be well at this
point to remember Maistre's quiet opposition to the attempts
of his fellow exiles to force the coming of an anti-Jacobin
counter-revolution in France.
In summing up this chapter, it would have to be said that
in it the two theorists have shown well their penchants toward
the philosophies I have called conservative libertarianism and
conservative authoritarianism. Burke is perfectly willing to
see the class structure of his society as largely fluid, with
no sharp lines of division marking the border between the top
of one class and the bottom of that just above it. Nevertheless,
there are classes, and the class to which one belongs has a
great deal to do with the rights one may claim in the governing
of the state, though not v/ith one's rights as a human being.
The class to v;hich one belongs is, moreover, largely, but not
entirely, determined by one's ability. It is proper that one
seeking to rise into the governing elite be subjected to a rig-
orous, and often harsh, cross-examination, and that one whose
family has already so ascended be permitted to keep his position,
regardless of his own personal attributes. A central consider-
ation, hov/ever, is that in Burke's theory the attributes equipping
one to rise in the social structure are generally marked out,
and should one possess these attributes and pass the initiation
he is required to take, he may then claim upward social mobility
as a matter of irrefutable right. With ability and perseverence
,
the humblest man in the state may make his way to the top i.vithout
owing his success to the undeserved favor of any man. In the
case of Maistre, however, social classes are divided by very
sharp lines of separation. If one has not the title of aristocrat
or priest, he is assigned to the vast pool of the commonality,
whatever his objective social standing may be. Furthermore,
not only are one's political rights strongly affected by one's
social class, but one's rights as a human being are as well.
Malstre has a strong tendency to let the common people escape
his purview completely. Finally, the class to which one belongs
is ultimately determined by God. One cannot, therefore, see
his lot in life as social injustice, since men have little or
nothing to do with it, and one must accept his place in society
with humble resignation. Divine authority, which determines
social strata and their membership, is not to be questioned.
Chapter IX: The Nature Of a Constitution and Its Significance
For Liberty
A. Burke's Ideas About the Nature Of Constitutions. In
order to understand what Burke meant by a "constitution", it
is first necessary to recapitulate briefly some of the points
of Chapter Three on how the state is initially established. The
foundation of government, and hence of the constitution, was
originally in the hands of the people, for "At some time or
other, to be sure, all the beginners of dynasties were chosen
by those who called them to govern,"^ By "those who called
them to govern", Burke clearly means the body of the nation.
As was seen in Chapter Three, Lockean ideas about a formation
of government by popular consent are very alive in Burke's mind.
This launciiing provides only the most primitive constitution
for a nation, and is joined to two other constitutional elements,
one prior to the primitive act of constitution and one follovdng
upon it. In reference to the latter, it must be said that the
laws of a state, especially the most fundamental laws, become
added to the original constitution. In the case of Britain,
this would mean that such documents as Magna Charta, Petition
of Right, Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement of 1689
had become parts of the British constitution. It v/ould have
been surprising if Burke, who, albeit somewhat unwillingly,
^ Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In France
, pp. 16-17.
had been trained as a la;vyer, had not seen written lawc as very
important elements of a constitution. The profession of a lawyer
is, of course, that of the explanation (or distortion) of written
laws. Had this been all Burke meant by "constitution", his
would have been a mundane enough view. There are, however,
two somewhat more abstract meanings of "constitution" in Burke's
theory. The constitution of a nation derives from the char-acter,
morals, and traditions of the people, and has a reciprocal effect
upon the people's character, as in the case of the Anti-Popery
Laws which, by denying Catholics the right to own land, were
felt by Burke to have encouraged dissipation and immorality
among the Irish Catholics,^ The fact that a constitution is
immanent in the character, morals, and traditions of a people
means that the constitution is somehow uniquely suited for the
nation, and therefore cannot be established based only on what
are felt to be universal principles of good government. Univ-
ersal principles do, nevertheless, have a place in this abstract
meaning of "constitution," As was seen in Chapter Four, a law
(or a constitution) depends on general principles of justice
and good government for its legitimacy. This gives a cosmic
quality to constitutions. They are, whatever their somewhat
mundane origins and legislatively-conceived components, part
of God's design for the well-being of all manlcind and of individual
2Burke, Fragment Against the Anti-Popery Laws, in Burke '
s
Works
.
VI, 351-353.
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nations. As Burke feels is true of the state as a whole, so
for him is the constitution in part sanctified. It is not entirely
clear just how the sacred and non-sacred elements of a consti-
tution are to be reconciled. All constitutions, since they
come somewhat from the hand of God, Who is the Creator of man's
character and looks after him, must be deemed somewhat worthy
of respect. Nevertheless, a people can somehow lack freedom
in its natural constitution and traditions, as Burke, who never
much liked the French, felt to be true of France. It would
appear^ therefore, that the glorious and the debased and the
divine and the human coexist in uneasy combination in every
constitution. For those countries that lack freedom in their
natural constitutions, Burke offers no easy or quick solutions.
This is because a constitution is the result of a slow process
of development, and cannot be made for a country overnight.^
Though, as was seen, the written constitution of a country
Is very important (for Burke would be the last man to underrate
the importance of Magna Chart a) , the constitution represented
in the character of the people in general and of the office-
holders in particular is the more decisive for the well-being
of a nation.^ It was seen that Burke decried the corruption
England brought upon Irish character, and at a later point in
^Burke, Fourth Letter On the Regicide Peace , in Burke '
s
Works
,
VI, 61.
^Ibid.
, p. 62.
his career he viewed Jacobinism as seeking to maintain itself
in power in France by abolishing all morals and seeking to corrupt
the youth of that country through all manner of "corporal grat-
ification."5 cpj^^^.^ therefore, a strong linkage between
a corrupt political constitution (such as that of Jacobin France)
and a corrupt populace, and presumably also between a healthy
political constitution and a morally upright populace. Though
this is not a novel concept, being the central concept of Mach-
iavelli«s Prince and Discourses (There is no evidence that Burke
borrowed the idea from these sources.), it is nonetheless im-
portant for an understanding of Burke's theory of the nature
of constitutions.
B. Maistre On the Nature Of Constitutions. Maistre's
ideas about the nature of constitutions are simultaneously simpler
and more abstract than those of Burke. l(Vhereas Burke saw con-
stitutions emerging from written laws, national character, and
the will of God, Maistre admits the existence of only the final
two. A constitution cannot, or ought not to be, 'ATitten, be-
cause it is a diTine work, and because ijvritten lav/s may be ab-
dished, but fundamental laws cannot be. This contempt for
the written word is one of the chief characteristics of Maistre.
He declares that Plato, "who is always the first on the path
^Ibid.
, pp. lO/f-105.
^Maistre, Generative Principle Of Political Constitutions ,
in Lively, V/orka Of Joseph De Maistre, p. 1i+7.
to all the great truths", was correct in saying that one can
get only the appearance of wisdom from written discourses, and
that, furthermore, one of the chief errors of Protestantism
is its reliance on the written word of God, the problem being
that even in this case writing is not animate and can neither
defend itself nor hide itself from those who should not see
it. The overpoweringly authoritarian aspects of the last part
of this statement need hardly be belabored. A constitution
is a governing device which springs full-grown from the brain
of God at the moment of a nation^s birth. This takes place
in two ways. First, much of the constitution of a society is
the direct work of God, without any intermediary. It may be
assumed that these constitutional elements stem from the period
when, Maistre believes, all men were under the direct rule of
Sod in some sort of State of Wature (see Chapter Three). Any
law must derive from a superior will if it is to be obligatory^,
and so, naturally, the law of laws (the constitution) must derive
from the most superior of wills. The constitution does so in
an indirect manner also. "The fundamentals of political con-
stitutions exist before all written laws", because, as Maistre
says in regard to England, "The real English constitution is
the public spirit" (a declaration with which Burke would agree)»^
^Ibid .. pp. 156 and 158.
^Ibid., p. h8.
^Ibid., pp. 149-150 and 151.
Since God is the Creator of a society's public spirit and nat-
ional character, tliis contribution to the constitution repre-
sents God working at one remove. A ^vritten constitution is not
only objectionable because of its failure to convey vdsdom,
but also because ±z is weak, and by being we ale it endangers
the existence of the state. ''^ This is probably because the
very act of writing laws, especially fundamental laws, gives
men the mistaken belief that they are truly masters of their
fate, thereby causing people to doubt the sanctification of
the constitution.
Attempts to reform the constitution are not acceptable.
This is both because such is questioning the work of God, which
is obviously unacceptable, and because every constitution has
faults basic to its nature and inseparable from it.^" How in-
trinsic faults can e:d.st in an entirely divine institution is
a very good question. It is probable that Maistre is trying
to doubly protect the constitution from tampering. First of
all, one ought not to touch the constitution with profane hands
because it is an ark of the covenant. Secondly, if unquestion-
able defects in the constitution *s design are perceived, these
still exist for the good of man (a case in point being the sale
of judicial offices in pre-revolutionary France, v/hich resulted
^°Ibid., p. 151.
^^Ibid., p. 167.
in the establishment of an independent judiciary) ^ 2, and one
should never attempt repair of them, even if the divine plan
incorporated in them is not apparent.
C. The Relationship Of Burke's Views Of Constitutions
To Liberty. Burke's ideas about constitutions are that con-
stitutions are a mixture of flexibility and rigidity. The or-
iginal constitution of every state is, as was seen, the result
of the free choice of the populace, who set a direction for the
society by choosing a king. Though this power to create a gov-
ernment is one that Burke feels ought to be handled very gin-
gerly and applied only as a remedy for intolerable provocation,
the fact that the original constitution arose as a result of
popular \'n.ll gives the people, at least in theory, a substantial
say over their constitution. Naturally, however, this is no-
thing like a total say. Burke was no populist, and never claimed
to be one. The power of any man or group over the constitution
is, in two ways, severely limited. First, no constitution worthy
of the name may depart from the universal principles of the
Natural Law* This may certainly be viewed as a strong defense
for the liberty and morality of a society, but it definitely
derogates from the freedom of a society to shape its constitu-
tion as it chooses. There is a God-given element to every con-
stitution that it is beyond human power (or at least right)
to alter* Another fact giving a degree of rigidity to consti-
^^Ibid.
, p. 169.
tutions is the connection between a nation's national character
and its constitution. This is ambiguous as far as freedom it-
self is concerned, as opposed to the freedom to change one's
constitution. If a country is blessed vn.th a national character
conducive to liberty, it would be almost inevitable that its
constitution would reflect it, and if some conspiracy should
be hatched to rob the land of its liberty, it vrauld face over-
whelmingly hostile odds. All this is to the good so far as
liberty is concerned. There Is, however, another side to the
coin. If a country, due to immorality or slavishness in its
national character, lacks a free constitution, it will be ex-
tremely difficult to give one to it. There is, therefore, a
strong resistance against change in national character, and
this will, for good or ill, be reflected in the constitution
of the particular country.
The fact that every constitution has a large component
of written laws is of major significance for the relationship
of Burke's theory of constitutions to liberty. A flexibility
ie injected into the whole notion of a constitution. Bui'ke
had too good a feel for the history of his land to think England
was under the sane constitution as it was in 1066, 1215» or
even 1689» The constitution of a nation is, in part, an evolving
reality, because written laws affect the constitution, because
national character (which does change, though slowly) affects
the constitution, and because written laws and national character
reciprocally affect each other. This results in giving the
people, through their representatives, at least some measure
of continuing control over the content of the constitution.
The constitution is not set in concrete for all time, nor is
its content entirely beyond human control. This dictates eternal
vigilance on the part of people in a country blessed with a
free constitution, for subversion is always possible, as almost
happened to England in the 1760«s and 1770 's, and yet hope is
held out to unfree countries, for passage of laws can improve
the character of the people and permit a slow transformation
from slavery to freedom. The constitution is a framework through
which the best of a nation's laws and traditions (certainly
not all lav/s and traditions) are to be conserved in the name
of liberty, and in which such new laws and traditions as are
amenable to liberty and the best of the original constitutional
design are to be incorporated.
D« The Effect Of Maistre's Constitutional Ideas On Lib-
erty. The reason why Maistre's constitutional ideas are less
amenable to liberty than are those of Burke is that what Burke
sees as the foundation of the constitution is to Maistre the
entire constitution. Both believe all constitutions must rest
upon the rock of God's law, v/hich necessarily makes them that
much less amenable to human will. God's law has, however, al-
ready been seen to be a freer concept in Burke than in Maistre,
the latter seeing it as dictating obedience to almost all acts
of almost all governments. In contrast to Burke, Haistre sees
all of a constitution as being God's law. This makes it all
well beyond the control, or even conceivably the understanding,
of man. A further point in Maistre that derogates froa liberty
is the very scope he gives to the constitution. Not only is
a constitution unquestionable in its entirety, it is also limit-
less in the ground it covers. Since written laws are very lowly
regarded by Maistre, the only exception being the Ten Command-
ments, v/hich v/ere written by God^-^, quite literally every law
in a society is part of the unwritten code of the constitution.
To Mai.stre, a constitution is an ethereal de^/ice living with
its Creator up in heaven and comprising the society's entire
laws, traditions, and life. Also deriving from the belief that
lav/s should not be written is the fact that, unlike Burke, Maistre
does not see the constitution as an evolving mechanism. If a
country is free by tradition, "free", to Maistre, being a syn-
onym for Ultramontane Catholic, this freedom is secure forever,
barring temporary abberations like the Protestant Reformation
or the French Revolution. If, hov/ever, a nation is not blessed
with liberty, not only can it not be given liberty overnight
(which Burke conceded), but it probably cannot be given liberty
at all. Nor can liberty, in all likelihood, evolve. This is
because national character, which both Burke and Maistre feel
has an unavoidable connection \irith the content of a nation's
constitution, is either not amenable to change in Maistre^s
theory, or does not change as a result of human actions expressed
in laws or anything else. It is. therefore, an article of faith
with Maistre that a nation represents an unalterable phenomenon
with a changeless national character, changeless laws, a change-
less constitution, and a changeless government. It is so until
the nation dies. It was probably this belief that led Maistre
into absurdities such as believing England could not "really"
be Protestant, and would ultimately reconvert to Catholicism.
It may be seen, in summation, that the two theorists*
views of constitutions fit closely into the philosophical con-
structs of conservative libertarianism and conservative author-
itarianism. For neither is a constitution something to be
created, destroyed, or amended capriciously. It is for Burke
a document including within it (among other things) much of
the best of the vdsdom of both God and the nation. For Maistre,
it is a phenomenon that, ideally speaking, exists only in the
mind of God, and yet is very real and reflects the perfect wisdom
of God, Burke, the practical politician, sees a constitution
ae something that, though doubtless deserving of decent respect,
exists primarily in order to be used to arrange social and pol-
itical relationships in the most acceptable possible manner.
Maistre, on the other hand, sees the constitution as something
before which one should burn incense and feels its very exist-
ence justifies it. Man has some control over the constitution
in Burke and none in Maistre.
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Chapter X: The Meaning, Value, and Goal Of History
A. Burke's Definition Of History. As should be eminently
clear by now. Burke sees two participants in the affairs of men:
God and man. This is also true of his view of history. It shall
be seen somewhat later in this chapter that God exercises a final
say over the history of a state, but it is also true that the human
mind is still "the proximate efficient cause" of a state's history.^
The human mind acts upon history in two ways, by creating a nation's
traditions (for Burke believes historical traditions to be man-
made and the result of constant incremental activity by men) and
by acting within the normal political world (These two naturally
overlap.). This second point shows that practically anything can
change the course of history.^ It is likely that Burke, in his
less modest moments, felt that he did just this during the French
revolutionary crisis, and he was probably correct. History is,
therefore, a cooperative endeavor betv/een all generations of men
and God. All men can make their contributions to the building
of history, v.-ibh God overseeing the project to make sure it turns
out right. History is, consequently, a developmental process to
which man makes major contributions, and one whose final results
are necessarily good.
^ Burke, First Letter On the Regicide Peace, in Burke * s V/orks ,
2Ibid
. , p. 235.
The Relationship Between the Individual and Hictory In
Burke »s Theory. One can «ee from the foregoing that Burke sees
the indiTidual (at least potentially) as having a somewhat lim-
ited, yet real, role in the judging «f history. A nation* c trad-
itions are to be respected, as they are the creation of many gen-
erations and of God. Respect is, however, not idolatry. Since
history is in large measure the product of the reason of Bore or
less ordinary human beings, human beings are somewhat free to de-
teraine whether a nation's traditions do serve, or ever did serve,,
the ends of just government. Reform is, therefore, an expected
part of the life of a state.
One should, however, be very cautious about undertaking re-
farm of a nation's historical traditions, since they are such a
great coiipendiuin of political knowledge. History is properly a
subject of very intense study, because such study can give to one
the accessary understanding to (possibly) carry out reforms. Con-
sequently, it is entirely illegitimate for an individual to crit-
icize his country's historical traditions from a theoretical per-
spective, as the Jacobins did, but a criticism based en a keen
historical understanding may be proper, since the reason in history
1b, at least largely, human reason.
C. Maistre's Definition Of History. A very different view
ef history is found in Maistre. He adheres to the belief that
"God is the universal moving force"^ in history, as in all else.
^Maistre, Fifth Saint Petersburg Dialogue , in Lively, Works
Of Joseph De Maistre
, p. 231»
The independent role man in history is essentially zero, since,
thougk God may u«e man as a tool and man may even be able to flaunt
the ifili of God in the short run, God provided to each state at
its inception all it needed in the line of traditions and customs.
MaiBtre nay, therefore, in striking contrast to Burke, be consid-
ered anti-hifitorical, for a state would neither have had nor have
needed a history if its people had not sinned by departing from
God^s perfect pattern. History is completely under God's control,
with men operating within it only by His sufferance, and is, more-
over, entirely a record of man's corruption and divorce from Gcd,
History is that which happened after man's fall from grace.
D. Maistre's View Of the Role Of the Individual In Regard
To History, Maistre feels that it is permissible in one way for
the individual to judge the content of history, but it is impersiiss-
ible in another way^ It stands t© reason that ae person may judge
the original historical traditions ©f his country, since they are
a creation cf God. Reform is this regard is campletely unaccept-
able^ and the atheistic desire for such reform is ©ne of the card-
inal sins *f the eighteenth century. NTevertheless, a certain form
of judgement ©f history is proper. History is no source ©f know-
ledge, contrary to what Burke felt, and S9 history as a whole may,
and should be,, judged and condemned. The only learning that one
can gain from the study of history Is the evil consequences of
departing from the path of God, this departure being the starting
point of human history. History has the one value that is said
t© «^d)3ftr« to a thoroushly depraved individual, that of serving
as a bad example. Only in the sense of the abolition of depar-
tures from God«8 original pattern can reform be permitted, thj.s
abolition naturally culminating in the abolition of history it-
self. Such is, of course, a sweeping refora, but it is also the
final one.
E. A Controvsrsy Over Interpretation Of Burke. Those who
haye written on Burke disagree on the important question of whe-
ther
» in Burke »e philosophy, the goal of history has been realized
er whether it is yet t» be realized. Iti order to deal with this
question, it is necessary to ascertain first if history has a goal
t* Burke. Host writers on Burke have answered this question in
the af firisative; Mansfield is an exception and declares that Burke
felt there to be no fixed goal or nature for Ean.^ Burke 'a own
writings give support to the view that there is a goal for maa.
First, there is a Divine Providence that works within hicztory.^
This does not directly state that history has a goal, but it does
render such at least plausible by showing history t© be something
other than a record of the activities of mere men. A stronger sugg-
estion that there is a goal to history was given during the French
Harvey C. Mansfield, Statesmanship and Party Government :
A Study Of Burke and Bolingbroke (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1965), p. 257.
^Burke, Sr^eech On Reconciliation With the Colonies , p» lifO,
Revolution, ^vhen Burke referred to prudence, the proper guide of
statesmen, as being "formed upon the known march of the ordinary
providence of God."^ To say that God's providence is on the march
iirplies it is on the march to somewhere, especially since Eurke
did not tend to be sloppy in his logic, A more concrete indicator
of Burke»s belief in a goal of history is, unfortunately, not avail
able, since Burke only rarely made his philosophy explicit. One
must instead lock to Burke's life and actions, where the feeling
is gained that Burke saw himself as striving to bring history to
its proper goal. Ke saw himself as God»s servant resisting such
abuses, be they slavery, tyranny, or anarchy, as ran contrary to
God's desig-n for man.
Ifow that e-t/idence has been presented in favor of the view
that Burke sees history as having a goal, one must ascertain if
he sees this goal as lying in a return to the past, as having been
achr'.eved, or as lying in the future. Despite Burke's laments over
the world's 1 o ss of grace in his last years, the first poss-
ibility raa^r be disposed of easily. Burke was no reactionary.
He had "cAs eyes open to both the good and the bad of the past.
The second possibility has its devotees and is not so easily nor
entirely disposed of. Sabine says that Burke had a strong influenc
on Hegel, an idea which, due to Burke's great popularity in nine-
teenth century Germany, cannot be entirely dismissed, and that
Hegel expanded Burke's ideas of history by pointing out theoret-
^Burke, Second Letter On the Regicide Peace, in Burke ' s Works
ically history»s evolutionary quality.^ Fro. Vnls it follows that
Sabine saw Burke's theory of history as non-evolutionary. Cobban
takes Sabine's view a step further. He says that Burke had a "thor-
oughly conservative political philosophy", and that "Burke's version
of Locke turns out to be merely a justification in theory of the
methods of the Vfnig oligarchy."^ There could be no room for hist-
orical evolution in the theory of a man who was just a theoretical
Jiistifier of Whiggery (and of not even the most up-to-date Whiggery).
For such a man, existing conditions would provide all for which
man could ever hope. This was not the position of Burke, save,
as will be seen, for his views of social structure. Though he
was a V7hJ.g and did not doubt the value of traditional '/.Tiig prin-
ciples. Burke felt one of the most important of these principles
was that of rational reform.^ It has already been seen in this
chapter that Burke saw God's providence as being on the march.
As Parkin says, Burke feels that "The higher reason is disclosed
in the historical process. "^'^ The word process hints that history's
goal is yet to be achieved. Though one may be reasonably cer-
tain that this controversy over the nature of Burke's histor-
ical theory will not soon cease, the correct view appears to
7Sabine, A History Of Political Theory
, p. 619.
gCobban, Burke and the Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century
,
pp. 3k and 59.
q
Burke, Appeal From the New To the Old Whigs
, pp. 47-^+3.
^^Parkin, Moral Basis Of Burke ' s Political Thought, p. 11 8.
be that, despite some tendencies t© the contrary, Burke was
a progrecsivist with regard to the relationship of change to
the improvement of man. Though change is not necessarily im-
provement, improvement is both possible and necessary..
F. The Meaning Of "Progress" In Burke's Theory. It has,
I hope, been reasonably well established that Burke was a be-
liever in progress, which thereby refutes the view of Cobban
who caw Burke as divorced from the major thinkers of his age
by the fact of not believing in progress. It is, nonetheless,
true that "progress" aeans something different to Burke than
it does to, say, Bolingbroke, Progress is definitely not the
throT-Tlng off of enslaving traditions, both because Burke did
net believe traditions t© be iiecessarily enslaving, and because
even if they were, they wculd be so much a part of national
character that it would net be possible to remove them without
great effort over a long jjeriod ©f time, probably ages. Prog-
rees does not sean the establishment of new moral codes to re-
place the ones of the present time. Burke felt oorality t©
be founded upoa religion, and for that reason was very ill-
inclined to tamper with the bases of morality. The moral teach
ings of his tine were felt by Burke to be fully adequate to
any genuine progress. T© the extent that progress was impeded
by the actions ©f men, it case through not adhering to the dic-
tates of religion. Progress required not the destruction ot
religion, but its enhancement. Burke agreed with social critic
such as Rousseau that progress required the moral liberation
of man, but such liberation required man to be religious to
the fullest possible extent.
Burke also saw progress in a more down-to-Earth sense.
Science has a great deal to contribute to progress, as long
as it does not attempt to infringe on the moral sphere. 'Wien
science, or what shallow thinl-.ers deem to be science, is placed
above morality and religion, disasters like the French Revol-
ution must occur. This is because "Speculators ought to be
neutral" toward questions of morality. ^ ^ A separation is thus
established between science and morals. Progress is available
in both, but in science it can come only through alteration
of principles, which is not acceptable in morality. It is,
in fact, necessary for the principles of science to change,
though this generally occurs in a gradual manner, building UT)on
the scientific discoveries of the past. It must, furthermore,
be added that, unlike the cases of moral and (as will be seen)
social progress, Burke does not seem to believe that scientific
progress has any final goal, either in his o^-n time or in the
distant future. Burke never gave his readers reason to doubt
that he understood the potential of science for improving the
life and well-being of man, and in this he may be. said to have
shared the optimism and enthusiasm of his age to the fullest.
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It is necessary at this point to consider Burke's ideas
on the social aspects of progress. It would, of course, not
be correct to say that Burke is a thinker opposed to social
progress, for his sincere opposition to slavery needs little
reiteration. Nevertheless, the abolition of slavery (which
is to be an ultimate, and not an immediate, goal)^'-is as far
as Burke is willing to go in social changes involving an entire
class of people. Though social mobility for individuals is
definitely to be permitted (see Chapter Till), Burke appears
to feel that social progress would reach its limits with the
abolition of slavery. The best example of this view cor.es in
Burke's only work devoted solely to economics, in which he says
"The laboring people are poor because they are numerous. "^^
Since the government could never have the right to tamper with
the laws of economics by decreeing a minimum wage, and since
employers would be ill-inclined to pay their workers more than
they had to (keeping in mind their religious responsibilities
to their fellovraen)
, it stands to reason that the great numbers
of the laboring class would, through competition for jobs, keep
their salaries dovm. Burke did not, however, see poverty as
entailing misery, for he felt that even in time of real privation,
the moral duty of charity would prevent great suffering. Burke,
1 ^
"ftirke, Sketch Of a liegro Code, in Burke ' s Works
,
VI, 258-259.
^Burke, Thoughts and Details On Scarcity
, in Burke '
s
Works
,
V, 134.
therefore, sees the social classes of eighteenth-century England
as being permanent realities. Large-scale social change has
come to aa end,
G. Burke»s Ideas Of the Goal Of History In Relation T«
Liberty. These aspects of Burke's theory are simultaneously
supportive of and detrimental to liberty. One who wished to
establish a new theory of morality, especially ©ne not based
upon religioa, would not be free to do so. However, Burke was
aware that not all was right with society morally, and strongly
urged increased moral uprightness on people, both for its own
sake and as a necessity for liberty. Science is, at the saaie
time, encouraged and restricted. Scientific inquiry has an
honored place in Burke's theory, in that it is seen as cantrib-
utisig ta the progress and well-being of man. Burke, further-
more, sees no time limit upon what science can accomplish.
Scientists must, nevertheless, have a properly humble under-
standing of their place in society. Ne more than any other
en may they seek to subvert the ethical foundations of society
•r act as self-appointed saviors of their fellowmen. Also,
Burke's view of the future of class structure has tkls same
double-edged effect on liberty. Any man is free to rise as
high in the social structure as his abilities will carry him,
but he is not free to question the legitimacy of his social
structure, if it conforms to that of England. Finally, it nay
be said legitimately that Burke's belief that history's goal
lies in the future does, whatever restrictions are placed upon
progress, aake a desire for prosrees permissible. One may be-
lieve, therefore, that Burka's ideas about history's goal have
a rather mixed effect on human liberty.
H. Maistre's Ideas About History. In Kaistre's theory,
ene finds little thought of history as a sphere ia which sec-
ular progress is possible. Unlike Burke, Maistre is not some-
what skeptical about science, but is downright hostile to it.
Science can be useful to society mainly by giving arguments
to support the conclusions of authority, but must be "put every-
where in second place"^^ to the Church. Very little indepen-
dence was, therefore, granted to science, and it was to be under
Continual close inspection to nake sure it did not get out of
hand. Under such circumstances, it would have been strange
if science in a Maistrean society had contributed much to prog-
ress, for science needs a substantially free hand t© pursue
its inquiries if it is to reach profitable conclusions. To
Maistre, however, science does not exist in order to reach con-
clusions and aid temporal progress, but to serve as a prop for
tbe existing (Catholic) order. Science, therefore, d®es not
exist for the sake of scientific progress, and has nothing t©
contribute to any advances of the historical process.
^Wst re, Generative Principle Of Political Constitutions ,
In Lively, Works Of Joseph De Maistre , p. 166.
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Social progress is also in an uncertain position in Maistre.
His opposition to slavery is as great as Burke's, in that he
praises the Papacy greatly for aiding the abolition of that
InstitutionJ5 This abolition takes place through the upgrading
of man's morality, which leads one to believe that by "slavery"
Maistre does not mean only the ovmership of one man by another.
No doubt the abolition of slavery in its usual sense was felt
by Maistre to be great social progress, but the "slavery" that
Maistre is most interested in is that which is spiritual in
nature and stems from the moral degradation of man. Th?.s "slavery"
can be ended only by bringing all Protestants (and conceivably
other non-believers as well) back within the Papal fold. The
abolition of property in human beings is the only social prog-
ress Maistre is really willing to accept, and one may assume
that the very phrase "social progress" would have been hateful
to hi»a. It cannot be said that Maistre advocated a freezing
of the social status quo, for, as was seen in Chapter VIII,
the social structure of his time, v/hich included a wealthy and
influential bourgeoisie, was not congenial to him. This is
one part of Maistre 's theory in which he may be properly termed
a reactionary. The social structure is, if possible, to be
taken back several centuries by forced march, to the days when
the entire society could (Maistre believed) be explained ade-
quately on the basis of three estates, with the clergy being supreme.
15
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I. The Meaning Of "Progress" In Kaistre's Theory. A«
has already been seen, "progress", to Maistre, does not
what it means to many of his contemporaries. Maistre ^s "prog-
ress" does not involve a move to a new style of living, in either
a eecular or (most certainly) a spiritual sense. Very paradox-
ically, Maistre, who despised individualism and made ceaseless
war upon it, sees progress as involving a fundamental spiritual
revolution in every individual, which will then be manifested
by the seciety as a whole. Progress is, in other words, pri-
marily a philosophical concept to Maistre. It comes not through
scientific advances or through social reforms, but through the
purificatioa af one's soul. The soul is purified by having
all individuality and all doubts about authority (especially
the authority of the Church) removed from it. This part «f
Maistre 's theory aust stand as further proof of the fact that
ke was in much of kis thought a Pfeilcsophe of the extreme right.
The rarified atmosphere and abstract nature of this theory of
progress can hardly be over-emphasized. It could only be the
idea of & mystic who had systematically cut himself off from
the world in which he lived and had then decided that he would
reshape the world he had deserted in keeping with the philos-
ophy he had created or embraced.
J\ The Goal Of History and Its Relationship To Liberty
In Maistre* 8 Theory* The idea of thero being a goal to history
bulks rather larger in Maistre 's theory than in Burke's,, and
the goal is nore explicitly described. As w«s related in Chap-
ter III, political society is a very mixed blessing in Maistre's
eyes. If man had not disobeyed his Creator and poisoned his
soul, political society, which exists only to repress man's
penchant for evil, would not have been required. The end of
Kan's rebellious nature, which will take place as soon as man
abases himself before God and God's Cliurch, will have far reachin
effects oa the very nature of huBan existence* All diseases
and "natural" catastrophieo (which, to Maistrs, are not rooted
in nature at all) will certainly cease to assail man, since
thee© are sGiae ©f the forms Qod»e punishments of sin take.
War will pass away and there will bo no need for society's in-
stitutions to operate in a coercive nanner, since men will no
longer have to be coerced to do that which is right. It is,
• f course, not to be thought that this Utopia is what the average
person would deem a "free" society. T!!ose things which render
man's life miserable wi.ll vanish because all men have agreed
!• abandon their individuality and te subordinate themselves
to a corporate society ruled by a benevolent (in Maistre's est-
imation) but authoritarian Church. History will, therefore,
reach its goal when all individual liberty has been effaced
from the earth, and union of man with God's will is realized.
It can be said in summation that, with Burke's restric-
tions on what might be deemed historical progress (such as his
unwillingness to allow science t© move to front-rank importance
in the state and to permit massive alterations of the social
structure over time), Burke's theory still allows for a large
measure of liberty in the historical process. The day of reck-
oning is, first of all, pushed into the distant future, which
makes it no hindrance to the day-to-day actions of men, and
it is, furthermore, viewed as aiding the increase of liberty.
Maistre's theory Is certainly not like that. Salvation may
come at any hour, thus preventing a business-as-usual approach,
and consists of the extinction of human liberty (which is not
seen by Maistre as being true liberty).
Chapter XI: Attitudes Toward Utilitarianism
The responses Burke and Maistre have to Utilitarianiera are
important indicators of the direction of their thoughts. It is
necessary, first of all, to give a brief treatment of what Util-
itarianiem is. Utilitarianism^ in its Benthamite articulation, ie
the view that virtue consists in the fulfillment of human wants,
and that the goal of the state or society should be to promot© "the
greatest happiness of the greatest number." Utilitarianism is, furth
...that principle which approves or disapproves of every action
whatsoever according to the tendency which it appears to have
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest
is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words,
to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action
whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a pri-
vate individual, but of every measure of government.
^
It can be seen immediately that there are two points in Utilitar-
ianism that are antithetical to any sort of Conservatism: first,
the stress on the needs and desires of the human being as the focus
of morality, and second, the majoritarianism of the phrase "the
greatest happiness of the greatest- number." It was seen in Chapter
One that Conservatism is inclined to view morality as stemming
from some source other than human beings, scud furthermore believes
the majority to have no special claim to rights or consideration.
Veremy Bentham, An Introduction To the Principles Of Morals
and Legislation, in Edwin A. Burtt, ed., The English Philosophers
From Bacon To Mni (New York: Random House, 1939), p. 792.
Government is to serve the needs of all the people. In the cases
of Burke and Maistre, therefore, it is not a matter of asking whe-
ther one or both of them embraced Utilitarianism, for had either
of them done so his adherence to Conservatism would have been ren-
dered highly questionable, but instead the extent to which Util-
itarian ideas were accepted and rejected, either consciously or
unconsciously, by them,
A. Burke On Utilitarianism. As is the general case in his
writings. Burke dees not write specifically on the philosophy of
Utilitarianism. It is, therefore, necessary to glean from his
writings such references as seem to apply to the subject, and from
them to deduce what Burke's organized attitude toward Utilitariani
would have been, if he had articulated one. During the nineteenth
century, it was a common misconception that Burke was some sort
of Conservative Utilitarian, and MacCunn continues this error and
expressly praises Burke for his lack of abstract thinking.''' It
is probable that this mistake stems from a misunderstanding of
BurkG*s concept of "prudence", and froir. a misunderstanding of the
nature of Utilitarianism. If "Utilitarianism" meant only that
government was to serve the needs of the people (a not astonishing
declaration). Burke would indeed be a Utilitarian of sorts, but
the notions of "prudence" and "utility" are not to be confused.
Counting of heads and solicitation of opinions have nothing what-
ever to do vn.th the determination of prudence. To some extent,
John MacCunn, The Political Philosophy Of Burke, p. 46,
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Burke himself is responsible for this confusion, as in his Speech
On Conciliation With the Colonies, where he declares that Merica's
pceitiori in the struggle ^^th England must be taken as a fact of
life, whether that position be factually correct or not. because
the A.^ericans see it as correct.^ One may assume that Burke took
this approach because he did not want to burden himself with un-
necessary philosophical questions. This was, after all, a political
speech, not a philosophical disputation. Nevertheless, Burke did
believe the arguments embraced by the Americans to be valid, and
it was their validity, not the fact that the Americans had embraced
them, that led to Burke »s willingness to embrace them as part of
the empirical v/orld. Surely such tolerance was never shown to
the theories of the French revolutionaries, and would not have
been even if the theories had been backed by the entire French
population (As has been seen, however. Burke saw this latter rev-
olution as a conspiratorial coup, not a genuine popular revolution^)
.
This lack of tolerance of the French theories is because, in Burke »s
estimation, a given action must adhere to certain bsisic orinciples
(in essence those of the Natural Law) if it is to be deemed "pru-
dent". Usefulness, or (if one will) utility, is a derivative quality
in Burke, and it is derivative not from popular election, but from
its relationship to the law of God. Burke reverses the Utilitarian
formula which says that what is good for the people (by decision
of either individual or majority) is therefore moral; Burke, on
^Burke, Speech On Conciliation V/ith the Colonies
, pp. 70-71.
the contrary, believes that that which is moral must be good for
the people. As in so many other things, Burke descends fron heaven
to earth, whereas the Utilitarians ascend from earth to heaven.
In a somewhat misunderstood phrase, prudence is "the god
of this lower world. This quotation has gained wide circulation
am.ong students of Burke and has been seen as attesting to his high
regard for prudence, and yet what is less often commented upon
is the implied derivative status of prudence. If prudence is the
god of "this lower world" [emphasis min^, it, like all else, must
take its cue from the higher world, that of faith and religion.
Prudence is ultimately a religious doctrine to Burke, and, there-
fore, whether or not a given activity of men can be deemed prudent
can be deduced unerringly by examining it against the moral law.
That which is spiritually good is necessarily empirically good,
net the reverse (as in Utilitarianism).
This points up an additional difference between Burke and
the Utilitarians, namely Burke's unwillingness to set up a mech-
anical calculus of good and evil. To Burke, unlike many of his
contemporaries, the good is that wMch is the law of God, not any-
thing stemming from an earthly basis. That which is good does
promote the well-being of men, but its justification lies in it-
self, and not in any of its consequences.
It should now be eminently clear that Burke was no Utilitarian
of any sort, and in fact by the logic of his theory was required
^Burke, Letter To John Farr and John Harris , in Burke ' s Works,
VI, 226.
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to reject Utilitarianism. There are, ho^vever, degrees of rejec-
tion, and one can still be somewhat influenced by a philosophy
he rejects. To get a clearer understanding of Burke »s feelings
toward Utilitarianism, as opposed to mere acceptance or rejection
of it, shall be the next order of business.
Without specifically mentioning Utilitarianism (and probably
without even thinlcing about that philosophy), Burke unambiguously
repudiates its majoritarian bias. Burke believes all men to have
certain God-given rights and believes that there is a mutuality
of rights and duties between citizen and society. In An Avpesl
l£2^ the New To the Old Whigs . Burke declares that, contrary to
the views of the new Whigs, the majority may not alter the contract
of society and government as it sees fit, since this contract is
binding upon all; furthermore, the majority can have no say over
moral concerns, and power ought not to be vested in the multitude,
since this v/ould prevent the limitation of power. ^ It is obvious
that the populist aspects of Utilitarianism are completely rejected
by Burke. What the majority, or even the multitude, feels ought
to be done or is in its interests, is of no special consequence
whatever. The moral laws of the universe are not subject to a
show of hands. Quite apart from the immorality of the majority
claiming authority over the contract, is the fact that the majority
itself is a creation of the contract. The concept of "majority"
is simply a legal fiction, because people in a State of Nature
^Burke,. An Appeal From the New To the Old Whigs
, pp. 93-9Zf.
can have no corporate existence.^ For the majority to be granted
the right to question the contract (which, in Burke's view, sets
the basic goals and moral structure of the society) would be to
permit the majority to destroy itself. It is, therefore, not only
immoral for the majority to be granted control over the contract,
but also logically impossible.
Burke certainly agrees vd.th the Utilitarians that the needs
of the people are the goals of any just society, and yet he differs
from them as to what these needs are and how they are to be deter-
mined. It has already been seen that the majority is not able
to determine its needs or those of the society. The average person
just lacks the intelligence to determine what his needs are, except
in the most mundane cases. The people are to be ruled for their
own good by those who are more intelligent and talented than they,
though the people are to have some measure of control over their
rulers. The people, however, have only limited control over the
determination of their needs. It is, of course, also true that
the rulers have no free hand in determining the people's needs,
as they are also bound by the moral lav/ and can declare no needs
in contravention of it, nor violate those embodied in it.
The needs of people are two-fold in nature. First are the
purely physical needs: food, shelter, clothing. These obviously
require no choosing, as they derive (with the possible exception
of clothing) from man's nature as an animal. These needs arc not,
^Ibid., p. TOO.
however, to be provided for by the government (as the Utilitarian
"greatest happiness of the greatest number" doctrine might imply).
They are to be provided for by negDtiaticns between buyer and selle
wha, cognizant of their interrelated interests, vdll strike a mut-
ually acceptable bargain.*^ The higher needs of the human being,
those dealing with something other than mere physical survival,
may have some relationship to government. This relationship, how-
ever, is only a tenuous one, in that the government* s role is only
to provide the minimum climate necessary for other institutions
(such as a Church, the family, etcetera) to establish the nobler,
more civilized, needs of man. Government has only the negative
function of providing the conditions under which the positive func
tiorus can be implemented by others*
It can be seen, in contrast to the Utilitarian view, that
no strongly individualistic approach is evident in Burke, Though
the needs that are to be fulfilled naturally serve the needs of
the individual, they are neither chosen by the individual nor im-
plemented through him. The impulse is toward meeting corporate
needs and working through corporate organizations to meet needs
that the individual is not really free to accept or reject.
Yet another reason why Burke rejects the individualism of
Utilitarianism is his tendency to reject the egoism that often
goes with it. The individualism of Bentham must be as obvious
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as the non-individualism (but not anti-individualism) of Burke.
Burke sees the interests of every individual being served best
through serving the interests of the community. Though Burke rec-
ognizes that egoism may be a socially useful force, and for that
reason should not be scorned, he is never really comfortable v/ith
8it. Selfishness, whatever its practical justification, is still
selfishness, and is thus both a vice and less than rational. Bentham,
on the other hand, declares: "The interest of the community then
is—what? The sum of the interests of the several members who
9compose it." Burke lauds the morality and rationality of the
community interest, and Bentham, in effect, denies that there is
such a thing.
What all this means for the nature of Burke's theory is that
he is simultaneously more libertarian and less libertarian than
the Utilitarians. He expressly denies the right of the individual
to determine his own needs and act upon that determination, and
yet he does feel the individual does have needs v;hich should be
met. These needs, however, cannot be treated as exclusive of or
contradictory to the needs of society. In fact, the needs of one
cannot be treated apart from the needs of all. If libertarianism
has something to do v/ith individual freedom of choice, Burke's viev/
must be considered less libertarian than the Utilitarian alterna-
0
^Ibid
. , pp. Iif0-1/4l.
Q
Bentham, Princi-nles Of Morals and Le -^islation , in Burtt,
The English Philosophers From Bacon To Mill
, p. 792.
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tive. There is, nevertheless, another side of the issue that re-
quires examination. As was seen, Utilitarianism lays .-reat stress
on the needs of the "greatest number", thereby making conceivable
the total forfeiture of the needs of the minority. This is a pos-
ition that could easily justify slavery, and is one that is totally
abhorrent to Burke. Based on his belief in the moral equality of
all men, it is as unacceptable to sacrifice the needs of the min-
ority to those of the majority as it is to do the reverse. In the
society Burke favors, all must bo free, and so a democratic tj^ranny
is but little better (if at all) than an autocratic tyranny. The
needs of all are to be valued equally, as all the most important
needs are ultimately granted by a benevolent God. This is surely
nothing if not a libertarian belief. Further, Burke does not accept
the Utilitarian belief that the government can be used to pror.ote
the needs and freedom of the people, or the majority. He holds
instead to the Conservative Libertarian belief that doubts the
efficacy and safety of government action. In Burke own words,
"It \the governmen'^ can do very little positive 'Tood.'''^ Far from
being used to improve the lot of the people, pjovernment should
be restricted so that it shall not make unwarranted invasions on
liberty, as it has an omnipresent tendency to do. The state is
to be limited in the name of freedom.
It can be seen that Burke's theory is a direct mirror image
of that of Utilitarianism. Where he is corporate, It is individual-
1
0
""Burke, Thoughts and Details On Scarcity , in Burke' s '.Vorks ,
ietic, and
-/here he is at least somewhat individualistic, it is
corporate. Utilitarianism sees needs as individually determined
and implemGnted through and by the state, whereas Burke sees needs
as determined either by nature or by one's corporate associations,
and Implemented both by one's non-political associations and by
the individual. There can be little doubt that Burke's theory
is irreconciliably opposed to that of Utilitarianism.
B. Maistre On Utilitarianism. A somewhat different situation
is found in Maistre. Naturally Maistre is at least as little enam-
ored of Utilitarianism's atomistic theory of needs as is Burke,
To Maistre, it is entirely impossible, absurd, and even heretical
for people to seek to determine their own needs, both because they
necessarily lack the ability to do so and because all of a nation's
true needs are embodied in its God-given unwritten constitution.'^
Man has no right to even think about what his needs might be, for
this is tantamount to questioning the wisdom of God. A further
reason why this is so is that the greatest need of any nation is
1 2
order, Maistre is, with some justice, convinced that order canno
be reconciled with a continual questioning and debate about tnari^s
needs* One of man's chief needs, therefore, is not to be troubled
about his needs. They are permanently provided for, at least as
long as the divine equilibrium is not disturbed by man. Faith and
patriotism are also very great social needs, neither being an ob-
Maistre, Considerations On France , in Lively, V/orks Of
Joseph Do Maistre
, p. 80»
^
-Ibid.
, pp. 89-90.
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ject of human choice, but instead aspects intrinsic to any func-
tioning system. Still another great need for every man is the
external coercion that can cone from the state. There is no poss-
ibility of a person rising to his proper moral level unless the
state (and other institutions) coerce him.
After all this is said, Maistre comes out with a statement
that it is difficult to reconcile v/ith the foregoing. He declares
"The best form of government for each nation is that which, in
the territory occupied by this nation, is capable of producing
the greatest possible sum of happiness and strength, for the greatest
possible number of men, during the longest possible time,"^' Has
Maistre become a Utilitarian? If so, that revelation ivould come
at a rather late date in this work, and since it has been seen
that Conf^ervatism and Utilitarianism are mutually exclusive, would
badly damage the thesis expressed. Of course Maistre is no Util-
itarian, but it is still necessary to come to grips with the above
quotation. Just what did he mean? It would seem that the best
answer, that which v/ould do the least violence to tho tody of Maistre'
s
thought (It is best not to impute contradiction to a theorist un-
less definitely required to do so.), is that Maistre feels the state
that meets the requirements he set is that which adheres to its
natural constitution, and hence subordinates itself to the laws
of God. The suggestion of a right to experiment in government
' Maistre, Study On So verei gnty
, in Lively, vyorks Of Joseph
De Maistre
. p» 12G»
forms thereby entirely vanishes, and this Haistrean "Utilitarianism
is shown just to bo a matter of terminology that Maistre picked
up during liis pre-Pevolution "radical" period. This is not to
say that Kaistre vns being ;d.llfully deceptive, and it is there-
fore necessary to try to understand why Kaistre was apparently .
vidlling to accept a state which served the needs of less than all
of its citizens, which (as was seen in Chapter One) is an apparent
contradiction of Conservatism. The answer would probably be that
Maistre, vrith very great reluctance, was willing to read out of
the human race such compulsive violators of the moral law as the
French revolutionaries. They are so divorced from the laws of
God that their needs cannot be met in any organized and civilized
society. It has been seen that Maistre»s solution to the problem
of these people is that they should die. The society is, however,
to serve all others* needs.
Tho last great need of man is his need to understand his
place in the world. This place is one of extreme subordination
to both political and (especially) moral authorities. If a man
does not accept this subordination, he will give way to the pAyl
of pride (which is, in Maistre's estimation, the mother of all
sins) and thereby bring upon himself all manner of horrible (tut
deserved) sufferings, both spiritual and physical.
Rather significantly, Maistre (unlike Burke) is not even
Vvdlling to consider the economic requirements of life as being
among man's needs. Burke felt these were needs and were to be
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settled by asreement in the marketplace. Maistre could not be
obli^^icu8 to the physical needs of life, but he ivas unwilling to
even raise the question in his discussion of needs, possibly in
fear that an opening would be given for economic protest. It can
be ass-^ed, however, that Maistre would favor the relieving of
genuine distress through individual charity, for he was not a
heartless nian.
How are these needs to be achieved? Here Maistre approaches
somewhat nearer to the Utilitarian point of ^rLew than does Burke.
Man's needs are to be impleraented by a complete mobilization of
all of the institutions of society, spiritual, political, and social.
Man is so naturally rebellious that any less of an activity will
cause him to embrace his false needs in place of his true ones.
For the sake of humanity, this cannot be permitted. Working through
govermnent to bring about the realization of raan»s needs is q-aite
proper. Naturally, in keeping v;ath the essence of Maistre' s thought,
the key institution for forcing man to accept his needs, that in-
stitution which orders all the others, is the Catholic Church.
In thiis small part of his theory, therefore, Maistre may be looked
upon as an Ultramontane Catholic Utilitarian. If this sounds like
an. incongruous arrangement, it is only because it is.
Maistre takes Burke's non-individualistic theory of hiunan
needs one huge step further. That which is rational has nothing
whatever to do vidth the choices of men, either singly or in their
mass. To Burke, the desires of the individual are not the total
30S
Judge of rationality; to Maistre, they arc no judee at all. In
another departure from Utilitarianism, Maistre 's claim that he,
like Burke, judges the rationality of a strategy or practice based
on the results which occur from it, is shown to be false. The
best example of this is Maistre 's attitude toward Protestantism,
to which, at a time when he saw Europe at war ^^dth "a real prac-
tical atheism", he was unwilling to grant the slightest shred of
legitimacy in the common cause. At a time when England was the
bulwark of the anti-Jacobin crusade, Maistre was confidently pre-
dicting that country »s conversion to Catholicism. This had to
be offensive to British sensibilities and dajnaging to the alliance.
Kaietre determined a priori that only that which furthered the
cause cf Catholicism could be productive of good results (and thereby
rational), and v/as unvdlling to depart from this belief to help
save Christianity. Maistre was as good a Philosophe as one could
have hoped to have found in the Jacobin camp. Once he had fastened
upon a first principle, he v/ould pursue it to the end, come what
may. ks must be evident by now, Maistre 's response to Utilitar-
ianism had a fundamental inflexibility that was not present in Burke.
Thin was true notwithstanding Maistre *s contention that the
best state is that which promotes the greatest happiness and strength
of the greatest number. Maistre, as a strong Ultramontanist , de-
termined in advance what constituted "true happiness", and like
so many other ideologues v;as, despite (or perhaps because of} great
personal benevolence on his part, willing to spread fire, sword.
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._nd misery throughout the v/orld so that true reason and true happ-
iness might be achieved. One may safely assume that Spain was
a happier country before the coming of the Inquisition, but sin(
true reason and true happiness were possible only through the ti
religion, any loss of false happiness could not count for much.
Maistre's reason, or unreason, is essentially the same as that
of the Jacobins. Both of them feel that what ought to be, which
is the only reason and happiness, must be realized regardless of
cost, and anything less than this can be permitted only a very
transitory existence.
Maistre's relationship to Utilitarianism is an ambiguous
one. He believes that the important needs have nothing to do with
aiding the individual as individual. If the true needs of the
entire society are met, the actual needs of the individual vn.ll
also be met. Individualism itself is very far from a real need,
and is actually the death of all real needs. There is obviously
none of the arithmetic approach of Utilitarianism in this. On
the subject of implementing man's needs, however, there are some
decided similarities between Maistre and Utilitarianism. Once
man's needs are determined (though Maistre and Utilitarianism de-
termine, them in very different ways), they are brought to fruition
in similar ways by the two theories. There are no necessary lim-
itations on the executive pov/er of government in either theory.
The government may fairly be used to bring man's needs to fulfill-
ment. That this may indeed be a threat to the individual is something
of no consequence to Maistre and something overlooked by the Util-
itarians*
C, An Analysis. It is worthwhile to end this chapter vdth
the question of who is the closer to Utilitarianism, Burke or Maistre,
and what this means for their theories. It has already been seen
that neither one is a true Utilitarian, and the reasons for this
need not be reiterated* Surprisingly, or perhaps not so surpris-
ingly, Maistre, the Authoritarian Conservative, is somewhat closer
to Utilitarianism than is Burke, the Libertarian Conservative.
The idea of an activist state, which is unpleasant to Burke, is
not so to Maistre. Maistre is willing to use the state extensively
to bring about the establishment of a just and ideal society (though
the components of this utopia differ greatly from those a Qtilitarian
would suggest), which, on the subject of implementation, is not
all that dissimilar to the approach of Utilitarianism. That this
similarity exists may tell as much about Utilitarianism as it does
about Maistre.
A study of Burke's views on Utilitarianism shows both the
existence and the limits of his libertarian beliefs. He is unv/illing
to allow man to determine his ovm needs (at least in any v±tal
sphere of life), and yet he is also unwilling to allow the state
to be the prime mover for the needs of the people, out of fear
of what this could do to the liberty of both the individual and
society. Burke's theory is, therefore, simultaneously more and
less libertarian than that of Utilitarianism. No such partial
libertarianisrr. is found in Maistre. He rejoctc the libertariai
aspects of Utilitarianism, like Burke, but unlike Burke accept;
(consciously or unconsciously) those aspects of Utilitarianism
favorable to an authoritarian theory. The verdict of this cha-
Eay, therefore, be to underscore the fact of Burke's qualified
libc-rtarianisrc and of Maistre' s qualified authoritarianism.
312
Chapter XII: The Legacy Of Burke and Maist:
It has been seen throughout this dissertation that Burke
and Maistre represent substantially different solutions to niany
Of the problems of man, society, and government. The question
which must now be considered is what the importance of these two
thinkers was, for history, for Conservatism, and for political
theory. Naturally, these three spheres of inquiry necessarily
overlap each other.
A. The Significance Cf Burke. The effects of Burke on history
were quite striking. There is little doubt, for example, that
his opposition to George Illtg attempts at royal influence had
a real tendency to rally the Whig Party against this threat, and
thereby to pave the way for the modern British constitutional
monarchy. Just what the political development of England would
have been without Burke's substantially successful campaign for
Parliamentary independence and dominance is difficult to kno-:.
There is, however, good reason to believe that England's history
would have been far different if she had been ruled by a kin,^
with wide influence, or even dominance, over Parliament.
Allied to this endeavor of Burke was the intellectual ra-
tionale he gave to political parties (The details of his argument
need not be recapitulated.). It would, of course, be foolish
to say that political parties would not have developed if Burke
had not written Thoughts On the Cause Of the Present Discontents
,
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for proto-political parties had developed before he entered Par-
liament, but Burke's contribution to this development was to make
party membership an un-self conscious allegiance. Burke's friend
Oliver Goldsmith could jokingly say of him, in a game Burke's
club once played of thinking of humorous epitaphs for the members,
that he had "given to party that which belonged to mankind", but
the significant historical contribution Burke made in this regard
was to show that the needs of party and mankind could be recon-
ciled. Had Burke, or someone else, not made and openly declared
this discovery, it is doubtful that political parties, which might
have led a guilt-stricken existence, could have arisen to the
position of prominence they hold in the contemporary British pol-
itical system.
Burke's historic influence stretched across the Atlantic
Ocean during the period of the American Revolution. There can
be little doubt that Burke (along with Pitt, Rose Fuller, Rockingham,
and others) did much through his political opposition to hinder
the British war effort. It would be going too far to suggest
Burke was a decisive factor in the British defeat, for in this
war the British were laboring under enormous military and logis-
tical difficulties, but he did, nevertheless, make successful
conclusion of the war for Britain much more unlikely.
The most important historic contribution of Burke certainly
concerned the French Revolution. In this crisis, he (at the outset
almost single-handedly) rallied a British populace, which was
originally inclined toward temporizing with the menace, to a spir-
ited defense of the British constitution and of Western civiliza-
tion. Historical post-diction is always an extremely hazardous
undertaking, but it does seem that Burke was quite correct that
there was no basis for peace between England and revolutionary
France. Had England not embraced an anti-Jacobin crusade, or
had not done so in time, there is good reason to believe that
France might have won the war. If the new French principles had
triumphed (even in their Bonapartist manifestation), it is obvious
that the very basis of Western civilization would have been rad-
ically altered. If a universal Jacobin French empire had emerged
in the late eighteenth century, it is hardly likely that the world
as we know it today could have emerged. '.'Aether this would have
been a good or a bad thing is, of course, a matter of interpretation.
As one would expect of a crisis of this magnitude, the French
Revolution worked changes on the partisan political makeup of
England, v.dth Burke playing a central role in these changes.
It was seen earlier in this work that Burke abandoned the 'iiHiig
Party because of this catastrophe (after that party abandoned
its principles). He also took a large proportion of the Wliig
Party v/ith him into the Tory Party, thereby leading to a long
period of Tory dominance. During the forty years after Burke
crossed over to the Tories, the Whig Party was to be in power
in England for but two years. Consequently, Burke was reviled
ever after by the Whigs as a traitor, and hailed by the Tories
as a savior. An interestins side-effect of Burke's (and many
of his fellow m±ssn removal to the Tory Party was probably,
somewhat paradoxically, to weaken the authority of the king over
that party, and thereby over the British political system as a
whole. This is so because when a person goes from one party to
another, he does not leave behind all of the marks of his origins
The party of the "King»s Friends" was, consequently, somewhat
transformed.
Burke's effects on Conservatism were no less significant
than his effects on history. It may be permissible to see him
(with Maistre) as being one of the fathers of organized Conser-
vatism. Before these two men began thinking about the nature
of society and politics. Conservatism existed only as a series
of scattered threads here and there, not as an integrated fabric.
It may be said that it was Burke, who slightly pre-dated Maistre
in his writings, that first made Conservatism conscious of itself
This was definitely his effect in Germany (and fairly generally
on the continent), as v/e learn from Peinhcld Aris.
A history of political thought in Germany in this period of
,
transition and ferment (that of the French devolution and
Bonaparte, would be incomplete if vie did not consider the in-
fluence which Burke exerted upon German thinkers. This in-
fluence can indeed hardly be overestimated. None of the pol-
itical philosophers, with the sole exception of Rousseau,
forced the German thinkers to re-define their political views
to such an extent, nor opened such fundamentally new aspects
as did Burke. In one respect his influence even surpassed
that of Rousseau. Rousseau never formed a political school
in Germany, whereas Burke became the spiritual father not
only of the Romantic and the Historic schools but also
Ubera?ian!t
'^^'^'^^^^ developed after the war ;f
It was Burke who turned Conservatism from a nostalgic longing
for the "good old days" or a desire to maintain the status quo
into a coherent set of principles to which men of intellect could
rally. That they did rally to this standard was seen in the above
quotation from Aris. Burke was the pace-setter not only for Con-
servatism as a whole, but (as was seen in Chapter One) for a par-
ticular type of Conservatism, Conservative Libertarianism. As
such, he may be looked upon as the spiritual forebear of such
modern thinkers as Frank Meyer, '.Villiam F. Buckley, Jr.
,
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Goldwater, and others.
As one would expect, the emergence of an articulate Conser-
vatism fostered by Burke worked changes in the nature of polit-
ical philosophy. Before Burke, political discourse had for quite
a while tended to be divided between those oriented primarily
to the past or the status quo by impulse, and those "progressives"
who pointed the way to a future based on humanism and individual
reason* Naturally, the "reactionaries" were usually poor compet-
itors for the "rationalists" in an age rather entranced by "reason"
and so where rationalism was defeated it was usually by force
of arms, not ideas. This reached the point where Catherine the
Great, autocrat of all the Russias, fancied herself a philosophe
^Reinhold Aris, History Of Political Thought In Gt>rmany ,
From 1789 To l8l5 (London: George Allen and Dnwln, Ltd., 1936), p.
and had a bust of Voltaire in her palace! Burke introduced a
new element into the equation of political discourse, and by doing
so altered the nature of this discourse, though, as was seen in
Chapter One, some opponents of Conservatism insist upon identi-
fying it vath a status quo attitude or reaction. Such is, how-
ever, an honest or dishonest mistake. It may not be too much
to say that the advent of developed Conservative philosophy ra-
ther decisively altered the nature of the universe of political
philosophy. No longer could the "Enlightenment" claim sole own-
ership of thought. The fact that the "Enlightenment" and its
contemporary heirs, in their pure form, lost the unchallenged
intellectual mastery they once had and became v;hat they often
are today, a hesitant, uncertain, and compromising doctrine, may
be to some degree the result of the effective intellectual chall-
enge Burke and his Conservative successors made to it. A king
rules less confidently when there is a pretender to the throne
with forces in the field.
B. The Significance Of Maistre. The same basic format used
for examining Burke's importance shall be used for Maistre: he
shall be scrutinized as to his effects on history, Conservatism,
and political philosophy in general. It shall be seen that Maistr
importance has unfortunately been deemed to be less than it really
It is true that Maistre, at least in comparison with Burke,
never wrought any direct influence of importance on history.
He never held any political office where he could influence the
events of his time in any meaningful way. As a propagandist for
the anti-Jacobin cause in Switzerland he probably did something
to boost the spirits of his fellow refugees, but there was really
nothing especially decisive about this. Most of Maistre's mature
political career was spent in Russia as the representative of
a trivial power, in which position he was quite unable to influ-
ence the course of events of history. Though this is rather par-
adoxical in the case of a man who so hated philosophers, it must
be said that Maistre's significance would have to be considered
wholly philosophical. As a political figure, Maistre is almost
completely obscure.
His importance for Conservatism is, hov/ever, striking.
If Burke was the spiritual father of Conservative Libertarianisra,
Maistre had the same relationship to Conservative Authoritarianism.
As should be quite clear by new, the main philosophical themes
of Conservative Authoritarianism (complete subordination of the
individual, infallible implementation of the moral law by an earthl
institution, etcetera) are present in Maistre. The strange thing
is that Maistre's importance for Conservatism has not been rec-
ognised even by those, such as Bozell, who consciously or uncon-
sciously follow his teachings. Whether the debt is acknov/iedged
or not, however, Maistre's virtual creation of an entire Conser-
vative philosophical school cannot be denied. >Vhat Conservatism
would have been if it had not been a multiple birth is difficult
to say, but the fact is that Burke shared the duties of midwife
with Maistre.
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In political philosophy as a whole,. Maietre has been a
Y«ry neglected figure. I hope it has become apparent by now
that Maistre was the architect of several important concepts
that decerre Bore treatment than they hav* received. Certain
of hifi insights, such as that of the tendency of power to grav-
itate to one institution, within every society, are of first-
rate iaportance for Kaistre^s time and our o'jm. This leads,
then, to the question why Maistre has been such a neglected thinker,
There has never, whatever its real debt to liim, been a school
of txhought that proudly bore Maistre ^s name. One answer prob-
ably is that Maistre nearer wanted to be viewed as an indepen-
dent thinker.. His hatred for theory is quito obvious, this
hatred stenming from his belief that to ponder the nature of
society and the universe was tantamount t© a divorce frora God
and frcta God»s Church. Despite this, however, Maistre was as
independent thinker. When a raan says he is not a theorist, it
ay be reasonable to believe hiis and ignore his written evidence
t» the contrary. Some of this happened with Maistre. Another
factor that aay well contribute to the slighting of Maistre
is that his hoaaeland was an unimportant power in world affairs.
One's ideas are always more likely to receive a hearing if they
are trumpeted from center stage, rather than from the wings.
What would have happened to the reception of his thoughts if
Plato were born a Scythian instead of an Athenian, or Burke a
Savoyard instead ©f a subject of Great Britain? It is an un-
fortunate tendency of man to look for the great thoughts in the
great countries* Further, Maistre was a Catholic thinker, and
there might have been a tendency, for that reason, to feel he
was speaking only to Catholics. It is not really a coincidence
that Maistre 's chief popularizer in the United States was Orestes
Brownson, after he embraced the Church of Rome, I do, neverthe-
less, believe that Maistre has something to say to all people.
A final consideration that may incline people to disregard Maistre
is the tendency of some writers (such as Laski) to see him as
a forerunner of Fascism, and hence as a trivial thinker. Fascism,
after all, is a creed \vhJ.ch is proudly anti-intellectual and dis-
counts the value of thought. Fascism is, as far as any movement
can be, a creed Vvd-thout a creed. If Maistre were a precursor
of Fascism, therefore, it would be quite correct for political
philosophy to eschew examination of the political theory of a
man ift-ithout a political theory. It should be evident by now that
Conservative Authoritarianism and Fascism, whatever their super-
ficial similarities may be, are definitely distinct and often
sv/eepingiy different philosophies, and consequently this last
argument is not a good reason for hesitating to consider Maistre
the founder of a major school of political philosophy, and to
give him the degree of intellectual scrutiny which follov/s from
this position. I truly hope that one feature of current political
philosophy will be to take a second, or even a first, look at
Count Joseph De Maistre, and not to ignore him as has so often
been the case in the past.
C, Conclusion. The legacies of Burke and Maistre may be
seen collectively as Conservatism. Before their time, Conserva-
tism was a fugitive doctrine, existing in bits and shreds among
thinkers, some of whom possibly would not have thought of them-
selves as Conservatives, and spoken of in whispers, if at all.
Burke and Maistre, as it were, took Conservatisri out of obscurity
and into the bright daylight. Intellectual respectability could
no longer be confidently denied to Conservatism, though many have
tried to do this. After this initial point, however, the legacies
of Burke and Maistre diverge. At the same time that Conservatism
was born to a new and vibrant self-confidence, it was also born
to the di. vision that marks it to this day. As is good Conserva-
tive doctrine, one can only understand the future of an institu-
tion, a society, or a philosophy by understanding its originso
To speak of the effective origins of Conservatism is to speak
of Sdaund Burke and Joseph de Maistre, the founding fathers.
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